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PIRACY: AIR AND SEA*
JACOB W.F. SUNDBERG**
INTRODUCTION
THE STIGMA OF THE TERM
ANY contemporary problems arise from the belief that words
generally, and legal terms particularly, must have an inner
meaning, just like children must have parents. The truth is
the opposite. Legal terms have no meaning except in relation to
their practical context. The understanding of a legal term means
only that one realizes how to use it in communication with others.
The terms "pirate" and "piracy" are the topic of the present in-
vestigation. Today, they carry with them a stigma ready to be
exploited in a divided world characterized by agitation, propaganda
and psychological deep-motivation. They are indeed invaluable as-
sets in the game of name-calling. But do they mean anything in the
legal world?
Certainly, they did not have the same stigma from the start. The
Greek word "peirates" simply meant an adventurer. Adventurers
are often no angels and, indeed, such a famous adventurer as
Ulysses did, in perfect innocence, many things which today seem
criminal.' Even if associated with Ulysses' most horrid deeds, how-
ever, the words are still very far away from the almost universal neg-
*This article was prepared for publication in BASSIOUNI AND NANDA (EDS.),
A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (in print, 1972) and is published
herein with the kind permission of the author and the editors.
** MR. SUNDBERG is a Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Stockholm.
He received his law degree from the University of Uppsala, his LL.M. from the
New York University Law School, and his doctorate in law from the University of
Stockholm. He has authored numerous law review articles in the areas of Air Law,
Criminal Law, Private Law, International Law, and Jurisprudence. His books in-
elude: AIR CHARTER: A STUDY IN LEGAL DEVELOPMENT (1961); ON THE LIABILITY
FOR VICE IN LEASED GooDs (1966); and THE CHANGING FAMILY LAW-STUDIES ON
MARRIAGE AND SOCIAL SECURITY (1969).
1. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, Book IX, 40 (A.T. Murry ed. -).
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ativism which is today coupled with them. Having developed
through the years into names for exceptionally horrible people and
acts, the terms have acquired such a negative emotional appeal that
one is apt to question why.
Much of this appeal, presumably, comes from such books as Marr-
yat, The Pirate and the Three Cutters (1830's), chapter nine of
which describes in frightful detail the practices of the pirates of Cap-
tain Marryat's active days at sea. Some of the appeal, probably, has
another source as well. One should not disregard the handing down
through the generations of the traditions of antiquity, even if the per-
tinent texts of the Roman law-books only deal with the pirates' posi-
tion as outlaws, depriving them of the position of the lawful enemy-
justus hostis-who made the vanquished his slaves.2  There is no
special text in the Corpus Juris for the punishment of piracy. How-
ever, Cicero once said "pirata non est ex perduellium numero defi-
nitus, sed communis hostis omnium." This maxim, normally
phrased "pirata est hostis generis humani," has definitely done much
to sway judges and lawyers generally against the accused, although
more lucid minds have suggested that the assertion was made "not
in a way to suggest so much a constituent element of the offence as
an epithet of opprobrium which the offence deserves." 4  "Hostis
humani generis," observed Tindall 1693, "is neither a definition, or
as much a description of a pirate, but a rhetorical invective to show
the odiousness of that crime."5  Stiel calls it outright nonsense:
"nicht mehr als ein Flosk."6  Finally, one must, of course, con-
sider the likelihood of an intense feed-back on human consciousness
of the adoption and implementation by the courts of various pieces
of national legislation against piracy, however defined.
WHERE IS PIRACY TO BE FOUND?
Starting with the international agreements, the most important
2. DIGEST 49.15.19.2; 49.15.24; 50.16.118.
3. CICERO, DE OFFIClS, lib. III, 29 (Sabbadini ed. -).
4. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARv. L. REV. 334, 351
(1925) [citing COKE, INST. III, c. 49; 1 WYNNE, LIFE OF JENKINS, 86; MOLLOY,
DE JURE MARITIMO, Book I, c. 4, § 1 (6th ed.); I KENT, COMM. 171-172].
5. 12 How. St. Tr. 1269, at 1271 n. (1693).
6. DER TATBESTAND DER PIRATERIE NACH GELTENDEM VC)LKERRECHT, STAATS-
UND VOLKERRECHTLIGHE ABHANDLUNGEN bd IV heft 4 (Leipzig, 1905) 42.
338 (Vol. YX:337
PIRACY: AIR AND SEA
place in which the term "piracy" is found today is the Convention
on the High Seas, entered into on April 27, 1958 in Geneva. 7 Article
14-22 of that Convention set a general framework for the attempts
to suppress piracy. Mr. M. R. Simonnet, Vice President at the Con-
ference, called these articles a "sorte de petite convention sur la pi-
raterie ins6r~e dans la convention sur la haute mer" and in his view
the articles have been allowed a "place disproportionn6e avec l'im-
portance du sujet." s The Geneva Convention crowned a number of
efforts to arrive at an international conventional regulation of piracy
which had been initiated during the days of the League of Nations.
Besides these, however, use has also been made of the term "piracy"
in less ambitious international agreements. The so-called "anti-pi-
racy agreements" which were entered into in Nyon in 1937 are ex-
amples.' These accords denounce as "piratical" the acts of sub-
marines, aircraft and surface vessels in violation of the rules of naval
warfare laid down in the London Naval Treaty of 1930 and the Pro-
tocal of November 6, 1936,10 setting forth the rules as to the actions of
submarines with regard to merchant ships in time of war. When
comparing with the instruments to which reference was made, it
should be noted that the term "piracy" was added in 1937 and that
the explanations for this addition varied. Lauterpacht felt that the
use of the term reflected "the existing law of piracy in relation to an
unprecedented situation,"" while Professor David Johnson observes
that "the Nyon Conference felt compelled to introduce the word 'pi-
racy' somehow in view of its popular use and appeal."' 2  The term
"piracy" was also used in a previous, though unratified treaty-the
so-called Root Treaty of 1922, sometimes also referred to as the
7. 450 U.N. T.S. 11.
8. LA CONVENTION SUR LA HAUTE MER, 151 (Paris, 1966).
9. International Agreement for Collective Measures Against Piratical Attacks in
the Mediterranean by Submarines, signed Sept. 14, 1937, 181 L.N.T.S. 135; and
International Agreement for Collective Measures Against Piratical Attacks in the
Mediterranean by Surface Vessels and Aircraft, signed Sept. 17, 1937, 181 L.N.
T.S. 149.
10. Protocol concerning Rules of Submarine Warfare, 173 L.N.T.S. 353.
11. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 310 n. (Cambridge,
1947).
12. Piracy in Modern International Law, 43 TRANS. GROTIUS Soc. 63, at 84
(1957).
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Washington Rules.'8 Article HI denounced certain areas of attack
upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant ships and sought
to provide for their punishment "as if for an act of piracy." It has
been noted that "piracy" in these rules did not mean the same thing
as in the Nyon Agreements 15 years later.' 4
The preoccupation with the term "piracy" in these international
agreements must, of course, be seen in the context of the British
struggle for naval power as well as in the older context of the efforts
to make European powers accept having their ships visited and
searched on the high seas. In the struggle for naval power, Great
Britain had slipped considerably 5 by accepting international law
obligations through the Paris Declaration of 185616 and the Lon-
don Declaration of 1909.17 Attempting to free herself from the
fetters thus cast upon her, she had no interest in allowing her ene-
mies to make efficient use of the submarine which had turned out
to be a commerce destroyer even more dangerous than the privateer
once was and the suppression of privateering was part of the quid pro
quo which England had gained in hammering out the Paris Declara-
tion. The absence of a right to visit and search vessels of other na-
tions was much regretted by the British when they wanted to imple-
ment the recommendation of the Vienna Peace Congress of 1815
that the slave trade be suppressed.' 8 As no similar obstacles were
raised in relation to the suppression of piracy because the pirate of
old was classed as an outlaw, it was realized that whatever could be
classed as "piracy" meant rights of visit and search for British men
of war, hence, the assimilations of slave trading to piracy during the
19th century. To use the notion of "piracy" to achieve results which
had nothing to do with classical piracy at all became an established
international practice.
13. Treaty on the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, signed
Feb. 6, 1922 in Washington, 1 Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the U.S. 267
(1922). The denomination first mentioned is derived from the American initiator
and delegate, Mr. Elihu Root. The treaty never came into force since the French
refused to ratify.
14. Supra note 12.
15. See generally MAHAN, Naval Warfare in SELECTIONS FROM THE WRTINGS OF
REAR ADMIRAL ALFRED T. MAHAN 328-41 (A. Westcott ed. 1919).
16. 15 Nouveau Recueil G6n6ral 791.
17. 7 Nouveau Recueil G6n6ral, 3me S6rie 39.
18. -v. -, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464 (1817).
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Turning next to national legislation, Professor Bingham's excel-
lent research team has collected, in the course of the Harvard Re-
search in international law, English translations of most of the piracy
laws of the various countries as they stood in 1932.19 Moreover, a
compilation of penal provisions specifically relating to acts of unlaw-
ful seizure of aircraft was prepared for the 17th session of the Legal
Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
in 1970.20 For such reasons it is only necessary to mention a few of
the most important piracy laws in the present context.
The British offence of piracy at common law was never defined
by statute and there was no attempt in this direction in the first rele-
vant statute, the Offences at Sea Act of 1536.21 Commentators sim-
ply described the crime as the commission of those acts of robbery
and depredation upon the high seas which, if committed upon land,
would have amounted to a felony.22 An expansion of the notion of
piracy into the area of unlawful privateering started with the 1698
statute known as An Act For the More Effectual Suppression of
Piracy.2" Aiming at commissions (i.e., letters of marque) granted
by the then deposed English King, James II, the act extended piracy
to cover acts of privateering by Britishers (natives or denizens) un-
der foreign commissions against British subjects. The essence of
what the Act attempted to do, however, had been done by the Lords
of the Council and the Admiralty a few years before in the 1693 case
involving John Golding. Golding and his men were tried as pi-
rates, condemned, and some of them executed, for acting under
James II's commission. 4 Another extension achieved by the 1698
Act was to convert certain acts of mutiny into piracy. The next
extension came with the Piracy Act of 1721,25 which sought to asso-
ciate the black market of the pirate with his crime. It declared that
persons who traded with or outfitted pirates to be themselves guilty
19. 26 Am. J. Int'l L. Supplement Part V. (1932).
20. See Working Draft No. 744-1, 17/11/69, prepared for the session.
21. 28 Hen. 8, c. 15.
22. See citations in 26 Am. J. Int'l L. Supplement Part V, 910 n.4 (1932).
23. 11 & 12 Will. 3, c.7.
24. Supra note 11, at 302.
25. 8 Geo. 1, c. 24.
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of piracy. The Piracy Act of 174420 added little to the 1698 Act:
it was mainly aimed at increasing the British war effort in the strug-
gle with France and Spain. The Piracy Act of 1837 simply made
changes as to punishments2 7 and the Piracy Act of 185028 mainly
concerned itself with rewards for those who fought pirates. A recent
addition to the British legislation is the Tokyo Convention Act of
1963. It sets out to insure that British courts will not disclaim juris-
diction over "piracy committed by or against an aircraft where-ever
that piracy is committed." Furthermore it contains a declaration,
"for the avoidance of doubt," that the Geneva Convention provisions
on piracy constitute part of the law of nations.2 9 The British incli-
nation to use the term piracy for achieving, indirectly, desired results
in other matters will account for the reference to piracy in the Slave
Trade Act of 182430 and the Treaties of Washington Act, in effect
between 1922 and 1930.31
The French offence of piracy was defined in the Ordonnance de
la Marine,1681, in terms which show an intense preoccupation with
privateering. The Ordinance attempted to enforce discipline in
these matters upon French subjects and to prevent them from ac-
cepting foreign commissions. A later decree of 1798 reflected the
same attitude as did a decree of 1803. The old legislation was super-
seded, in 1825, by the Law for the Safety of Navigation and Mari-
time Commerce.3 2  Therein, piracy was defined to include-apart
from some offences connected with privateering-first in terms aimed
at facilitating the policing of the seas (art. 1) and then in terms of
mutiny (art. 4): "shall be prosecuted and condemned as pirates:
1. Every individual belonging to the crew of a French ship or vessel,
who, by fraud or violence against the captain or commander, takes
possession of the said vessel."
26. 18 Geo. 2, c. 30.
27. 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 88.
28. 13 & 14 Vict., c. 26.
29. 15 Eliz. 2, c. 52, § 4.
30. 5 Geo. 4, c. 113, see § 9; amended by the Statute Law Revision (No. 2)
Act, 51 & 52 Vict., c. 57 (1888).
31. 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 21, § 4; and 20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 48.
32. J.O. 3-1 (1825), D.P. III (1825). Insofar as they refer to pirates, the
provisions in this statute are believed to be still in effect, see du Pontavice, La
piraterie agrienne: notions et ejiets, REV. GAN. Aut 289 (1969).
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The Italian offence of piracy was created, prior to the Union of
Italy, by laws enacted from time to time by various Italian states.
When the union was formed, uniform regulations for the suppres-
sion of piracy were provided in the Mercantile Marine Code of 1865
which was replaced by a new such code in 1877. Later, some articles
on piracy were introduced in the successor legislation, the Code of
Navigation of 1943.11 It is noteworthy that the articles which use the
term "piracy" only relate to ships, not aircraft, although the Code is
drawn to cover both types of transportation. Thus, in Article 1135,
the crime of piracy is defined as acts of depredation by the master or
the officer of a ship to the damage of a national or foreign ship or
cargo, or the commission of violence for the purpose of depreda-
tion against a person embarked on a ship. Article 1136 specifies
a crime closely resembling the one defined in article 1 of the French
Act of 1825 but does not call it piracy. A recent addition to the
Italian legislation is the Act of December 8, 1961, No. 1658, by which
Article 1135 of the Code of Navigation was adopted to the Con-
vention on the High Seas.
The Spanish offence of piracy may, perhaps, be traced to the years
of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial expansion in the 15th and
16th centuries. A decree by John II (1481-1495) ordered that
foreign ships found in the Portuguese zone of interest should be cap-
tured and the crews drowned. Spain's exclusive rights were similarly
rigorously enforced.84 The union of 1582 between Portugal and
Spain resulted in the consolidation of the Iberian possessions in
Spanish hands. As a consequence, it seems safe to ascribe to Spain
the globe's most extensive experience of fighting piracy. In modem
terms, however, the Spanish offence of piracy should be traced back
to the Ordinance of the Royal Spanish Navy of 1748, which provided
that pirates should be punished with death as common enemies of the
human race. It also provided "that vessels found navigating without
legitimate letters from a sovereign or state having authority to grant
the same, should be seized as lawful prize;" however, in case the
33. For a translation into English, see PLINIO MANCA, THE ITALIAN CODE OF
NAVIGATION-TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY (Milano, 1958). Also see Romanelli,
Sulla c.d. pirateria aerea, IL DuIrro AEREO 33-34 (1970). The Tokyo Convention
was ratified pursuant to an Act of June 11, 1967, No. 468.
34. FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA, 106 (Edinburgh & London, 1911).
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vessel was armed for war, their masters and officers should be held
as pirates.8" The Spanish Criminal Code of 1848 contained exten-
sive articles dealing with piracy (articles 156-159). Among their
features one may note that black market people were to be punished
as accomplishes of the pirates, but that piracy committed against na-
tions at war with Spain was not a punishable offence. The 1848
Code was replaced by a new Penal Code of 1870 which said nothing
about the black market, but which extended the crime of piracy to
also cover those cases when the acts were perpetrated against sub-
jects of nations at war with Spain, provided that they were noncomba-
tants.8" Incidentally, this code remained in force in Cuba and the
Phillipine Islands when they were separated from Spain.87 The
Spanish-American War in 1898 brought some legislation which by
way of the crime of piracy, sought to restrict American privateering
warfare."8 When the 1870 Code, in Spain proper, was superseded
by the Penal Code of 1928, the change brought an important exten-
sion of the notion of piracy. Article 252 of that Code made the arti-
cles on piracy apply also to cases when "aircraft are used as the
means" of committing the crimes, "or the crimes are committed
against aircraft."8 9
In so far as the Scandinavian countries are concerned, it is in-
teresting to note that while piracy was accepted as a special crime in
the penal codes dating from the middle of the nineteenth century40
it disappeared from the statute books during the twentieth century.4 '
While the piratical acts were still punishable, they were not regarded
as piracy but as cases of robbery on navigable waters.42
35. Supra note 19, at 1006. These provisions were reenacted in an Ordinance
of 1801.
36. Supra note 19.
37. For an application by the supreme court of the Philippine Islands in 1922,
see People v. Lol-Lo and Saraw, [1919] Ann. Dig. 164.
38. Decree of April 24, 1898, Art. 7; see 1898 REv. GAN. DR. INT., 762.
39. Supra note 19, at 1008.
40. In the Swedish Penal Code of 1864, piracy was mentioned as a special
crime in c. 21, § 7 (for text, see supra note 19, at 1010). The same was true for
the Danish Penal Code of 1866, § 244 (for text, see supra note 19, at 957).
41. Piracy as a special crime was done away with already in the Norwegian
Penal Code of 1902, and the new Danish Penal Code of 1930 followed suit. The
Swedish provision disappeared during the law revision which took place in 1942.
42. Cf. the Finnish Criminal Code, c. 31, art. 2, § 2.
[Vol. XX:33,7
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In the United States of America the Constitution which accom-
panied the creation of the new nation empowered Congress to de-
fine and punish piracies 4 8-a departure from the common law ap-
proach in England. Congress set about to do so in the Crimes Act of
1790. The sections of this act were largely modeled upon the then
contemporary British statutes on piracy. It may be noted that the
act defined as piracy not only the normal acts arising in connection
with privateering but also mutiny-the acts by which "any seaman
should lay violent hands upon his commander, thereby to hinder
his fighting in defence of his ship or goods committed to his trust, or
should make a revolt in the ship."" This assimilation of mutiny to
piracy lasted until 1835 when the term piracy was taken away. 45
Otherwise, during the nineteenth century, American legislation, al-
though sometimes overlapping (e.g., the Acts of 1790 and 1820),
largely paralleled that of other maritime nations.
Like the British, however, the Americans were inclined to use the
term "piracy" for rather odd forms of criminal behaviours. By an
Act of 1847,46 it became possible to prosecute, in the United States,
people for piracy in conformity with its treaties which declared their
acts to be "piracy." This feature should be seen in the context of
the fight against the slave trade.
The federal statutes were revised in 1874 and were, also at that
time, all reenacted, although there were changes in arrangement.
Between that date and the enactment of the Criminal Code of 1909, 47
the only changes which took place concerned punishment. The
1909 legislation, however, only retained one provision on piracy:
section 290 directed against "whoever, on the high seas, commits the
crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations." In the United
States Code, no material changes were made as to piracy.48 In 1961,
however, a new subsection titled "Aircraft Piracy" was added to
§ 902 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. In this subsection the
term "piracy" was defined to mean "any seizure or exercise of con-
43. U.S. CONST. art. IX, § 8.
44. 1 Stat. 114.
45. 4 Stat. 775.
46. 9 Stat. 175.
47. 35 Stat. 1088.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 481, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1651.
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trol, by force or violence or threat of force or violence and with
wrongful intent, of an aircraft in flight in air commerce."49
A brief summary may be useful at this point. Looking at the use
of the term "piracy" which has been made in the treaties and pieces
of national legislation now accounted for, it may be seen that the
practice of privateering has dominated the scene-unlawful priva-
teering has been the mainstay of piracy. But it also strikes the eye
that there are few inherent restrictions on the use of the term. Mu-
tiny was as easily included as excluded and whenever a nation
hoped to gain extra advantage it never hesitated except by the for-
mula "as if" to apply the term to such bizarre things as slave trading
or submarine warfare. There is nothing inherent in the term which
restricts the notion to the sea; it serves several nations equally well in
the skies.
WHERE ARE THE PIRATES?
One would, perhaps, believe that piracy today is an obsolete
crime. That, however, is not quite true. During the last one
hundred years many areas of the world have experienced the type
of violence which is associated with piracy and, lately, such violence
has taken on new forms which make it anything but obsolete.
The Chinese Sea is such an area. For a long time it was so in-
fested with pirates that the legitimate Chinese imperial authorities
were completely incapable of suppressing it. For this purpose they
cooperated extensively during the mid-nineteenth century with Eu-
ropean powers. This explains why in Bingham's collection we find
special instructions, issued in 1877 by the then recently formed
German Empire, for the commanders of German warships in regard
to the suppression of piracy in Chinese waters.5" Due to the chaotic
state of China, however, the cooperation policy was only partly suc-
cessful. 5 As late as in the 1920's, Japan displayed concern over
the cases of piracy in the Chinese Sea (some sixteen cases in 1926
49. 75 Stat. 466.
50. Supra note 19, at 969.
51. It appears to have been the European participation in this fight against Chi-
nese pirates which inspired Paul Stiel to write his excellent little volume on the notion
of piracy: DER TATBESTAND DER PTRATERIE NACH GELTENDEM V6LKERRECHT (1905)
(a work which still remains the best available in the field).
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and fourteen in 1927).52 This may explain why a Japanese Profes-
sor, M. Matsuda, on January 26, 1926, signed for the League of Na-
tions Committee of Experts a "Projet de dispositions pour la r6-
pression de la piraterie"-a draft convention with eight articles and
a weighty commentary thereto.5" By 1951, the situation had not
grown much better. It was estimated that in that year, 42 Japanese
vessels had been attacked by pirates with 267 deaths resulting.54
In the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the Black Sea
was also credited with a flare-up of piracy, as Fauchille in his treatise
drew attention to some cases of attacks on French and Bulgarian ships
in 1920 and 1921. 55 They were sufficient to inspire very active
Roumanian participation in the League of Nations work on the codi-
fication of the law on piracy. 56
The American Prohibition of the 1920's resulted in an armada of
rum ships waiting outside the three mile limit for the purpose of re-
tailing their liquor over the rail. But it also brought forth the "hi-
jackers" as they were known by their contemporaries-another ar-
ray of ships preying upon the cashboxes of the rumships.5 7  This
practice was sufficiently frequent and successful as to prompt Profes-
sor Dickinson to make a deep inquiry into the problem of how the
law of piracy applied to "those who engage in so-called 'hijacking'
upon the seas." '5 8
As of late, new aerial variants of the old game have grown popu-
lar. During the last decades it has been generally realized that air-
craft are almost helpless when a determined person wants to take
over the command of the craft and divert it to some new destination
of his own choice. Sometimes, this realization has inspired a classi-
cal robbery within a new setting. A recent flight on November 6,
1968, may be a proper illustration. The crew of the Fokker Friend-
ship, en route over the Philippines and approaching the destination of
52. Pella, La ripression de la piraterie, 15 REC. DES COURS 163 (1926).
53. LEAGUE OFNATIONS, Doc. C/196/M.70. at 119 (1927).
54. Supra note 8.
55. 1 FAUCHILLE, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 93 (Paris, 1922).
56. Roumanian Draft, 1926: L.N. Doc. C/196/M.70. at 220 (1927).
57. Possibly the word "hijack" has something to do with sailors' way to hail the
rum-ship: "Hi Jack!"--the origin, however, remains obscure.
58. Dickinson, supra note 4, at 335.
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Manila International Airport, was overpowered by some passengers
who turned out to be Mario Rabuya y Calleto and his gang. They
robbed the passengers of some 123,109 pesos and jewelry, seriously
wounded a plain-clothes policeman who attempted armed resistance,
killed another passenger in the affray, and forced the pilot to taxi,
after landing at the destination, to a remote comer of the airfield
where the robbers escaped over the fence taking their loot with them
as well as hostages selected from amongst the crew.5 9 What has
really brought the boom to aerial "hijacking," however, is the present
state of hostility fostered by the "hot" and "cold" wars. This hos-
tility, fostered on both sides of the Iron Curtain, put a premium on
everybody who succeeded to secure his escape over the Curtain from
his own camp into the other camp. From time to time, somebody
escaped from Communist Europe into Austria, Switzerland or West
Germany by overpowering the pilot in a flight and forcing him to
reroute over the Iron Curtain. One important example thereof, was
the escape of pilot Ivo Kavic and his accomplice in an airliner on
October 17, 1951, diverting it from its route-Ljubljana to Belgrade
-taking it to Zdrich instead.60 In the 1960's, however, a sharp in-
crease in frequency took place, spurred on by the downfall of the
Battista regime in Cuba and the creation of a new one which-as it
got more and more entrenched in the Communist world camp-came
to introduce European conditions in the Western hemisphere. When
Fidel Castro had firmly established himself in Cuba, his supporters
turned against American aviation. A sequence of four hijackings in
1961 prompted the United States Congress to amend the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 to include a provision against "aircraft piracy."
Perhaps, the most spectacular of these four cases involved Pan Ameri-
can flight 501, a DC-8 en route between Mexico City and Guate-
mala City, carrying Colombia's Foreign Minister and eighty-one other
passengers. This flight was hijacked by Frenchman Albert Charles
Cadon in revenge for Washington's interference in the Algerian War,
and brought to Cuba on August 9, 1961.
59. Rabuya was later caught by the police, tried before the criminal court,
found guilty of robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries, and sentenced to
death on March 6, 1970.
60. - v. -, - I.L.R. 371 (- 1952).
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Another of these hijackings ended in criminal court. On August
3, 1961, one Leon Bearden and his son hijacked a Continental Air-
lines Boeing 707 in flight between Phoenix and El Paso in the United
States and tried to force the pilot to reroute the plane to Cuba, but the
pilot outsmarted him and the hijackers were eventually overpowered
by the crew and a security agent on board."'
Now the strong and the violent really woke up to the new oppor-
tunities prevailing over the Caribbean Sea. While Judge Hutcheson in
the Bearden trial had stated that "the facts of the case are bizarre,"
it soon grew impossible to repeat such language. All through the 1960's
American airlines were from time to time diverted to Cuba to de-
liver some hijackers; at times even some Cuban airliners were hi-
jacked by people desiring to go to Miami.
The rest of Latin America came to witness with increasing fre-
quency the diversion of their airliners to odd and unplanned desti-
nations. With over a dozen hijacked aircraft by September 1969,
Colombia was the main victim and the hijackers' chosen destination
was in each case, Cuba.
As time went by, even the violent around the Mediterranean Sea
grew aware of the new opportunity. The abduction of former Congo-
lese Prime Minister Moishe Tschombe, in an air taxi owned by Air
Hanson Ltd. of London, over the high seas on June 30, 1967, intro-
duced the game of rerouting aircraft to Arab destinations for politi-
cal reasons. The Tschombe hijacking was followed by Arab hi-
jackings of Israeli, American and Ethiopian planes and by dissident
Greeks hijacking airliners belonging to Olympic Airways, the Greek
flag airline.
In late 1968, there was a sudden upsurge in the frequency of hi-
jackings which is hard to explain. During 1968, twenty-seven air-
craft were diverted from their scheduled routes by threat or force.
During 1969, the number of hijacking incidents reached eighty-
nine. The 1968 hijackings involved 1,490 passengers, the 1969 hi-
jackings affected 4,519 people.
61. United States v. Bearden, 304 F.2d 532, (- Cir. 1962); vacated on other
grounds, 372 U.S. 252 (1963); obstruction of commerce charge affirmed, 320 F.2d
99 (- Cir. 19 ); cert. denied, 376 U.. 922 (1964).
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PIRACY AND WARFARE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
A famous pirate named Dionides was caught and brought before
Alexander the Great. Alexander asked him why he had arrogated
to himself the empire of the seas. Dionides threw the question back:
Why do you yourself sack the earth? "I am King," said Alexander,
"while you are only a pirate." "What matters the name," replied
Dionides. "The business is the same for both of us. Dionides ra-
vages the ships and Alexander the empires. If the Gods had made
me Alexander and had made you Dionides, perhaps I would be a
better prince than you would be a good pirate." 2
This story from antiquity has a message for the modern world-it
reveals the razor-thin edge which may separate piracy from other
acts of violence. Indeed, as already noted, Homer shows clearly in
his Odyssey that he found nothing criminal in the fact that seafarers
descended on the city of Ismarus, sacked the place, destroyed the
males and carried off the women and the plunder. As was pointed
out by Stiel in 1905,63 the attitude of the Malayan pirates sentenced
to death by the British authorities in Singapore in 1858 differs little
from that of King Agron of Illyria in 229 B.C.-piracy was custo-
mary and lawful under the laws of both their lands. In a certain
state of innocence, there is little difference between piratical be-
haviour and the feuds between princes and city states. 4
Dionides, perhaps, knew his Odyssey only too well. Even under
modern conditions, it is of limited value to approach the problem of
piracy only from the side of modem, orthodox criminal law. It may
be worthwhile to start from the law of warfare, although more than
two thousand years separate us from Alexander and Dionides.
CAPTURE IN NAVAL AND AERIAL WARFARE
Capture of Airliners
In April 1940, when Denmark submitted to German occupation,
the British found a Focke Wulff 200 Kondor airliner belonging to
the Danish airline, at Shoreham. They put it through a prize pro-
62. As told in SESTIER, LA PIRATEmE DANS L'ANTIQUITt, 268 (Paris, 1880).
63. Supra note 6, at 30 n.1.
64. A fascinating discussion of the notion of war in the late middle ages is
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ceeding pursuant to the British Prize Act of 19 3 9 ,11 and condemned
it as a good prize. 6 That was, it would seem, the first case in which
the rules of capture of the ancient law of naval warfare were applied
to modern civilian airliners. Of course, it was an economically in-
significant step in a war in which the British Prize Court in London
dealt with captured ships and cargoes worth about 75 million dol-
lars. But in the perspective of law and history it was an audacious
thing to apply to the aeroplane the naval remants of Justinian's rule
"ea, quae ex hostibus capimus, iure gentium statim nostra fiunt" 67
a rule condemned on land since the signing of the Hague Conven-
tion on the laws and customs of land warfare of 1907. s It was also
daring in view of the fact that the Americans had been most reluc-
tant even to acknowledge that the principle should still be allowed to
apply to the seas.69  The British action prevailed, however. By
adopting the American Prize Act of June 24, 1941, which also ex-
tended prize law to aircraft,7 ° the Americans have indicated their
complete approval of the step taken by the British.71
We are reluctant today to compare captures by pirates and the
right of capture in international law. It is normal for the modem
mind to react forcefully and to point out a believed fundamental dif-
offered by KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 72, 218 (London
& Toronto, 1965).
65. 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 63; 1939 U.S. Av. 339.
66. The prize proceeding is mentioned by SPAIGHT, Am POWER AND WAR RIGHTS,
411 (3rd ed. 1947).
67. INSTITUTES 2.1.17.
68. 3 Nouveau Recueil G6n6ral, 3me S6rie, 461 (Art. 47 of the Rules).
69. Napoleon said in his memoirs: "I1 est A d6sirer qu'un temps vienne ob les
m~mes id6es lib6rales s'6tendent sur la guerre de mer, et que les armfes navales de
deux puissances puissent se battre, sans donner lieu A la confiscation des navires
merchands, et sans faire constituer prisonniers de guerre de simples matelots de
commerce ou des passagers non militaires. Le commerce se ferait alors sur mer,
entre les antions bellig6rantes, comme il se fait sur terre, au milieu des batailles que
se livrent les arm6es." (3 MIMorRES DE NAPOLiON, ch. 6, at 304). A promising
development towards the inviolability of private property at sea which got moving
in the European wars of the 1860's, was broken in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-
71 and has not recovered since. See SALMON, LA COURSE DiPUIS LA D&CLARATION
DE PARIS, (th se) 113 (Paris, 1901); Quigley, The American Attitude Towards Cap-
ture at Sea, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 820 (1917) and Knauth, Prize Law Reconsidered,
46 COL. L. REv. 69 (1946).
70. 55 Stat. 261, 34 U.S.C. § 1131 (Supp. 1945).
71. For further indications of approval of the principle, see Rowson, Prize Law
during the Second World War, 24 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 160, 212 (1947).
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ference-the right of capture can only be exercised by the belliger-
ent state while piracy is a most private business. Let us look into the
distinction and see what basis there is for treating private capture as
piracy.
Is Warfare Only State Business?
It was indeed one of the remarkable points in European history
when Emperor Maximilian I of Hapsburg secured the passage by
the Diet of Worms on August 7, 1495, of the act which prescribed
"die ewige Landfriede"-the perpetual peace of the land--ending
the private wars which, until then had tormented Germany in pursu-
ance of the "Faustrecht" or the feudal right of private war.72 Hav-
ing this as a point of departure, we must turn our attention in two
directions: first, how the European view that private warfare was
outlawed in international law and later became known as brigandism
and; second, why this idea of war as a state exclusive privilege had
a different significance in the Muslim world, since it was largely un-
touched by the European nations of international law.72a
The European fathers of modem international law were strong
in condemning the brigands who conducted their private warfare.
Since the brigands did not subject themselves to established state war-
fare (although they might occasionally ally themselves with state forc-
es) and did not themselves form a state, there was no necessity to de-
clare war against them and all means were permissible in operations
against them.73 On one point alone the private warefare of medieval
times persisted in only slightly changed forms. The daring exploits of
72. On the notion of "Landfrieden" (regional peace-compacts), see VON BAR,
A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL LAW (1968). For some recent comments
on the work at the Diet of Worms, see ANGERMEIER, K8NIGTUM UND LANDFRIEDE IN
DEUTSCHEN SPXTMITTELALTER (Mdnchen, 1966). On private war and the distinction
between marque and feudal war, see the chapter on Letters of Marque and Defiance,
in KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 218-38 (London & Toronto,
1965). The maritime aspects of the same phenomena are treated in the ancient but
excellent work by VON MARTENS, VERSUCH OBER CAPER, FEINLICHE NEHMUNGEN
UND INSONDERHEIT WIEDERNEHMUNGEN. NACH DEN GESETZEN, VERTRXGEN UND
GEBRXUCHEN DER EUROPXISCHEN SEEMXCHTE (Gittingen, 1795).
72a. AL GHUNAIMI, THE MUSLIM CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
WESTERN APPROACH (1968).
73. GRoTnUs, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LInu TRES, 631, 794 (Carnegie transl.
1925); GENTILI, DE JuRE BELLI LIBRI TRES, 143-44, 199-200 (Carnegie transl.
1933); Cf. KEEN, supra note 72, at 246.
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the Vikings certainly brought home the message that under Germanic
law, as it originally stood, 74 it was altogether permissible for enter-
prising individuals to levy war on the world at large. It was not un-
til the fourteenth century that such private warfare took on the aspect
of privateering. 75 In the form of privateering, however, private war-
fare on the seas was tolerated by international law down to the
Spanish government's decree of April 24, 1898: "maintenant son
droit de conc6der des patentes de course. ' 76  Le Fur that year
claimed the privateers to be "les francs-tireurs de la mer. ' 77  Even
after Spain, in 1908, had acceded to the Declaration of Paris of 1856
which outlawed privateering in naval war between parties to the
treaty,78 the opinion was advanced that it is perfectly possible under
general international law to issue letters of marque.79 Generally,
however, it is conceded that the Seventh Hague Convention relating
to the conversion of merchant ships into warships (October 18,
1907) has made the matter moot as far as the sea is concerned.
Prussia's instant navy in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71-the
"freiwillige Seewehr"-showed how to draw military resources from
private shipping without violating the Declaration. ° Remnants of
the private interest in captures at sea continued even later. Prize
money, an institution which the British Navy was forced to introduce
as a reward to the crews of her men-of-war in order to compete with
the privateers in recruiting sailors, 81 worked well in both the World
74. There are provisions against piracy in book XIII, c. 20 ("Utgjerbolk,
Um Toftebot") in the Norwegian Gulathing Law, but this may be dated about 940
A.D. An interesting attempt to explain the Viking seige of Paris about 860 A.D.
and the sacking of Mainz and Cologne by the Vikings during the same period in
terms of war between Denmark and the Frankish States was made by Hegewisch,
Ueber die vermeinten seeriiuberischen Unternehmungen der sogenannten Nord-
minner oder Diinen wider die Franken im neunten und zehnten Jahrhundert, in 1
HIsToRiscHE, PHILOSOPHISCHE uN) LITERXmSCI- SCi IFTEN, 33, 43 (Hamburg, 1793).
75. VON MARTENS, supra note 72, at 31; 1 THE BLACK BOOK OF THE ADMIRALTY,
(Sir Travers Twiss ed.), 76, 430 ff (London, 1871).
76. 1898 REV. GfiE. DR. INT. 761, note Art. 4.
77. Chronique, 1898 REv. GAN. DR. INT., 757.
78. 15 Nouveau Recueil G~neral 791; cf. Malkin, The Inner History of the
Declaration of Paris, 8 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L 43 (1927).
79. PELLA, La ripression de la piraterie, 15 REC. DES CoURas 190 (1926-V): "la
course . . . existe encore comme institution de droit international public."
80. For a full discussion, see Kriege, Die Umwandlung von Kauffahrteischiffen
in Kriegsschifle, 26 NIEMEYERSZ 71 (1916).
81. SMITH, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 102 n.3 (3rd ed. 1959).
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Wars. In the Second World War, the British Prize Court in London
alone, awarded prize money to the captors of about 40 million dol-
lars.82
The Moslem world, however, was largely untouched by the Euro-
pean ideas of international law and, until very late, it rejected the
principle that private warfare was illegal. The Qur'an, the sacred
book of Mohammedans, was then read as supporting the notion that
every Moslem could kill the infidels (other than Christians and Jews,
who are the people of the book).8 " "Jihad", the holy war, was a duty
of the individual to participate in the wars of the state. The piracy
practiced by the inhabitants of the Barbary states was nothing but
"la forme maritime de la guerre sainte."84  Consequently, there
could be nothing surprising in the fact that the Beys and Sultans of
the time were entitled to one-fifth of the spoils of every expedi-
tion. 5 Furthermore, even if it be conceded that many times the
piratical enterprise was conducted more for the sake of plunder than
out of religious conviction, it would seem, as sometimes intimated
by Continental writers, that much of the English and American indig-
nation over the Barbary corsairs displays more of a lack of inner un-
derstanding of the phenomenon than it evidences moral superi-
ority. 8
The idea that warfare is state business only has a somewhat un-
comfortable place in modem international practice. It combines
with the ideas of the classic European war, the ideal example of
which was the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. It is certainly true
that most of the modern conventions on warfare reflect the tactics
and basic organizational concepts of a European-oriented armed
force. The drafters of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 "visualized
82. Knauth, supra note 69, at 73; see also COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
THE SEA 820 (6th ed. 1967).
83. THE HOLY QuR'AN c. 9 verse 5; c. 8 verses 38-39 (ed. by M.M. 'Ali, 4th
ed. 1951).
84. MONLAU, LES ETATS BARBARESQUES 38, 121 (Paris, 1964); M6SSNER,
DIE VOLKERRECHTSPERSONLICHKEIT UND DIE VOLKERRECHTSPRAXIS DER BARBARESKEN-
STAATEN, NEUE KOLNER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFTLICHE ABHANDLUNGEN HFT 58, 169
(Berlin, 1968); see also Bassiouni, Islam: Concept, Law, and World Habeas
Corpus, 2 RUTGERS • CAMDEN L. REV. - (1969).
85. Mbssner, supra note 84, at 169.
86. See, e.g., supra note 6, at 40, 70; M6SSNER, supra note 84. It is a relief to
read Professor Johnson's remarks on the Barbary pirates. Supra note 13, at 78.
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a series of relatively stable, interlocking corps fronts; the organiza-
tion of the forces engaged has been presumed to follow the stan-
dardized concept, e.g. infantry, artillery, medical corps; the partici-
pation of guerilla or partisan bands has been presumed to be a minor
adjunct of the major conflict; the civil population as a whole has been
assumed to be little more than innocent bystanders."87  The natural
tendency of the man whose task it is to devise war tactics is, of course,
to rely on the letter of the law in all areas where it works to the ad-
vantage of his own forces and to stress changing conditions in the
areas where the letter of the law places his forces at a disadvantage.
The basic assumptions of the rules of warfare here referred to clearly
facilitate that type of work; we will find a particularly vicious ex-
ample of it in the Maoist tactic implied by the maxim of using the
people like "the sea through which the fishes swim." The tactic
rides roughshod over the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants when civilian fighters are ordered on the offensive; and
when on the defensive, the same fighters are only termed civilian
non-combatants- hence the tactitians cry out about violations of in-
ternational law. The Western nations have here been caught in a
trap which, indeed, they arranged themselves by allowing, since the
days of the Second World War, chilly analysis to be replaced with
"the generally heroic imagery used to describe anti-Nazi terrorism in
German-occupied Europe. ' 8  Guerilla warfare which thus has
passed the test of usefulness also in an international law context, is
very much connected to the private warfare which was once believed
supressed. Hence it also affects the privateer. If the guerilla band
can find at least some acceptance of its activity within the frame-
work of the "compagnies franches admises dans les guerres terrest-
res," why should not the "francs-tireurs de la mer" find an equiva-
lent place in the naval war effort?89 And this is the point of en-
try of the aerial hijackings performed by Arab commandos emanat-
ing from the Middle East.
87. Shull, Counterinsurgency and the Geneva Conventions-Some Practical Con-
siderations, 3 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 49, 51 (1968).
88. Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 AM-
J. INT'L L. 415, 423 (1969).
89. Le Fur Chronique, 1898 REV. G&. DR. INT. 757; cf. Saporta, La guerre de
course airienne LEMONDE, Feb. 12, 1969, at 7, col. 4-5.
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Ever since the creation of the Israeli State on May 15, 1948, and
perhaps even earlier the Middle East has swarmed with various mili-
tary and para-military organizations with no official line of com-
mand from the sovereign states in the area. There are several "lib-
eration" groups constituted by Palestinian refugees. The most im-
portant group is the Palestine Liberation Organization, presently pre-
sided over by Yasser Arafat. Not so important but of major interest
to us, is a rival group with a Communist outlook called the Popu-
lar Front for the Liberation of Palestine and some offshoot groups
from the Front. These groups have earned renown for organizing at-
tacks on civilian airliners either belonging to the Israeli airline El-
Al or otherwise connected with Israeli interests.90  The attacks
range from simple destroy missions carried out on foreign neutral
territory to complete captures with solemn messages read to the peo-
ple on board accompanied by a renaming of the flight or aircraft."'
It seems profitable to discuss two of these cases more closely: the
hijackings of El-Al flight 426 on July 23, 1968 and of TWA flight
840 on August 29, 1969.
During the early hours of July 23, 1968, an Israeli Boeing 707,
belonging to El-Al and under the command of Captain 0. Abarba-
nell, was hijacked in flight over Sorrento in Italy by two armed men
belonging to the Popular Front. They forced the pilot to abandon
the flight to Tel Aviv and go down in Algiers instead. The Algerian
authorities seized the plane, the crew and 12 passengers all of whom
were of Israeli nationality. It was not until after six weeks of nego-
tiations, involving the International Federation of Airline Pilots As-
sociations (IFALPA), that Algeria gave in, restored control of the
90. Supra note 88, at 416 n. 2. The sabotaging of Swissair flight 303 and
Austrian Airlines flight 402 on Feb. 21, 1970, is generally linked to The Popular
Front (General Command) which split off from the Front in 1968.
91. Among destroy missions of European interest should be mentioned the at-
tacks on El Al ships on the airports of Athens and Ziirich-Kloten on Dec. 26,
1968, and Feb. 18, 1969. Among formal captures should be mentioned-apart from
TWA flight 840 on Aug. 29, 1969, details of which are given in text-the abortive
hijacking of El Al flight 435 on Feb. 10, 1970. In the debris of the Munich airport
bus which blew up when bringing the passengers to the aircraft it was found a
message to be read to the people on board: "In the name of the Palestine revolution,
we are seizing this airplane and renaming it Palestine H." (International Herald
Tribune Feb. 13, 1970, at 2 col. 3). Black Panthers in the United States were
linked to the same technique in the hijacking of a National Airlines flight 186 on
Nov. 4, 1968, the aircraft being renamed "Republic of New Africa."
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aircraft to the owners and permitted passengers and crew to continue
their journey.
On August 29, 1969, an American Boeing 707, belonging to
Trans World Airlines and under the command of Captain D. Carter,
was hijacked in flight probably over the Ionian Sea,92 en route
to Athens by two armed persons-probably females,93 belonging
to the Popular Front. They renamed the flight "Popular Front-i"
and made the pilot reroute, first towards Tel Aviv, then towards
Beirut, and finally towards Damascus where the aircraft eventu-
ally landed. After the landing the hijackers planted bombs which
blew off the cockpit from the ship and announced that the hijack-
ing was in retaliation for the three-day old American-Israeli deal
involving the delivery of American Phantom jets for the Israeli
military forces. 94  The Syrian authorities, however, allowed the
American owners to repair the aircraft: a replacement cock-pit was
brought to Syria, repairs were completed about ten weeks later and
the aircraft left Syria for the United States. Most of the passengers
were allowed to continue their journey but two of the fourteen
Israeli passengers were held by Syria, apparently in view of their
importance. After 99 days they were exchanged for a number of
Arab prisoners of war in Israel in a complicated three-power move
sponsored by the International Red Cross.
These two cases have never been satisfactorily explained, by the
popular front nor by the Arab States who are not inclined to elaborate
on their roles in this context. Guerilla organizations are probably
poorly equipped in the technical knowledge of the rights and duties of
belligerents in a legal context.
In making a case for the Arab practice a number of points should
be stressed: First, the aircraft captured were enemy aircraft or
aircraft linked with unnuetral service in the Arab-Israeli strug-
gle. Second, the Israeli aircraft belonged to El-Al which is a
governmental corporation and its aircraft may thus be considered
92. The aircraft was reported hijacked 1/ hours after take-off from Rome which
would seem to place it somewhere over the Ionian Sea.
93. Names given are Shadia Abu Ghazaall, head of the Front's "Guevara unit,"
and Leila Khaled.
94. International Herald Tribune, Nov. 13, 1969, at 5, col. 4; see also, e.g.,
Bassiouni & Fisher, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 399 (1970),
and Bassiouni, The "Middle East": The Misunderstood Conflict, 19 KANSAS L.
REv. 373 (1971).
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State property. Third, El-Al aircraft are believed to carry war ma-
terials; they certainly carry contraband cargoes if the contraband
lists of the Second World War are made to apply. Fourth, any Arab
state involved in the struggle against Israel should be entitled to de-
clare captured aircraft to be good prize. Indeed, Egypt back in 1949
set up a Prize Court in Alexandria95 which has functioned ever
since96 and which certainly could also perform in relation to air-
craft. Fifth, it is possible that the Front itself might be entitled to
capture. It is recalled that the Free French forces in the Second
World War issued, in 1943, a decree constituting a prize court for
the territories under their control. In rendering its decision in the
Liguria, the court upheld the right of the forces to effect seizures.97
Sixth, the decree of the prize court was in any case not material to
the right of capture, but only to the title acquired by a neutral pur-
chaser of the captured craft or cargo. Finally, it is an established
maritime practice, at least since the days of the Confederate priva-
teers which due to the Union blockade could not hope to bring their
prizes to a prize court back home, that prizes which cannot be used-
put up for sale or otherwise-are simply destroyed at sea. The blow-
ing up of an enemy airliner under similar conditions should not violate
any principle of privateering.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, the position of the Arab command-
os cannot satisfy the principles of the orthodox, European-oriented
law of war. It fails on two principal counts: belligerency and pri-
vate warfare.
It is extremely hard to say from U.N. documents whether the Arab
states are belligerents, that is to say, are at war with Israel or not.
Stalder claims that the Algerian refusal to restore control of the El-Al
aircraft to its owners was only an act of war ("ein Kriegsakt") and ex-
plains that Algeria officially considered herself at war with Israel. 98
Professor Paul de LaPradelle takes the opposite view and states that
"a aucun moment les autorit6s alg6riennes n'ont pr~tendu en effet
95. Military Proclamation No. 38 of July 9, 1948. For the text of this procla-
mation, see 5 REv. EGYPT 319 (1949). See further Safwat Bey, The Egyptian
Prize Court: Organization and Procedure, 5 REv. EGYPT 28-33 (1949).
96. See, e.g., the Inge Toft, 31 I.L.R. 251 (1960).
97. Rowson, supra note 71, at 164, 173.
98. Stalder, Die Luftpiraterie in rechtlicher Sicht, 1969 ZLR 153.
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placer l'affaire dans le champs d'application des lois de la guerre." 99
The cease-fire of June 10, 1967, is crucial. Algeria was never
made to sign it and according to Julius Stone it "seems to be claiming
a position of active belligerence despite the cease-fire."'100 It has
turned out, however, to be impossible to get an official statement on
the point. 10' Syria, on the other hand, where the Trans World Air-
lines flight 840 finally landed, signed the cease-fire. But while Al-
geria did not exist as a sovereign state when Israel achieved statehood,
Syria was made a sovereign state a few days ahead of Israel and claims
to be engaged in a war of self-defence against Israel since the latter's
creation. Besides the grounds which, thus, may exist to doubt that Al-
geria was a belligerent at all, she probably had other good reasons
for not claiming belligerent rights in the El-Al affair. The El-Al
flight was, after all, captured over Italian territory and could thus in-
volve Algeria in a violation of the territorial sovereignty of Italy.
Furthermore, Algeria's Security Council role as supervisor of the
cease-fire between her allies and her enemy was too good to be com-
promised by ostentatious reminders of her own part in the conflict.
Syria was even more cautious than Algeria in her handling of the
captured flight. As to the Israeli passengers, it must be noted that
once they were in Syria's territorial jurisdiction, it was only normal
modem state practice to detain them. 10 2  Even the Tokyo Convention
of 1963103 reserves to the territorial state "any criminal jurisdiction
exercised in accordance with national law" (article 3, paragraph 3).
Even if Syria had been bound by that Convention, she could not
have been reproached unless she had turned out to be unable to
build some kind of criminal case against the foreign intruders.
99. de la Pradelle, Les d~tournements d'aironejs et le droit international, REV.
GAN. Am 250, 258 (1969).
100. No PEACE-No WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 6 (Sydney, 1969); cf. Bassiouni,
supra note 94.
101. The author's personal call upon the Algerian Embassy in Stockholm on
Nov. 21, 1969, resulted in much discussion but failed to produce any official state-
ment as to the Algerian position on the war question. Indeed, the writer was
formally forbidden to use what had been said or referred to as an official statement
that "guerre ouverte" persisted between. Algeria and Israel. Some of the reluctance
to show colours may perhaps be attributed to the fact that Algeria occupied a seat
in the Security Council supervising the cease-fire between the Algerian allies,
Syria, Jordan and Egypt, on the one hand, and Israel, Algeria's enemy, on the other
hand.
102. See text infra at -.
103. [- ] -U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 6768.
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Even if Algeria and Syria had claimed belligerent rights, however,
the private guerilla organizations could not have benefitted there-
from. If the Free French could capture enemy and neutral vessels, it
was because they were recognized as belligerents at least by their
allies. But this is not at all the case with the Palestine organizations.
First of all, the Arab governments have been quite eager to dissociate
themselves from the acts of the private warring factions active in
their territories; neither Algeria, nor Syria has wanted to benefit from
the implied responsibility for, the particular hijacking acts of the
Front. Secondly, even if one assumes that the Front and other pri-
vate warring factions are insurgents which have de facto deprived
the Arab governments of part of their sovereignty (where they can-
not implement their decisions due to the resistance of the guerillas),
this is no substitute for the recognition as a belligerent. Failing such
a recognition, they cannot exercise the right of capture on, or over,
the international sea. Legally speaking, they do so at their peril.
It remains to qualify, legally, the captures of airliners by the Arab
commandos. Acts committed in the course of a privateering ex-
pedition but in violation of the international law of warfare have
long been considered to be acts of piracy. "If any private subject
cruise against the enemy without [lawful] . . . commission, they
are liable to be treated as pirates," said Croke in the Curlew in
1812.104 The advent of the Paris Declaration, 1856,105 did not
change this situation. The result was simply that from then on all
acts of privateering could be classed as piracy when performed by
somebody bound by the Declaration. When the Turco-Greek war
broke out in 1897, and both states had acceded to the Declaration, it
was noted by Politis that each could treat the privateers of the other
as pirates. 16 The Spanish decree of April 24, 1898, directed in
Article 7 that non-American vessels committing acts of war against
Spain should be treated as pirates.10 7 In the instructions given by
the French naval authorities in January 1916, all people serving on
board privateer vessels commissioned in violation of the Declaration
104. (1812) STEW. ADM. 312, 326.
105. 15 Nouveau Recueil Gen6ral 791.
106. Chronique, 1897 REV. G . DR. INT. 695.
107. 1898 REV. G&. DR. INT. 762.
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were qualified as "passibles des peines pr6vues pour le crime de pi-
raterie."'10  It is therefore, not surprising that the British definition
of piracy remained very broad. The Privy Council, in 1934, defined
it as "any armed violence at sea which is not a lawful act of war."' 0 9
In the 1967 edition of the well known British textbook by Colom-
bos, the definition includes "acts of violence done on the high seas,
without recognized authority and outside the jurisdiction of any civi-
lized state." 0 To this extent, there is evidently ample support for
the charge that the Arab commandos are engaging in aerial piracy.
This classification, of course, has been bitterly resented by the
Arabs. In 1969 the Jordanian delegate at the United Nations suc-
ceeded, when this organization was to debate the problem of hijack-
ings, in getting the word "piracy" stricken from the headline. The
matter was renamed "forcible diversion of civil aircraft in flight."
He then relied on the definition of piracy given in the Geneva Con-
vention on the High Seas (1958) 1" which also included aerial piracy.
According to this definition, it could not be piracy unless it was
"committed for private ends" and he felt entitled to conclude that
"piracy is connected with robbery and looting for personal gain."
When judging the merits of this contention, it is well, perhaps, first to
recall that the Eastern bloc nations bitterly opposed the restrictions
introduced by the Geneva Conference relative to the scope of the
notion of piracy. The apparent reason was that the Soviets wanted
to condemn the naval warfare of the Nationalists on Formosa. These
nations even attached declarations to their signatures which amounted
to reservations on the point of definition. In the West, it has been
contended that such reservations are null and void." 2  It does not
seem to be contested, however, that the Geneva Convention does not
108. Art. 117. The text is reproduced from Lauterpacht, Insurrection et pira-
terie, 1939 REV. G9N. DR. INT. 513, 524; however, the text here relates the instruc-
tions to the French rather than the American authorities in accordance with Lauter-
pacht's own correction of the matter as expressed in his RECOGNITION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 306.
109. [1934] A.C. 586 ( ).
110. Colombos, supra note 82, at 444.
111. 450 U.N.T.S. 11 (Art. 15). The mistake that the Geneva Convention con-
trols all aspects of piracy is a widespread one. See e.g. Poulantzas, Hijacking or air
piracy, NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD (1970).
112. Supra note 8, at 219.
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affect claims and actions which rest on the rules of warfare, not even
those based on the right of self-defence. 1 3 This is so in spite of the
fact that the Convention lacks the clause, otherwise prevalent, to
the effect that it does not affect the rights of belligerents. Conse-
quently, there would seem to be little need for a reservation in order
to make unlawful privateering piracy.
Thus, the net effect of the Geneva Convention would seem to be
highly inimical to neutrals. They are in difficulty if they want to
check abuses of the laws of war directed against their commerce, due
to the provisions of the Convention, because the Convention in no
way checks the powers of warring factions. Such a state of the law
is best described in the formula of Sir Austen Chamberlain: "a trap
for the innocent and a sign-post for the guilty."" 4
Does its Capture by State Purge it of
Piractical Character?
Oppenheim used to say that "private vessels only can commit pi-
racy . . . A man-of-war or other public ship, as long as she re-
mains such, is never a pirate. If she commits unjustified acts of
violence, redress must be asked from her flag state.""'  Similarly
W.E. Hall stated: "'Piracy' includes acts differing much from each
other in kind and in moral value; but one thing they all have in com-
mon: they are done under conditions which render it impossible or
unfair to hold any state responsible for their commission. ' 116 And
Roxburgh, who edited Oppenheim's treatise after his death, ex-
plained that "piracy is a crime which cannot be committed by the au-
thority of any state" because only thereby is it avoided that piracy will
"give rise to diplomatic complications. 1" 7  There are, in addition,
several reasons why this should be so, apart from the argument put
forward by Roxburgh.
One is the idea that international law, in general, and war, in par-
113. Supra note 8, at 202.
114. House of Commons, Nov. 24, 1927 (relative to the definition of "aggres-
sion").
115. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 341, § 273 (2d ed. 1912).
116. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 310 § 81 (8th ed. 1924).
117. Roxburgh, Submarines at the Washington Conference, 3 Bar. Y.B. INT'L
L. 150, 155 (1923).
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ticular, are matters between states only. This was the temporarily
successful idea of the enlightment to which, as Talleyrand explained
it to Emperor Napoleon I (Bonaparte), "Europe is indebted for the
maintenance and increase of its property even amidst the frequent
wars that have divided it.' ' 1l8 As furthered by Jean Jacques Rous-
seau and others' 9 this was the idea which made the more humane
treatment of prisoners of war possible. 2 ' Consequently, redress for
acts of war should be sought from the belligerent country and not
from the individuals, and this principle applied a fortiori when vio-
lent acts short of war were ordered by one state against another. In
this context it is easy to understand the American attitude in the
McLeod case of the 1840's.
In that case, the American authorities had allowed the gathering,
in 1837, on American territory of what later came to be known as a
filibuster expedition into Canada which at that time was in a state of
rebellion against the Britsh rule. The filibusters planned to enter
Canada by means of a tiny steamer called Caroline and British forces
kept matters under supervision from the Canadian shore. On the
night commencing December 29, an expeditionary force under the
command of Captain Drew surprised the filibusters on the American
side, cut loose the steamer from the dock, set her on fire and sent her
over Niagara Falls. The filibusters and their sympathizers grew
wildly indignant about this energetic action in violation of the sanc-
tity of American soil and when, in 1840, Alexander McLeod visited
New York on business and happened to boast about his participa-
tion in the British expedition, he was arrested and indicted for the
killing of the two Americans who had lost their lives in the nightly
affray. The diplomatic exchange between Great Britain and the
United States which resulted from this incident prompted Daniel
Webster, the American Secretary of State, to explain the American
attitude to be that "after the avowal of the transaction [i.e., Captain
118. Moniteur Universel, Dec. 5, 1806, No. 339, at 1462, col. 2 (signed Berlin,
Nov. 20, 1806) (as translated by Bartlett, Liability for Official War Crimes, 35
Law Q. Rev. 178 (1919).
119. 1 CONTRAT SOCIAL, - (- ed. -).
120. It is a peculiar twist of history that today, when war is as total as the
government being fought against, and consequently the basis of the privileged treat-
ment of prisoners of war has totally disappeared, the privilege as such is still capable
to rally enthusiastic support in countries of the Western, non-Communist type.
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Drew's expedition] as a public transaction, authorized and under-
taken by the British authorities, individuals concerned in it ought
not. . . to be holden personally responsible in the ordinary tribunals
for their participation in it.' 121
This doctrine that a formal State commission purges the act com-
mitted of its criminality under the laws of the state at the receiving
end, has found restatement even after the Second World War in
treatises 122 and cases. Among the latter should be noted the case
of Hanswolf von Herder, decided by the Swedish Supreme Court in
1946.123 Von Herder was a German citizen and was called up for
military service during the Second World War. As an ordinary sol-
dier he was assigned to the German "Abwehr" in occupied Norway
and was there given military intelligence work directed against Swe-
den. When Germany lost the war, von Herder took refuge in Swe-
den, was arrested and tried for espionage. Eventually, he was ac-
quitted but expelled from Sweden. Lotika Sarkar explains the out-
come of the case in terms of the court "adhering to the territorial
principle," referring thereby to the fact that the intelligence work
had been carried out in Norway. 124  Professor Gihl, however, con-
siders it difficult to find any reason for the acquittal other "than the
fact that von Herder was an officer and had carried out the activity
in question in the course of his duties." Having this for a point of
departure, Gihl indeed considers that it was unlawful for the Rus-
sians to convict Francis Powers in September 1960 for espionage
consisting of his flying over Russian territory with an American mili-
tary U-2 plane for the purpose of collecting information.' 25 Powers
121. GmL, Who is a Spy?, LEGAL EssAYs-A TRIBUTE TO FREDE CASTBERG,
230, 235 (OsLo, NORWAY, 1963). For a detailed account of the case, see Jennings,
The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938).
122. See, e.g., VERDROSS, VbLKERREcTrr, 235 (5th ed. Vienna, 1964); KELSEN &
TUCKER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 358 (2d ed. 1966).
123. Von Herder v. Public Prosecutor, Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv, 65 (1946); [1946]
Ann. Dig. 95.
124. Sarkar, The Proper Law of Crime, 11 INT. & COM. L.Q. 446, 452 (1952);
also published in MUELLER & WISE, INTERNATIONAL CRiMINAL LAw, 50, 56 (1965).
125. Supra note 121, at 234, 235. Before he was charged with the Chair in
International Law in Stockholm, Professor Gihl was legal counsel to the Swedish
Foreign Office and served in that capacity during the second world war. It is
probably a complete mistake to ascribe the outcome of the Herder Case to "the ter-
ritorial principle" and the reasons will be set out more fully below.
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came down in uniform, his aircraft had U.S. markings and the
United States officially announced that he had been flying under U.S.
orders. Consequently, there was no question about the United States
not being responsible for the violation of Soviet territory. But, con-
cludes Professor Gihl: "The United States Government and Powers
could not both be responsible at the same time. "126
A position such as that which Webster took in the McLeod case
also fits in well with the general expositions of the so-called "act of
state" doctrine as stated in the American case Underhill v. Her-
nandez.12 7 The doctrine means that "every sovereign state is bound
to respect the independence of every other sovereign, and the courts
of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of another govern-
ment done within its own territory." Indeed, the national court lacks
competence to pronounce upon the legality of an act performed by
a foreign state and unless the foreign state consents to such a pro-
nouncement, the act must be taken as a fact.' 2 s
This attitude toward foreign states, however, has not fared well in
the development which has taken place in this century.12 9  Indeed,
the general return, to the idea of a bellum iustum has dispelled the
classic European notion of the iustus hostis and the fatefully total
victories of the one side in the two world wars have allowed the new
doctrine to work unfettered of the restraint which the resources of
the opposing nations otherwise normally will impose on the victors.
The inclination has been to view the world at large in the light of
the law as conceived back home and to inflict upon the individuals
revenge for law-breaking which could not be satisfied by dealing
with the state. One of the principal instruments in so doing has been
the setting aside of the defence of obedience to superior orders.12 9a It
is ironic that most countries which have participated in this turning of
the tables, are given to proclaim, as a matter of course, that in case
126. Id. at 240.
127. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
128. See generally Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826
(1959); Van Panhuys, In the Borderland Between the Act of State Doctrine and
Questions of Jurisdictional Immunities, 13 INT. & COMP. L.Q. 1193 (1964).
129. For previous criticism of the idea that an act cannot be piratical if done
under state authority, see Magellan Pirates, 1 SPiNe's ECCL. & ADM. REP. 81 (1965)
(decided by Lushington).
129a. See DINSTEIN, OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDER (1965).
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of an unavoidable conflict between a rule of the law of nations and
the municipal law of the country in question, the courts should defer
to the supreme authority from which they derive their own powers.3
and apply the municipal law. Indignation over enemy warfare and
the conviction that the enemy's governmental officials would escape
punishment, if it were left to their own governments to try them, have
contributed to the opposite conclusion in matters of political conflict:
international law as interpreted back home takes precedence over
the municipal law and orders of the government which the accused
had to obey.
The development in this direction was particularly spurred on by
pronouncements by the victors' tribunals after the Second World War
and the support which these pronouncements subsequently received
from the United Nations, at that time re-organized as a world or-
ganization. It may not be profitable, however, to discuss those pro-
nouncements themselves but would rather be more appropriate to
discuss subsequent applications of them in a setting without victors
and vanquished.
When the Indonesians, in pursuance of the policy to try to change
the status of New Guinea, in May 1953, sent a party of Indonesian
soldiers with arms and munitions to land on the coast of the Dutch
part of the island and build a strong point there, they were made
prisoners by Dutch forces and brought to trial according to Dutch
criminal law for having attempted to bring Dutch territory under for-
eign domination. The local Dutch court convicted them of this
crime holding that "the prisoners cannot have thought in good faith
that an Indonesian commander would be competent to give an or-
der for an assault intended to bring Netherlands New Guinea under
Indonesion rule."'' Accepting that it was a lesser evil to be put in
jail by the Dutch after legalistic rites than to be shot by them in battle,
the soldiers presumably resigned themselves to this judgment. It
must have been a matter of bitter surprise for the Dutch court, how-
ever, about a decade later, to read in the resolutions of the Confer-
130. SMITH, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA, 209 (3rd ed. 1959). An
elaborate study of the enforcement of international law in the courts of Germany,
Switzerland, France and Belgium down to the 1930's is offered by MASTER'S, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS (1932).
131. Raad van Justitie March 9, 1955, 3 N.T.I.R. 164 (1956).
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ence of Non-Aligned Countries, assembled in Cairo in 1964, that the
participants had undertaken to render all necessary support to people
struggling against "colonialism and neo-colonialism." Apparently,
it was only when the soldiers had been made prisoners by the Dutch
that their behaviour was unlawful; under the international law as in-
terpreted by a great number of independent states it was completely
lawful. 13 2
It has been asserted that the military U-2 pilot with military orders
to fly over the territory of another country could lawfully be tried by
that other country for whatever violation of domestic law of the latter
country which had taken place.' Obviously, the Dutch case seri-
ously questions the wisdom of that statement.
As long as we have to face the fact that political conflict will even-
tually be settled by arms and since the post-war period has experi-
enced about as many armed conflicts as did the mid-war period there
is little reason to believe that the prospects of peace have been much
furthered by the advent of the "peace-loving" United Nations. And
if we are to accept the notion that war may be ended otherwise than
by total victory, it would seem that the Act of State doctrine is a much
sounder basis for solution than the bellum iuslum theory.'
132. Green, New States in International Law, 4 ISRAEL L. REV. 27, 46 (19 ).
Green adds: "The attitude adopted by the African [i.e. Arab and Negro states in
Africa] States suggests that they regard their belief in 'African' self-government
above the obligation imposed upon them by their membership in the United Nations
to 'live together in peace with one another as good neighbors ... to ensure ...
that armed force shall not be used ... [and to] refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or independence
of any State'."
133. Wright, Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 836 (1960).
134. Suffice it to point out that the otherwise able discussion of these matters in
DINSTEIN, THE DEFENCE OF OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Leyden, 1965), seems to build on a misunderstanding of the interrelationship
between armed force and state structure. Certainly it is not true that "the se-
curity of the international community is not dependent upon the existence of effi-
cient and disciplined national armies." Id. at 21. On the contrary, the existence of
the very states which form the international community is in each particular case
dependent upon the existence of armed power within each state, normally in the
form of the national armed forces. See OLIVECRONA, RXTTSORDNING. I DIER OCH
FAKTA, 15, 262 (Lund, 1966): "Military power and police are attributes exclusively
belonging to the State. That is their mark of distinction. . . . [T]he whole con-
figuration of the world is dependent upon the existence of a number of different
military organizations . . . . [Tihe monopolization of armed' power is a precondi-
tion for organized government, for legislation, adjudication and administration ...
The monopolization of armed power and by that the powers to exercise violence at a
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It does not seem necessary though, for the purposes of this dis-
cussion to dwell more on the demise of the Act of State doctrine in
the wake of dismissing the plea of obedience to superior orders. It
is sufficient to conclude that a broad sector of contemporary legal
thinking is perfectly prepared to hold the individual responsible as
well as the state. To this extent, there is, therefore, no longer any
bar to treating as pirates the agents of displeasing or obnoxious states.
Perhaps it is useful to recall, here, that the idea of bellum iustum
worked equally to confuse all issues in the case of the Barbary Cor-
sairs. While little doubt could be entertained that these (Barbary)
areas were more or less independent parts of the Ottoman Empire
(except Morocco which was altogether independent and sovereign)
most Christian nations felt entitled to look independently upon the
question of piracy: "The Barbary Corsair was a pirate, and no one
doubted the fact."' 5  Furthermore, "on the whole in the long his-
tory of North African piracy the pirates received short shrift when-
ever the opportunity occurred." There is a ready explanation for
this apparent departure from the general idea that "an act cannot be
piratical if it is done under the authority of a state,"' 86 and that is
the idea of a bellum iustum. That the Barbary sailors themselves
were waging a holy war on Christianity has already been mentioned,
but let it not be forgotten that Christian nations were waging a
holy war on the infidels as well. 13 The Laws of Oleron equalize
the lot of pirates and infidels: they are both subject to the extreme
rights of war.'38 Francisco de Vitoria, in the sixteenth century, fa-
greater scale is generally a precondition for organized societal life and for a higher
culture. It is an erroneous idea that violence could be abolished and that the law
should rule in sovereign majesty. To abolish all violence would be to abolish the
military organizations of the State. But this would open the road to anarchy. The
setting up of new armed organizations cannot be prevented by mere disuasion."
(Author's transl.).
135. de Montmorency, Piracy and the Barbary Corsairs, 35 LAW Q. REV. 133,
141 (1919).
136. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS, 241 (5th ed. 1955). Even Sir Edward
Coke conceded that enemies could never commit piracy within the meaning of 28
HEN. 8, C. 15, see INSTITUTES 4th Part, 153.
137. An account of the state of war between the Barbary States and the Chris-
tian States will be found in Stiel, supra note 6, at 39 n.2. de Montmorency gives
a superficial account of peace treaties between the contestants mainly based on JEAN
DUMONT, CORPS UNIVERSEL DIPLOMATIQUE DU DROIT DES GENS (8 vols., Am.
sterdam, 1726-31), see supra note 135.
138. § 45.
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voured almost any form of warfare so long as the victims were the in-
fidels, however illegal such acts would be between Christians.' 39
Peace was a rare condition indeed and it seldom troubled the Sover-
eign Military Order of St. John of Jersualem-an order of knight-
hood for 1113 A.D., the members of which since 1120 A.D. made
a fourth monastic vow to fight against the infidels. Since 1530 this
order sat on the island of Malta "pour . . . qu'ils puissent . . . em-
ployer leurs forces et leurs armes contre les perfides ennemis de la
sainte foi" as it was put in Emperior Charles V's Instrument of Do-
nation. The interpretation has been advanced that the gift of the is-
land was made in return for a pledge to perpetually fight the Mos-
lems, the Turks and the Pirates. 140 There is, consequently, ample
support for the view that the relationship between European nations
and the Barbary states was essentially one of warfare, indeed, a war-
fare unfettered by the intra-European law of nations.' 4' Conse-
quently, it is believed that the views taken toward treatment of the
corsairs of the Barbary States are really of little significance for the
law or piracy.
Is Capture by Insurgents Piratical in Character?
Turning now to the case of insurgents we find that theirs is a case
of ever growing importance as the likely disorders of the future are
not war or military attack between states but subversion, revolution,
insurrection and civil war.' 42
139. See, e.g., DE IURE BELLI, 42 (1539) (only massacres on children appear
to be excepted, see DE IURE BELLI, 38).
140. As to the state of war generally, see supra note 137. On the perpetual war,
see HEGEWISCH, Erlijuterung der Frage: "Ist es recht, dass wir die Algerier und
Tripolitaner Seeriiuber nennen?", HISTORISCHE, PHILOSOPHISCHE UND LITERARISCHE
SCIIFTEN 18, 21 (Hamburg, 1793).
141. Perhaps this statement even may be permitted to cover the final outburst
of Barbary piracy in the 1890's, when one of the Moroccan tribes in the Riff area
suddenly started to practice it on European vessels. The affairs of the Anna, the
Prosper-Corin and the Tones-Enrique appear indeed to be the dying convulsions of
the savage era. Cf. supra note 106, at 425.
142. The United Nations Charter bars conquest from the outside (Art. 2, para. 4)
but-like traditional international law-it does not bar or even address itself to
revolution within, whether by constitutional means or by force. See Henkin, Force,
Intervention, and Neutrality in Contemporary International Law, (1963) PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 154. It is but natural
that tactical and political experts of governments, anticipating a pay-off of lip service
to the Charter, will advise force to be applied in furtherance of political aims in the
manner not outlawed by the Charter.
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There have been few uprisings in the course of which the legitimate
government has not attempted to brand the insurgent vessels as pi-
rates. There is not much difference to be seen between the British
Parliament declaring, on the outbreak of the American revolution, all
ships operating in the service of the rebels to be pirates, and the
Spanish legitimate government decreeing on July 27, 1936, the Na-
tionalist cruiser Almirante Cervera to be a pirate ship which should
be treated according to the international law of piracy.'43 Indeed,
even the tiny little steamer Caroline, active in the abortive American
filibuster expedition against Canada of 1837, was branded by the
British to be of "piratical character."' 44
From the point of view of the legitimate government, the situa-
tion is normally quite simple, legally speaking. An armed rebel at-
tracts the full weight of the state's penal law. He stands condemned
of the most heinous of domestic crimes-treason. As long as the nor-
mal apparatus of judicial enforcement is effective, the government
will usually also act within the framework of the municipal law rather
than enhancing the status of the insurgents by recognizing them as
belligerents. Even if the rebels have a measure of success (naturally
by methods which are both clandestine and violent and consequently
criminal from the governmental point of view, and which strain
the judicial and police apparatus), the government is likely to stick
to the same approach. However, in the end, if the rebels' success is
sufficient, the government will have to switch from the domestic law
approach to the law of warfare and perhaps, too, to peaceful recogni-
tion of a new state of law. This brings the qualification as piracy
to the forefront, for the criminality of the piracy is likely to change in
the same way: from crime, to capture under the law of naval war-
fare, to peaceful requisition at whatever price the rebel leadership
finds useful to pay.
A useful example of this development is offered by the American
Civil War. When the war broke out practically the whole regular
navy was in Union hands. The Confederates, consequently, had to
143. Gaceta de Madrid for July 27, 1936, col. -, -, reproduced in GENET,
DROIT MARITIME POUR LE TEMP DE GUERRE, 185 n. 270 (1937) (some excerpts
translated to English will be found in Genet, The Charge of Piracy in the Spanish
Civil War, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 253, 260 (1938).
144. See 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 85 (1938).
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rely on privateering on the high seas and the American Civil War
grew into the last outburst of large scale privateering. 145 The Union
originally charged the prisoners taken from Confederate privateers
with piracy,14 but soon abandoned this policy when it lead to re-
taliatory action on the part of the Confederates. By an order of
January 31, 1862, all "pirates" were transferred to military prisons
for the purpose "of exchanging them as prisoners of war."'47 The
charges were no more successful in neutral courts. In the French
Alabama Case, decided by the Tribunal de commerce de Bordeaux
on August 8, 1863, the owners of the cargo of the American vessel
Olive Jane which had been sunk by the famous Confederate priva-
teer steamer Alabama under the command of Captain Semmes, main-
tained that the Alabama was a pirate. The court rejected the claim:
"L'Alabama, arm6 en guerre, portant le pavilion de la Conf6deration
du Sud, faisant uniquemen la guerre au profit du pavilion arbor6
A bord, ne saurait &tre consid6r6e comme un pirate.'
' 4 8
The conclusion of this state of affairs is drawn by W.E. Hall: "It
is impossible to pretend that acts which are done for the purpose of
setting up a legal state of things, and which may in fact have al-
ready succeeded in setting it up, are piratical for want of an external
recognition of their validity, when the grant of that recognition is
properly dependent in the main upon the existence of such a condi-
tions of affairs as can only be produced by the very acts in ques-
tion."' 49
The main point in the case of insurgents, however, is not the treat-
ment prepared for the rebels by their adversary, the legitimate gov-
ernment. It is, rather, the attitude taken by third powers. Third
powers may consider their own interests only or they may be ma-
145. The importance of this type of warfare may best be judged by the award
of 3,200,000 pounds granted to the United States by the Arbitration Tribunal in
Geneva on Sept. 15, 1872, for Confederate privateers having been permitted the use
of British neutral waters. See generally 1 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
495-682 (1898), and 4 op. cit. 4057-4178. SCOTT, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW,
713-20 (1960) (gives the award).
146. Calvo, Examen des trois rgles de droit international proposges dans le
trait6 de Washington, 1874 REv. DR. INT. Lto. COMP. 453, 454.
147. SCOTT, supra note 145, at 350.
148. Supra note 8, at 155.
149. Supra note 116, at 310.
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nipulated to a greater or lesser extent by the parties to the conflict.
If a third power were to recognize the parties as belligerents, that
would, under the laws of war, imply that both parties have the right
of capture on the high seas and above them vis-d-vis the sea and air-
borne commerce of the recognizing states and can proclaim block-
ades on the high seas to the detriment of such commerce, not to men-
tion establish war or risk zones on the high seas. Often a state is not
willing to do this.150 It is then more tempting not to recognize bellig-
erency since that confers an illicit character upon naval action against
foreign sea or airborne commerce. One main example of this was the
attitude of Western nations towards Governmental and Nationalist
action in the Spanish Civil War of the 1930's. Some of these nations
were happy to outlaw as "piratical" naval action, aimed at prevent-
ing the adversary party's importation of contraband. 5' A more re-
cent example has been the United States' attitude towards the war
between Communists and Nationalists in China. For political rea-
sons, neither the Chinese (Nationalist-legitimate) government, nor
the American government, wanted to concede to the Communist in-
surgents the prestige and status of belligerents. As a consequence,
the Nationalists were deprived of the right to interfere with the sea
and airborne commerce of the Communists except within the limits
of the Chinese territorial waters.' 5 2 The American Civil War offers
an example of the opposite attitude. Great Britain and France al-
most immediately granted recognition to the contestants in the war as
belligerents and this, indeed, made possible the Confederate war-
fare by means of privateers. The Union government made sophisti-
cated moves to have this weapon outlawed. It proposed a conven-
tion with the two powers mentioned by which the United States
would accept the Declaration of Paris, 1856, as it stood. The Un-
ion interest melted away, however, when the British and French gov-
150. For a reasoned view, see Wilson, Insurgency and International Maritime
Law, 1 Am. J. IN'L L. 46, 60 (1907).
151. Cf. Genet, The Charge of Piracy in the Spanish Civil War, supra note
143, at 262. It may be added that the action by the nations in question appears to
have been most efficient inasmuch as the attacks by unknown submarines and air-
craft ceased almost immediately. de la Pradelle, La piraterie adrienne: notion et ef-fets, Rnv. GEN. AiR 299 (1969).
152. Woolsey, Closure of Ports by the Chinese Nationalist Government, 44 AM.
J. INT'L L. 350, 354 (1950).
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ernments intimated that they would attach to their signatures of the
convention a declaration which would prevent the convention from
having any effect on the warfare of the Confederates.' 53
If the insurgents have not been recognized as belligerents, what is
the status of their ships cruising the high seas? During the nineteenth
century it became a fairly well settled practice in international law
that insurgents who interfered with the shipping of a third nation on
the high seas (presumably in the exercise of some right equivalent
to the right of angary belonging to a belligerent), if apprehended by
the warships of such a nation, could be treated as pirates. Instruc-
tions to this effect were given to Britsh naval forces in 1873, to
American naval forces in 1876, and to Imperial German naval forces
in 1903.151 Even if Castrdn submits that "it seems neither right nor
fair to equate insurgents with pirates,"'15 5 there was little authority
until 1958 which seriously challenged this legal qualifcation of in-
surgents' naval action against third country shipping. 1 6 The Har-
vard Draft (1932) attempted to exclude insurgents' acts from the
definition of piracy. 57 This solution, though, would have afforded
the insurgents no protection from charges of piracy brought by the
affected third country, but only the satisfaction that nonaffected
states could not be called upon to hunt them down on the basis of
the universal jurisdiction over piracy.' When the Convention on
the High Seas of 1958 was being prepared, largely on the basis of
153. Malkin, The Inner History of the Declaration of Paris, 8 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 1, 42 (1927); Hall, Should the Declaration of Paris, 1856, be revised?, in U.S.
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE-INTERNATIONAL LAW ToPics AND DISCUSSIONS 107, 116
(1905).
154. The British directions to the Admiralty of July 24, 1873, are partly repro-
duced in Stiel, supra note 6, at 96 n.1; the United States Navy Regulations of 1876
may be found in 2 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1108 ( ); and the
Imperial German "Bestimmungen fir den Dienst an Bord" of Nov. 21, 1903, are
partly reproduced in Stiel, supra note 6, at 96 n.2.
155. Castr6n, Civil War, 142 ANNALES ACADEMIAE SCIENTIARUM FENNICAE 2,
131 (Helsinki, 1966).
156. Lauterpacht summarizes the 1947 situation under British and American law
as follows: "The preponderant practice of governments, weighty judicial decisions, as
well as the majority of writers, seem to favour the view that unrecognized insur-
gents, if they interfere with the ships of third states or their subjects, may be treated
as piratical." RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 298.
157. Art. 16; see supra note 19, at 857.
158. Cf. McDOUGAL & BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS, 817 (1962).
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the Harvard Draft, the debate did not focus on the unrecognized in-
surgents. A vote was taken to determine whether the words "for
private ends" in what is now Article 15 of the Convention should
be retained. The affirmative vote at least brought about the same
result as would have followed from the Harvard Draft. At present,
then, the situation would seem to be as follows: A state which does
not recognize the insurgents as belligerents can not, under the gen-
eral international law of piracy, call upon other states to assist in sup-
pressing the naval action of the insurgents against the sea or airborne
commerce of the first state; it will have to do so on its own under
general principles of self-defence, and even if "the right of self-de-
fence on the high seas in time of peace has at no time received uni-
versal approval"' 9 the risk would seem minimal to exercise it against
ships not flying the flag of any recognized state. 6 ° But states which
do recognize the insurgents as belligerents, on the other hand, need
not apply the principles of the Geneva Convention of 1958 to their
deeds. If the insurgents' acts are in excess of the law of naval war-
fare, their captures can be treated as piracy and the law of piracy
can be invoked against them.
A complication which ought not to be left out of sight concerns
the lower limit of insurgency. The anarchists raised the issue when
they started to appear towards the end of the nineteenth century.
They wanted to terrorize society but did not want to govern it. It is
presumably with an eye towards this phenomenon that W. E. Hall is
unwilling to grant any rights of insurgency to an individual exercising
violence upon his neighbour and his neighbour's property, which
would raise him above being a pirate, unless he belongs to a group
which somehow forms "a politically organized society."'' Lately,
this point has been again stressed by Fenwick commenting upon the
Santa Maria party of Captain Galvao: "The status of insurgency is
not one to be conceded to any and every citizen who believes that the
government of his country is tyrannical and should be over-
thrown."'6 2 Whether malicious killing, wounding or destruction is
159. Brownie, The Use of Force in Self-Defence, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 183,
252 (1961).
160. See text infra at -.
161. Supra note 116, at 311, 312, 313.
162. Fenwick, "Piracy" in the Caribbean, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 426, 427 (1961).
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done for "private ends" or not, when the activity is rather individual
than collective or when it is rather the expression of discontent with
life than of a constructive political message, does not seem to have
received any authoritative answer in the Geneva Convention.16 It
is difficult to see that the Convention has added such new elements
to the classical problem so that this type of activity must now be privi-
leged. Although in an era characterized more by the absence than
by the presence of solidarity between states, the classifaction is no
act of great significance. Obviously this type of activity can be pi-
racy under the Geneva Convention.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICE POWER
POLICING THE INTERNATIONAL SEA
When the high seas were no longer considered to be a part of the
territory of any single state but a free space for all to fight on or for
all to govern, the eras of landlocked thinking came to an end. We
are used to associating the idea of the freedom of the seas, i.e., the
idea of the international sea, with the anonymous publication in 1609
of Hugo Grotius' chapter on "Mare liberum." While this work is
mainly directed against the terrene view of the sea held by the Brit-
ish, it was in fact only part of the much greater work "De jure
praede" written in 1605 at the behest of the Dutch government, or,
perhaps, the Dutch East India Company (in which the Dutch prov-
inces appointed members of the Board of Directors) as an attack
on the Spanish (and Portuguese) claims under what Grotius calls
the donatio Alexandri.16 4 But, it was the felicitous phrase of Cor-
nelius Bynkershoek in 1702: "Imperium terrae finitur ubi finitur
armorum vis" which ended the so-called "hundred-year war of
163. A survey will be found in McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 158, at 810-12.
164. On Grotius' part, see generally NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
LAW OF NATIONS, 97 (1950). Grotius' arguments of that day-he was born 1583
and consequently only 22 years old-were perhaps rather cheap: he confused the
feudal title of the Spanish with the ownership notion of the Digests and was thereby
able to conclude that Alexander Borgia no more than anyone else "plus iuris a
alium transferre potest quam ipse habet." See Staedler, Hugo Grotius iiber die
"donatio Alexandri" von 1493, 1941 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR V6LKERRECHT 258. De iure
praede was left unpublished: publication did not take place until 1868, see SCHMITr,
DER NOMOS DER EiDE IM VOLKERRECHT DES Jus PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM 151 (Kbiln,
1950).
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books" (der hundertjiihrige Biicherkrieg) which was waged around
this idea in the wake of Grotius' efforts to satisfy his Dutch masters.
Bynkershoek's phrase much better conveys what the new teaching
meant-the existence of an immense ocean territory which be-
longed to nobody and which could be appropriated by no one.
When this idea took form during the seventeenth century there
arose also the problem of whether the sea was simply the arena for
all to fight in or, somehow, the framework for orderly cooperation
and competition.
Privateering havings its heydays in the eighteenth century' and
needing nothing more than a letter of marque from a belligerent sov-
ereign, the high seas were nearly always affected by whatever war
was going on in whatever corner of the earth. Of course, no nation
was willing to offer its merchantmen as the prey of the greedy and
violent who furthermore, if they exceeded the pattern of lawful pri-
vateering were often held to be pirates. The result was that each na-
tion tried to protect his shipping by arms. In these days, as put by
Commander Burdick H. Brittin, "all nations employed substantial
portions of their naval forces in efforts directed towards this end,"
that is to say "as the guardians of the freedom of the seas" and having
the suppression of piracy as one of their primary concerns.' 66
Behaviour on the high seas thus could be considered from two
aspects: what to do when a foreign ship approached and how to
approach a foreign ship. The former problem was mainly the one of
the merchantman, the second, of the man-of-war. But it might well
be the other way around as was illustrated by Lieutenant Colonel A.J.
Wrangel commanding the Swedish frigate Fridja escorting the famous
brig Maria.'67
THE NATIONAL FLAG
The basic rule of the international law of the sea is that the na-
tional flag of a recognized state is a matter of extensive protection by
165. von Martens, supra note 72, at 46, concludes from the amount of regula-
tion of privateering in contemporary statutes and treatises that "die 2te Hiilfte des
17ten Jahrhunderts die Zeit sey, von welchen der ausgebreiteste und allgemenste
Gebrauch der Caper anfdngt."
166. BuRTTiN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SEAGOING OFFICERS, 85 (1956).
167. 1 C. Rob. 340 (1799).
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that very state. In times of peace, this general principle forbids any
interference with ships of another nationality upon the high seas. In
the famous controversy about the Canadian registered rum running
ship i'm Alone which was sunk on the high seas in the Gulf of Mexico
by the American revenue cutter Dexter on March 22, 1929, the
Commissioners appointed by the United States and Canada jointly
held that the sinking of the ship "by officers of the United States
Coast Guard was . . . an unlawful act" and recommended that the
United States apologize to the Canadian Government and pay a ma-
terial amend in respect of the wrong. 168  We find the same principle
advanced by the United States in the classical case of the Virginius.
That insurgent vessel, in the face of the Spanish warship Tornado,
hoisted false colours (in fact the Stars and Stripes) to avoid seizure.
When the Spaniards boarded her, nonetheless, the United States felt
entitled to lodge a protest with the Spanish government for violation
of sovereignty. In the opinion of the Attorney General, Spain had
"no jurisdiction whatever over the question as to whether or not such
vessel is on the high seas in violation of any law of the United
States."" "
Acts of interference, however, may be justified under powers con-
ferred by treaty. 7 ' Customary law is believed to accept a general
exception to the rule, that a warship is entitled to verify the na-
tionality of any merchant ship it meets at sea.'17  But many coun-
tries make the unlawful use of their flag a criminal offence, 72 and
it does not seem to be a well considered solution that foreign war-
ships should have powers to police such a regulation. In the Ge-
neva Convention on the High Seas, (Article 22, paragraph 1(c)),
this right applies only if "there is reasonable ground for suspecting
. . . that . . . the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the
warship. x17
168. 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 329 (1935).
169. Scott, supra note 145, at 320.
170. See, e.g., Convention for Regulating the Police of the North Sea Fisheries.
1882, and the Convention Respecting the Liquor Traffic in the North Sea.
171. Smith, supra note 130, at 64.
172. Under the British Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, § 64, the illegitimate
use of the British flag rendered the ship liable to forfeiture, see Smith, supra note
130, at 64.
173. This solution partly supports the position advocated by the American At-
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In times of war, every belligerant warship has the right of visit and
search. Every ship on the high seas is subject to this right, however
small the conflict upon which the right is based. The only case which
may be an exception to the general rule concerns the armed convoy.
Although the British in the old days were powerful enough to also in-
sist upon visiting neutral merchantmen in a convoy of neutral war-
ships, and the relative weakness of the neutrals barred them from
successfully opposing the practice, it does not require much common
sense to see in what situations these practices upon the armed neutrals
will doubtless be ending. 174
Moving now, for the sake of completeness, to the territorial sea,
the basic rule is that the warships and public vessels of the littoral
state can interfere as they please with foreign ships. The problem
posed thus is the opposite of the one on the high seas-whether there
is any right of innocent passage; a right to pass unmolested. These
matters are regulated in the Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958.171 Under Article 14, para-
graph 2 "passage" means any navigation which traverses the terri-
torial sea, to and from the high seas, and to and from internal waters.
The passage must not be hampered by the littoral state if it is inno-
cent (Article 15), but it ceases to be so (and to be privileged) if it
is prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
state (Article 14, paragraph 4). The privilege also expires if the
littoral state wants to exercise its criminal jurisdiction on board the
foreign merchantman if the behaviour which is classed as "criminal"
by the littoral state "is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country
or the good order of the territorial sea" (Article 19, paragraph 1)
or if it has consequences which extend to the littoral state (Article 19,
paragraph 1(a).
THE JOLLY ROGER: THE CASE OF THE UNRECOGNIZED FLAG
If we turn to the ships sailing under the famous "Jolly Roger"
torney General in the Virginius Case, partly derogates from it inasmuch as a sus-
picion of identical nationality will permit what the Attorney General considered
a violation of the American flag. In the latter respect, indeed, as noted by Simon-
net: "ce n'est pas une exception, mais une application de la r~gle qu'en haute mer
les navires ne rel~vent que de 1'Etat du pavilion." See supra note 8, at 181.
174. Cf. Tucker, The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea, U.S. NAVAL WAR
COLLEGE-INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIEs, 334 (1955).
175. 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
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or under the less well known flags of some unrecognized insurgents,
we get into the area of the unregistered ships-ships without na-
tionality. The case of the Asya is the celebrated illustration of the
principle prevailing."7 6 In the days of the British mandate of Pale-
stine, the Asya made a trip between La Ciotat Bay in France and a
port north of Tel Aviv with 733 immigrants to support the Zionist
cause in Palestine. Approached on the high seas by the British de-
stroyer Chequers on March 27, 1946, the Asya hoisted after first
showing false colours, the Zionist flag. Chequers sent a boarding
party which forced the Asya to put into Palestine territorial waters.
In the subsequent criminal proceedings against her owners part of
the defense to charges of violating a local immigration ordinance
was based on the fact that the visit by the Chequers was an illegal
interference with the freedom of the seas. When the case reached
the Privy Council, this defense was brushed aside on the strength of
a quote from Oppenheim: "a vessel not sailing under the maritime
flag of a State enjoys no protection whatever, for the freedom of navi-
gation on the open sea is freedom for such vessels only as sail under
the flag of a State.' 77
The Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 1958, has interfered
slightly with this rule. Under Article 22, paragraph 1(c), of that
Convention, a warship is not even entitled to approach an unregis-
tered ship except if there is reasonable ground to suspect that the
ship has a nationality which is the same as that of the warship. 178
It is clear, nonetheless that the unregistered ship is at a loss since no-
body will press its case against the interfering government. This
dilemma has repeatedly been illustrated in the course of government
attacks on piratical broadcasting installations in European waters in
response to their challenge of governmental radio monopolies.
Furthermore, it is easy to perceive a tendency to return, by way of
"contiguous zones" and the like, to the terrene view of the sea. That
return means, of course, that the notion of the "international sea"
loses out proportionately in the process. 179
176. The Asya, [1948] Ann. Dig. 115.
177. Id. at 124; 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 546 (5th ed. 1955).
178. Supra note 155, at 132.
179. See, e.g., supra note 158, at 595 n. 90 with comments on the too respectful
attitude to the freedom-of-the-seas notion taken by the Scandinavian countries.
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POLICING THE SKIES
Turning now to aircraft, it is clear that the very technical condi-
tions of flight are such that interference in flight is a method of very
restricted usefulness. The aircraft has been aptly described as "a
tin can in the sky"-you cannot force that tin can to open, you can-
not even force it to come down against the will of the pilot in com-
mand except by shooting it down. The famous Maydeck Case1 80
arose when a Bulgarian fighter aircraft fired at an El Al airliner
which was, by mistake, out of Air Lane Amber 10 between Belgrad
and Saloniki (the lane assigned to it under the flight plan) and in-
truding upon Bulgarian air space: total loss, 58 victims. Sending
up fighter aircraft is, therefore, one way to enforce orders to the man
in command of the airliner in flight, but it is a kind of brinksmanship.
As against a pilot with responsibility for his passengers, it works
well. As against a hijacker, it hardly works at all since he rightly
assumes that the fighter pilot will be more considerate to the passen-
gers-hostages than the hijacker intends to be. Perhaps it should
be added, too, that the Tokyo Convention of 1963 obliges the con-
tracting states to restore control of the hijacked aircraft to the lawful
commander and this cannot reasonably be done by destroying the
aircraft with its captive commander.181
At this point it may be wise to say a few words on buzzing as a
means of interfering with aircraft in flight. It is certainly no suc-
cess. When Trans World Airlines flight 840 was captured by Arab
commandos, Israeli fighter aircraft took to the air to buzz it down at
Lydda airport (Tel Aviv) and when LOT flight 247 was hijacked
by East Germans attempting to escape into West Berlin, two Soviet
Migs tried to buzz it down on the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain.
In both cases the technique was of absolutely no avail. The prime
concern of the airliner pilots was to keep the hijackers happy and the
buzzing simply meant extra difficulties in achieving that goal.
It is clear, then, that the type of police interference discussed in
relation to the high seas is largely academic in relation to the skies
above them. It is, indeed, difficult to find a case which illustrates
problems of such interference with aircraft. The only case which
180. REV. FR. DR. AfRIEN 106 (1964); 232 (1965).
181. - U.S. Av. 305 (-1963).
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has been disputed in aviation concerns the immunity which a charter-
party would confer upon an aircraft flying over the high seas in re-
lation to the state of registry. This point was raised in the famous
Ben Bella Case in 1956. Here, a French registered airliner was char-
tered by a Moroccan airline (Morocco at that time being a French
protectorate). On October 22, 1956, in flight over the Mediter-
ranean en route between Rabat and Tunis with Ben Bella and other
important Algerian rebels as passengers, the French pilot received
orders from the French authorities in Algiers (at that time part of
France) to land in Algiers for control. He complied, and the Al-
gerian rebels were seized by the French. Morocco protested against
the seizure of a Moroccan plane over the high seas, and an inter-
national commission of inquiry and conciliation was set up in Ge-
neva. However, when Morocco became convinced that she could
not win, she withdrew her delegation and the commission efforts
broke down. 182
It does not seem altogether unreasonable that the charter-party
should confer some immunity upon the aircraft over the high seas,
particularly if a change of colours of the aircraft is involved. A
time-chartered plane is often repainted in the colours of the charterer.
Lord Wilberforce, explaining the Tokyo Convention Bill to the
House of Lords on June 12, 1967, points out that the British crimi-
nal jurisdiction under the new legislation extends to "both British
registered aircraft and what are known as inter-changed aircraft-
that is to say, foreign registered aircraft chartered on demise charter
to British operators."'18 3  It seems reasonable to allow immunity
against foreign interference along similar lines. If registry is differ-
ent from ownership, it seems perfectly clear that the aircraft should
be immune from interference by the state of ownership. This is so
because the responsibility for the maintenance of the operating qual-
ity of the plane stays, under present treaty regulations, with the state
of registry, and here, as always in civil aviation, air safety should be
the overriding consideration.
182. de la Pradelle, L'enlvement Arien des Chefs Fellagah, 1965 REv. GEN. Am,
232-38; Anonymous, L'affaire du F.OABV, A.F.D.I., 282-95 (1958).
183. 284 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) - (1967). For a discussion of the notion
of demise in Anglo-American law, see SUNDBERG, Am CHARTER-A STUDY IN
LEGAL DEVELOPMENT, 276-282 (Stockholm, 1961).
1971]
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
What remains to be discussed, then, is simply the right to interfere
with the aircraft when it has landed. That problem can be stated in
much the same way as its counterpart relative to the territorial sea:
To what extent do aircraft have a right to continue the journey with-
out interference from the state of landing?
Recent history is replete with cases showing that under these con-
ditions aircraft enjoy no jurisdictional immunity whatsoever. When
an Aeroflot flight on October 31, 1966 made an involuntary stop at
Prague, due to technical defects the Czech authorities felt entitled to
remove one of the passengers, sought by the Czechs, and to force
him to stand trial in Czechoslovakia. When Pan American flight
150 New York-Nairobi made an unannounced refuelling stop at
Accra on October 29, 1966, the Ghanaian authorities felt entitled
to remove from among the passengers the Guinean foreign min-
ister, Luis Benavogui, and his entourage, in order to hold them
as hostages. When Air Hanson's air taxi was hijacked, on June 30,
1967, and taken with its passenger Moishe Tshombe to Algiers, the
Algerian authorities felt entitled to put him to trial in order to deter-
mine whether he should be extradited to the Congo and to detain
him until his death two years later.
The legal basis for this is clear. Whatever privilege there ever
was under the Transit Air Services Agreement of 1944 to operate
without interference from the state overflown (Article 1, § 1, para-
graph 1),184 was ruthlessly swept aside by the Tokyo Convention,
1963. Under that Convention, the state overflown is entitled to call
upon the foreign aircraft to land in order to exercise criminal juris-
diction in relation to behaviour on board the aircraft which is crimi-
nal under the law of the overflown state if: (a) the offence has effect
on her territory; (b) the offence has been committed by or against
a national or permanent resident of the state overflown; (c) the of-
fence is against the security of the state overflown; (d) the offence
consists of a breach of a local rule relating to the flight or maneouvre
of aircraft; or (e) the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure
the observance of any obligation of the state overflown under a multi-
lateral international agreement (Article 4).
184. International Air Services Transit Agreement, signed Dec. 7, 1944, 84 U.N.
T.S. 389.
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PIRACY CHARACTERIZED BY THE POLICE POWERS TO REPRESS IT
If the curiosity of an approaching ship could always be averted
by flying another flag than she did, pirates might secure immunity
merely by means of a ready collection of national flags. For such
reasons, piracy always seems to have been an exception to the pro-
hibition against exercising authority over foreign ships on the high
seas. As time went by the importance of this feature grew. Partly
it was a function of the diminishing importance of the criminal law
aspect of the old rules of piracy which held the pirates to be outlaws
as "pacis publicae et juris gentium violatores."'185 But the idea of
proscription as a method to deal with criminals had only slender ap-
peal in the nineteenth century and the advent of the legality princi-
ple186 tended to center the criminal law aspects in the penal code
rather than in the teachings of international law.
Under the impact of such forces there developed a tendency, par-
ticularly among German writers, to view the law of piracy as a mat-
ter of joint exercise by all seafaring nations of police powers at sea:
"ein internationales seepolizeilichen Einschreiten gegen die Pira-
ten."' 18 7 Piracy having two principal aspects, the violation of inter-
national law and the international law of crime, it was sometimes felt
that they should be kept strictly apart. 188  Furthermore, and above
all, in the wake of the idea of police powers at sea a re-orientation of
the law of piracy set in which sought to denationalize the notion of
piracy: to divorce it from the connection with existing states and
their struggles with one another.8 9 This re-orientation meant that
there was an international law notion of piracy which could be quite
different from the one appearing in the penal code. This divorce
facilitated the addition of restrictions onto the international law notion
which were unthinkable in the penal code. By 1937, Carl Schmitt
185. LOCCENIUS, DE JURE MARITOMO ET NAVALI, C. 1, c. 3 (Holmiae, 1652).
186. Cf. FEUERBACH, LEHRBUCH DES GEMEINEN IN DEUTSCHLAND GLTIGEN
PEINLICHEN RECHTS § 75, at 76 (Giessen 1823).
187. GEBERT, Die viilkerrechtliche Denationalisierung der Piraterie, 26 NIE-
MEYERSZ 8, 23 (1916).
188. Id. at 20.
189. Id.
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summarizes these restrictions as follows: Piracy could only exist out-
side of the territorial jurisdiction of states, on the high seas, it was
unthinkable that an act supported or authorized by a state was piracy;
piratical acts must be directed against all nations indiscriminately;
and the pirate's motive must involve "animus furandi"-he could
not have a political motive. 190
The definition of "piracy" in the Geneva Convention on the High
Seas must be seen in the light of this tradition. While it may be true
that "the pre-occupation with piracy merely as a basis for jurisdiction
seems substantially to have disappeared"'' and the excessive appli-
cation of the denationalization theory has been checked,' 92 it is also
true that the Rapporteur for the International Law Commission
based his recommendations "almost completely upon the Harvard
draft"'9 3 and the Harvard draft rested on the idea that "piracy is not
a crime by the law of nations [rather] [i]t is the basis of an extra-
ordinary jurisdiction in every state to seize and to prosecute and
punish."' 94  This explains three limitations which are set to the no-
tion of piracy in the Geneva Convention and which appear useless
unless one recalls the police power aspect: the piratical act must be
committed for private ends; it must be committed by the crew or
passengers of a private craft against another craft or persons or
property on board such craft; and it must be committed in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any state.' 95
The Geneva definition makes it next to useless in aviation. It
calls for an act committed by the crew or passengers of one vehicle
against another vehicle. But, as has been explained, interference
between two aircraft is next to impossible except at the expense of
the destruction of one of them. Consequently, aerial piracy as en-
190. 4 ScHMIrr, DER BEGRIFF DER PIRATERIE, V6LKERBUND UND VOLKERRECHT
351 (1937).
191. Supra note 158, at 877.
192. Supra note 8, at 169. See Article 18, Geneva Convention on the High
Seas, signed April 27, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
193. Supra note 158, at 877.
194. Bingham, Piracy-Introduction, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 749, 760 (1932). Cf.
Johnson, Piracy in Modern International Law, 43 Trans. Grotius Soc. 63, 69 (1957).
195. See the definition in Geneva Convention on the High Seas signed April 27,
1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11, Art. 15.
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visaged by the Convention, as a practical matter, only means that air-
craft are used to capture vessels at sea. At present, that is no practi-
cal problem.
PIRACY AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY
The Convention on the High Seas states boldly that all states shall
co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy
on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any
state (Article 14). This is certainly no burdensome obligation to
cast upon the seafaring nations, considering that the obligation only
covers piracy as defined in the Geneva Convention. After all, that
excludes piratical action for political purposes as well as all seizures
of airliners. The only place where it would seem to have some prac-
tical importance is on and above the seas of the Far East.
Judging from the Far East experience, however, the more impor-
tant obligation to fight piracy is not the one relating to the high seas,
but the one relating to the states' territorial waters. To suppress pi-
racy within a state's territorial jurisdiction is considered to be an in-
ternational law obligation, not based upon the Geneva Convention
but on general international customary law. "If a State should fail
to do so or should associate itself persistently with piratical ventures,
it would certainly violate this rule," says Schwarzenberger. He
adds: "It is liable for the commission of an international tort and, in
an extreme case, may even forfeit its own international personality
and be treated as an international outlaw."'196 It is not difficult to
see behind that statement the plight of China in the nineteenth cen-
tury which was forced by means of treaties with European pow-
ers to undertake to fight the pirates in the Chinese waters. 97  From
a practical point of view, such destruction of base areas for the
pirates may be even more important than hunting them on the high
seas. But it would also seem to follow that this obligation cannot
extend to forms of piracy other than those defined in the Geneva
Convention.
Piracy in forms not covered by the Geneva Convention may be no
less interesting from the point of view of state liability. The world
196. Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, 3 CUii.
LEG. PROB. 263, 269 (1950) with further references.
197. For an enumeration of these treaties, see supra note 6, at 26 n.7.
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has grown accustomed to viewing armed bands, with varying mo-
tives, swarming over a state border into the neighbouring state.
Sometimes a land border is concerned, sometimes they come over
the sea. The maritime expedition often raises the problem, of pi-
racy. Attacks on third country shipping may raise the issue, as may
violations of the rules of naval warfare relating to capture. Or it
may simply be that the victim country has adopted a definition of
piracy which includes such an expedition. Many of the problems
raised in this context were illustrated in the course of the expeditions
which crisscrossed the Caribbean in the nineteenth century. There
was then a succession of lawless expeditions from the Atlantic and
Gulf ports of the United States to various Latin American destina-
tions for the purpose of participating in some of their frequent in-
ternal disorders. The participants came to be known by the ancient
Dutch name for pirates, "Vrijbuiters," which was corrupted by the
non-Dutch into "filibusters."'19
The state liability problem can arise here in no less than three dif-
ferent ways. A third country may be considered liable if it bars the
advance of the filibusters. The sending country may be considered
liable for sending, or permitting the departure of, the filibusters. Fi-
nally, the victim country may be considered liable for damage done to
foreign lives and foreign property in the course of the disorders re-
sulting from the advent of the filibusters. Let us cope with these
problems, one at a time.
Great Britain was originally reluctant to interfere with the fili-
buster expeditions on behalf of the victim states, for fear that the
United States might object to the killing of some American citizen
who had chosen to join the filibusters. 99 In the end, however, all
the great powers of the day appear to have united in rendering fili-
bustering domestically criminal and in not objecting when their own
citizens were tried and executed for such activities: indeed, they lost
198. French: "flibustiers," Spanish: "flibustero," German: "Flibustier." In his
Roman history, Theodor Mommsen even uses this word to characterize the language
of -the pirates of antiquity--"Flibustiersprache", see 3 ROMISCHE GESCHICHTE,
43 (8th ed. Berlin, 1889). A less corrupted version of the Dutch word has entered
the English language in the form of "freebooters."
199. See Lord Palmerston's letter to Clarendon, Jan. 6, 1858, in Van Alstyne,
American Filibustering and the British Navy: A Carribbean Analogue of Mediter-
ranean "Piracy", 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 141 (1938).
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their right to diplomatic protection. The United States even arrived
at the position that other nations also had lost their right to protest
American action with respect to filibusters, who were citizens of
such nations.200 This solution parallels the one advanced in rela-
tion to more orthodox pirates and their acts. "If such acts are un-
authorized, the home State of the pirates, or of the pirate ship, if still
entitled to sail under its flag, or of the pirate aircraft is estopped by
international customary law from exercising the right of protecting
its nationals, ships or aircraft against interference by the State which
assumes an extraordinary jurisdiction over pirates." 0' 1
As to the liability of the sending country, let us note the assertion
in modem legal scholarship that there is a state practice showing that
state complicity in such armed incursions or toleration of such bands
operating from national territory is "unlawful," constitutes a breach
of the legal duties of a state in its international relations, and justifies
a protest and request for preventive measures either by the malefac-
tor or by an international or regional organ for maintaining peace.202
This attitude, however, seems to refer more to the conditions of the
days when the British Queen supported, or even sent, the British buc-
caneers to sap the strength of the Spanish Empire, 20 3 than to today's
world of continuous parcellisation. It is, certainly, not now possi-
ble to state the law in such broad terms since the assertion fails to
take account of the uncertainty introduced within the framework of
the United Nations. In regional organizations of members of the
United Nations, such as the Organization of African Unity estab-
lished in Addis Ababa in 1963, one will find resolutions calling for
actions in conducting their relations with obnoxious neighbours
which obviously include the sending of armed bands. One example
is the 1963 resolution of the Heads of State in this organization deal-
ing with the unification of the different rebel movements abroad
and the creation for export of rebel armies and volunteer corps within
200. Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CAL'F. L. REV.
177, 191.
201. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 94 (5th ed. London,
1967).
202. Brownie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 INT. &
Comp. L.Q. 729, 734 (1958).
203. SCHMITr, supra note 164, at 145, 153; but see supra note 6, at 41 n. 1, and
KEEN, supra note 72, at 238.
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the different states in Africa, and of a nine-power coordinating com-
mittee for the organization of direct action for civil war in neigh-
bouring countries.20 4 It is evident that these states have not ac-
cepted any rules against "filibustering" in any sense. Since no objec-
tions to this position have been heard from the United Nations es-
tablishments, it seems unlikely that the new position when tested at
sea or in the air, would result in any state liability.
To what extent, then, is the country of disorder liable for the dam-
age wrought by the filibusters? In the case of the Magellan Pirates,
Lushington pointed out that one of the consequences of regarding
the offenders as pirates would be that no claim would lie against the
government of Chile; whereas, if the offenders were not regarded as
pirates but only as subjects revolting against the Chilean government,
a claim for damages might lie against that government. 20 5  The first
part of the observation still holds true. "In case of piracy, individual,
and not collective responsibility for violation of international law takes
place," says Kelsen.20 6  The second part, however, may have to be
modified. Today, the legitimate government may avoid liability by
standing a due diligence test. Indeed, there is a presumption that the
government is doing its utmost to put down the rebellion and on the
strength of that presumption liability is avoided. 207  Should the gov-
ernment fail that test, however, it may still shield itself behind the
generally accepted principle that no obligation to pay an indemnity
exists when the party injured in an insurrection brings the injury
upon himself. Merchantmen moving within the field of actual hostile
naval operations thus move at their own peril. 20 s  As against third
powers which have recognized the insurgents as belligerents, how-
ever, complete immunity arises. Consequently, when Great Britain
recognized the Confederates as belligerents in 1861, the Union gov-
204. BOUTROS-GHALI, The Addis Ababa Charter-A Commentary, 546 INTER-
NATIONAL CONCILIATION, 25, 32 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)
(1964).
205. 1 Spinks' Eccl. & Adm. Rep. 81 (1853).
206. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 205 (Tucker ed. 1966).
207. See generally Silvanie, Responsibility for Acts of Insurgent Governments,
33 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 103 (1939).
208. Wilson, Insurgency and International Maritime Law, I AM. J. INT'L L. 46,
59 (1907).
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ernment found some consolation in the reflection that "at any rate
there was one compensation, the act had released the Government
. . . from responsibility for any misdeeds of the rebels towards
Great Britain."20 9
It is the Arab warfare against Israel and Ethiopia which today
seems most likely to raise the problems discussed in this part. Such
contexts also illustrate the difficult medium for legal claims which
has been created within the United Nations. The most conspicuous
instances so far were perhaps the armed attacks performed by Popu-
lar Front agents against passenger-filled El-Al aircraft at foreign air-
fields. Let us look at two of them: the one performed on Decem-
ber 26, 1968 at Athens airfield and the other performed on Febru-
ary 18, 1969 at Ziirich-Kloten airfield. Arab governments were not
openly linked to the actual attacks. The fact that the agent trav-
eled to Athens from Beirut on Lebanese travel documents ordinarily
provided for stateless persons was the only direct link in the Athens
incident. In the Ziirich incident, the agents did not even travel direct-
ly from any Arab country-those departing from Amman flew into
Switzerland via Vienna, those departing from Damascus flew via
Beirut-Rome-Paris. The link was at best indirect. It related to the
agents' organization, the Popular Front, which provided them with all
money and equipment. This Front has been operating openly in Leb-
anon and Jordan since the June war of 1967 and, consequently, with
the knowledge and apparent acquiescence of the governments.2 10 It
may be questioned whether the governments are capable of taking
action against the guerilla movement. If they are not, this would
normally mean that the territory held by the movement may be con-
sidered to be under an insurgent de facto government. Since, how-
ever, the legitimate governments do not want to oppose but rather
prefer to side with the guerilla movement, they certainly cannot meet
any due diligence test. On the other hand, it is hard to see how Is-
rael could obtain redress in a situation so heavily dominated by the
Security Council which, after all, is subject to no judicial or legal re-
view.
209. Supra note 11, at 248.
210. Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 AM.
J. INT'L L. 415, 420 (1969).
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PIRACY AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
THE CLOSED COMMUNITY CONCEPT
If the world were one and monolithic, it would be a closed com-
munity. There would be only one will of State. The whole idea of
regulating violence between equals-the regime of the duel-would
be nonexistent because, in principle, in such a society competing
wills do not exist on the armed level. In the closed community, so-
ciety is regulated throughout. This affects the view taken of piracy,
hence a departure from the guiding idea of the preceding sections
which was to view piracy in the international law context of violence
between the members of the international community.
The classic example of a closed community was the Roman Empire.
It fathomed all the known waters of the contemporary civilized world.
The seas beyond only washed the shores of the barbarous peoples-
those incapable of building states. But the Romans did not arrive
at this stage until the wars with Mithridates Eupator (between 88
and 66 B.C.) were won because not until then could they claim the
Mediterranean as mare nostrum. It was the pirates' interference
with the African grain ships which supplied Rome,"' that gave the
piracy problem its importance. When the pirates struck the cura
annona 2 2 on which the Roman social welfare scheme depended, lex
Gabinia was passed (67 B.C.) asking Pompey Magnus to sweep
them from the sea.213  But in taking their countermeasures against
the piratical conditions of the Mediterranean, the Romans acted in no
way different from the way they acted against the brigands on land.
They saw nothing peculiar about the fact that the undesired activity
was committed on the high seas-nothing different, in principle,
to distinguish it from action committed on land: piracy, as such, was
no special crime, the pirate's road to the cross was paved by the lex
211. Some 1.4 million bushels were imported to Rome annually in August's
time, see BABLED, LA CURA ANNONA CHEZ LES ROMAINs, 29 (Paris, 1892) (thesis).
212. The grain trade was organized under the title of cura annona under a
praefectura annonae with a transport organization of its own, handled by a
separate and privileged guild, and-on the receiving side-with various leges
frumentariae to control the more or less gratuitous distribution of the grain to the
plebs of Rome. See generally BABLED, supra note 211, at 11-13, 18-24.
213. On the promotor of the act, Aulus Gabinius, tribune of the plebs; and the
legislative history of the enactment, see T. MOMMSEN, supra note 198, at 113.
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Julia de vi publica214 and other similar enactments. 215  Indeed, many
piratical adventures consisted of seizing a port town; this is one ex-
planation of the custom of antiquity of placing the great cities at a
certain distance from the seashore.
The magnificent empires of the Iberian nations, united more or
less by accident in 1582, provide a more recent thought-provoking
example of a closed community. They benefited from the papal edict
Inter cetera216 of 1493 which granted to the King of Spain, "sub ex-
communicationis latae sententiae poena," as a matter held in fee from
the pope, i.e., the exclusive right, west of a line 370 leagues west of
the Kap Verde Islands, drawn from the Arctic to the Antarctic pole,
"ad insulas et terras firmas inventas et inveniendas dectas et deten-
gendas . . . accedere" (lines 110 f., 118). In 1454, the papal edict
Romanus pontifex had given a corresponding right to the Crown of
Portugal.21 7  As a consequence, the Portuguese and the Spaniards ap-
propriated for themselves particular seas, among them the East and
West Indian Seas, and any unlicensed ship there was summarily sunk
and the crew drowned. Even if the Dutch (for a long time rebels
against the Spanish Crown) and the British interpreted this to mean
that the Spanish regarded all ships found south of the Tropic of Can-
cer and west of Greenwich as enemy vessels, I think it is a mistake to
confuse the attitude of the Spaniards and the Portuguese with the
later general belligerent right of visit and search upon seas unappro-
priated. Theirs was a criminal law attitude reflecting a terrene view
which permitted no basic distinction between land and sea terri-
tory; 218 their outlook was one of the closed community.
And, certainly, such was the dominant view in Medieval times.
214. DIGEST 48.6.3.6. For comments, see MOMMSEN, R6MIscHES STRAFRECHT
128 (Leipzig, 1909).
215. DIGEST 47.8; 48.19.28.10.
216. See Corpus luris Canonici 1.9 liber septimus (publ. by P. Matthaeus 1534).
217. On the dispute between Spain and Portugal and the Tordesillas treaty of
1494, which deviated considerably from Inter cetera and the confirmation of which,
tactfully, was not asked for until Pope Alexander Borgia's successor had taken the
tiara. See Staedlerz Die westindische Raya von 1493 und ihr vtdlkerrechtliches
Schicksaj. 1938 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VOLKERRECHT 165; idem, Zur Vorgeschichte der
Raya von 1493, 1941 ZEITSCIRIFT FUR V6LKERRECHT 57.
218. ScnmiTT, supra note 164, at 144-46. Schmitt observes that the "riimisch-
rechtlichen Begriffsmodellen . . . die rein terrane Denkweise der antiken und mit-
telalterischen Binnenmeerskulturen beibehielten."
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The English king claimed to be sovereign over the "narrow seas" sur-
rounding England, just like the Danish and Swedish kings claimed
to be co-sovereigns over the Baltic Sea, sometimes even referred to as
the "streams of Sweden and Denmark. ' 219 Such sovereigns consid-
ered themselves responsible for order within their territories-land
or sea-and took action against any menace to such order-whether
robbers on land or pirates at sea. Apparently, cases of piracy de-
cided under such conditions are of limited value in other settings.
And it should not be forgotten that England did not desert the terrene
approach until after the publication, in 1689, of Sir Philip Meadow's
Observations Concerning the Dominion and Sovereignty of the Seas.22 0
THE INTERNATIONAL SEA-THE PROBLEMS OF LAW
IN A LAWLESS SPACE
The advent of the idea of the international sea in the seventeenth
century has been sketched elsewhere. It is here sufficient to point
out what the new thinking meant to the closed community approach.
When the high seas were no longer part of the territory of any coun-
try, the idea of a limited rather than universal jurisdiction was forced
upon the maritime lawyers. If nobody held the maritime territory
beyond the three mile limit, how could anybody have jurisdiction
there?
The impact of the confrontation with the new state of affairs was
aggravated by the simultaneous advance of territoriality. The prin-
ciple of territoriality, as such, was embedded in the feudal regime
and had overrun opposing attempts at creating dual loyalties based
on, e.g., the Italian urban notions of domicilium originis and domi-
cilium facti.22' Territoriality grew into a concept of exclusivity when
the notion of the sovereign state took hold. Of essence to this no-
tion, was the equality between the sovereign states; that, in turn,
seemed to prevent one state from assuming jurisdiction over what was
happening in the territory of another.
219. See generally supra note 34. Gihr, Dominium mars Baltici och 6stersjin
som mare clausum, STUDIER I INTERNATIONELL RXTT, 193 (1955).
220. SCHMrrT, supra note 164, at 152.
221. DE VABRES, INTRODUCTION I L'TTUDE DU DROIT PIENAL INTERNATIONAL
237 (Paris, 1922).
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Sensitivity to the encroachment upon sovereignty which followed
from subjection to a foreign jurisdiction was variously developed in
various places. Perhaps not unnaturally, states, the sovereignty of
which was most open to doubt, were most sensitive on this point:
that is to say quasi-states combined into a sovereign federal state.
The Anglo-Saxon state-building policy was particularly fertile in cre-
ating such bodies: the states of the United States of America, and
the self-governing dominions of the British Empire. In the United
States, this sensitivity was reflected in the famous Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution, 1787 (article 4, § 1) which re-
quires that the various states of the union respect each other's legis-
lation, public acts, etc. These views, prevailing within the Union,
also came to mark the outward attitude of the Union. They cli-
maxed in the Cutting Case of 1886. In that case, Mexico sought
to punish an act which had been committed within the United States
by a citizen of the United States. The Secretary of State expressed
the American position to be that the United States themselves main-
tained "due justice to all offenses committed in their respective juris-
dictions" and that "they will not permit that this prerogative shall in
any degree be usurped by Mexico." '222 The principle of exclusive
territorial jurisdiction, apparently, was equally natural to the British.
But such a principle could make little allowance for the international
sea. If you stuck to the territoriality principle, the high sea was
nothing but a huge expanse of lawlessness. Consequently, while
the Anglo-Saxon powers, enjoying dominating positions in the manu-
facture and operation of aircraft after the Second World War, filled
the skies above the oceans with their aircraft, they also emptied these
skies and the oceans below of their law. Each of these aircraft, when
flying over the high seas, became an oasis of lawlessness. The world
was shocked to learn from Professor Arnold Knauth, in 1951, that it
was "legally safe to commit almost any crime in the calendar while
traveling in an American airplane over the ocean."22  Some years
later, R. v. Martin224 brought attention to the fact that the British
222. Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States [1886], Depart-
ment of State, Wash. D.C. 701 (1887).
223. Knauth, Crime in the High Air-A Footnote to History, 25 TUL. L. REv.
446, 447 (1951).
224. [1956] 2 Q.B. 272. For a general review of the British situation in 1959,
see Cheng, Crimes on Board Aircraft, 12 CURR. LEG. PROB. 177 (1959).
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situation was not much different. On the basis of that holding, and
assuming that stealing a ride in an aircraft does not amount to the
universal crime of theft as conceived by the British, it would seem to
follow that the hijacking of Air Hanson's air taxi with Moishe
Tschombe over the Mediterranean in 1967 was not criminal under
British law. 225
An important cross-current in many places, followed upon the rise
of the absolute monarchs. Strong monarchical power tends natur-
ally to include strong legislative power. Ideas about statutory inter-
pretation which rely heavily on the legislator's will come just as natur-
ally. To the extent that the law was divine or founded in natural
law, one was hard put to explain why the vague evidence of this uni-
versal law which could be found in the law books back home, should
be superior to evidence of it found abroad; hence, the suprising
tendency to let foreign law materials serve the court just as readily
as domestic law materials. But the absolute ruler entering the scene
could not accept such influences from abroad. When he had for-
bidden his courts to apply the customary law, he excluded the foreign
law as well. Furthermore, he could see no reason why his commands
should stop at his territorial borders if he could enforce respect for
them beyond. Since everybody who was personally brought into his
courts (or could expect to be brought there) had cause for such re-
spect, there arose a claim to competence to enact legislation which
did not need to stop at any border and certainly not at the three-mile
limit. This attitude was all the more natural in places where-like
the European Continent-national rivalries soared and neighbouring
countries were given to harbouring each other's political dissidents
who were conspiring to overthrow their national regimes.2 26  Why
should the sovereign permit an oasis shielded from his power simply
because his enemy had found a territorial border?
In Sweden, it has been claimed that the previous exclusive reliance
on territoriality came to an end under the aegis of the absolute Caro-
225. The situation has since been remedied, in the United States by Legislation
in 1952, and in Great Britain by legislation in 1967, (in effect in 1968). See
66 Stat. 589 (subsection 5 of 18 U.S.C. § 7), and Tokyo Convention Act, 1967(in force by the Tokyo Convention Act 1967 (Commencement) Order 1968, S.1.
1968 No. 469).
226. Cf. Bassiouni, International Extradition in American Practice and World
Public Order, 36 TENNESSEE L. REV. 1, 8 (1968).
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line monarchy. Some judicial decisions arising out of the termina-
tion of the Great Nordic War (1700-1721) brushed aside the idea of
any built-in obstacles to a penal law jurisdiction over acts committed
abroad, provided that there was a reasonable connection between the
act and the state exercising jurisdiction.227 The customary law, thus
evolved, finally entered the statute book in 1864. Criminal law juris-
diction asserted in the Criminal Code of 1864 meant that proceed-
ings could be taken against any foreigner found in the realm, if he
was accused of a crime against Sweden or a Swedish person, wherever
committed, and, of course, could be taken against any Swedish subject
accused of a crime wherever committed. 228  This attitude, which was
reflected in the Norwegian criminal law of 1902 as well, could easily
embrace acts committed on, or over the high seas. 229  But it was
not appreciated by the Anglo-Saxons.
Commenting upon these Scandinavian rules, W.E. Hall observes:
Whether . . . they can be enforced adversely to a state which may choose to object
to their exercise, appears, to say the least, to be eminently doubtful. It is indeed
difficult to see upon what they can be supported. . . . [T]heir theoretical justifica-
tion, as against an objecting country, if any is alleged at all, must be that the exclu-
sive territorial jurisdiction of a state gives complete control over all foreigners not
protected by special immunities, while they remain on its soil. But to assert that
this right of jurisdiction covers acts done before the arrival of the foreign subjects
in the country is in reality to set up a claim to a concurrent jurisdiction with other
227. Jigerskjbld, Om krigsfangar, krigsockupation och jurisdiktionsriitt, 1964
JURIDISKA FORENINGENS I FINLAND TIDSKRIFT 160, 176.
228. See generally Thornstedt, Svensk Medborgares Ansvar fdr Brott Utom-
lands, 1966 SvJT 506. The clause "against Sweden" which appears in other contexts
as well, is construed to mean "against a Swedish interest." In the identification of a
"Swedish interest" surprising results are arrived at. Thornstedt discusses whether
the foetus of a Swedish woman is a carrier of a Swedish interest the protection of
which calls for extraterritorial application of Swedish penal law and finds it "fully
clear" that this is the case-to the detriment of the Swedish girl seeking a legal
abortion abroad. Id. at 515 n. 31.
229. The Danish penal code of 1930 extends criminal jurisdiction of Danish
courts to acts committed by anyone outside the national territory violating such in-
terests "the protection of which in the Danish State implies a special connection
with it." (Sec. 8, para. 1, No. 1). This criterion has been used to stamp out from
the high seas such activities as are known as "pirate broadcasting," and a leading
case has been interpreted to mean "that the public interest in avoiding the corrupting
influence of advertising upon the medical and odontologic practices was envisaged.
The public interest in maintaining order in the air-of preventing evasion of
the delicately balanced system of allocating radio frequencies-is a sufficient basis
for exercising jurisdiction even with respect to acts of aliens outside the national
territory." See Sorensen, 'Pirate Broadcasting' from the High Seas, LEGAL ESSAYS-
A TRiBUTE TO FREDE CASTRERG 319, 329 (Norway, 1963).
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states as to acts done within them, and so to destroy the very principle of exclusive
territorial jurisdiction to which the alleged right must appeal for support.28 0
It became clear in the Lotus Case that this criticism was exag-
gerated. Stating that "the territoriality of criminal law . . . is not
an absolute principle of international law and by no means coincides
with territorial sovereignty," the World Court added that interna-
tional law did not contain any "general prohibition to States to ex-
tend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts
to persons, property and acts outside their territory. ' 21l
The Lotus Case only crowned a general process towards more ex-
traterritorial application of the criminal law. Even the Anglo-Saxon
powers, long shielded by their geographical positions from the rival-
ries and strains so prevalent on the European Continent, had experi-
enced a need to follow suit. The United States first saw the need to
protect its economic structure and competitive system of free enter-
prise by the extraterritorial application of its antitrust laws.2 2  An
intent of Congress to encompass acts committed abroad by foreigners
was found in the Sherman Act and in § 1546 of the Federal Crimi-
nal Code.28 ' Indeed, the claims came to be so extensive that even
Swedish lawyers, in turn, felt entitled to protest on the basis of inter-
national law.2" 4 An inclination towards greater restraint has lately
made itself felt inasmuch as an anti-Lotus Convention was signed in
Brussels in 1952.285 When this convention turned out to be unsuc-
cessful, article 11 was included in the Convention on the High Seas,
(1958) in order to reverse the specific holding of the Lotus Case.
These developments, however, have not affected the more general sig-
nificance of the Lotus decision.
Considering how the attitudes toward piracy have evolved during
230. Supra note 116, at 263.
231. S.S. "Lotus," [1927] P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 9.
232. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
233. United States v. Aluminium Co. of America, supra note 231; United States
v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949); United States v. Rodriguez,
182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D.Cal. 1960).
234. Nordstr6m, Folkrusliga aspekter pa kontroll av linjekonferenser, HANDELS-
HOSKOLAN : GOTEBORO SKRIFTER 1965:6 p. 19.
235. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
Penal Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision or Other Incidents of Navigation, signed at
Brussels May 10, 1932, 439 U.N.T.S. 233.
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the formative nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this basic
divergence of ideas should not be left out of sight. To the British,
for example, the chief problem was to overcome the basic void which
they faced when venturing outside the British lands or outside the
British ships. Their natural response to the challenge was to rely
upon the international law for assistance. Others saw it quite dif-
ferently. The Scandinavians, particularly, had difficulty finding any
problem of international law. Their perspective was dominated by a
criminal law problem and they saw no reason why this problem
should not be mastered in the ways criminal law problems were
normally mastered: hence the disappearance of piracy as a special
crime. 236 It will not be denied that the split opening up between the
criminal law proper and the international law rules relating to state
jurisdiction made it possible to hold that, as a corollary to the state's
obligation to fight piracy, international law exacted a standard of
criminal law. 217  Once this standard was met, however, interna-
tional law ceased to be relevant in the criminal law context.
Today, the exterritoriality of the international sea commands no
excessive respect. Why should it when even in the relations between
states nobody claims that they be based on some implied Full Faith
and Credit Clause? On the contrary, the scene is dominated by con-
current jurisdictions. The high seas themselves are being turned into
an arena for conflicts between concurrent jurisdictions; and as to the
national air space of the various states, the 1963 Tokyo Convention
has done much to include them in that arena. The conflicts to be faced
have indeed brought about much adverse comment on the Conven-
tion. Some have the British restraint typified by Professor John-
son's observation: "Whereas in the past there has sometimes been
insufficient jurisdiction with regard to crimes committed on board
aircraft, there may in the future be too much. ' 2 8  Others indicate
more pleasure with the aphorism: "Strangely enough, the greater
number of ratifying states the less will be the degree of uniformity
accomplished. 239  Indeed, after four centuries with Grotius' idea
236. Cf. p. - of text & notes 34, 35, 36 supra.
237. Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, 3 CumR.
LEG. PROB. 263, 269 (1950).
238. JOHNSON, RIGHTS IN AIR SPACE 79 (Manchester, 1965).
239. Gutierrez, Should the Tokyo Convention of 1963 Be Ratified?, 31 J. AIR L.
& COM. 1, 10 (1965).
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which tended to blow to pieces the closed community approach, in-
herited from the Romans, strange results have been arrived at. One
may well wonder what those nations which organize their criminal
law to be enforced within their narrow state borders but draft it to
apply to the world at large are doing. Oblivious to the existence of
their neighbours, it appears, each of them lies brooding like a Roman
Empire in miniature over its universal rule!
IS THERE A NEED FOR A CRIME OF PIRACY?
The problem, thus defined, may be puzzling. After all, it seems a
matter of course that it should be criminal to intentionally kill and
rob others on the high seas or in the skies above. The problem will,
therefore, have to be restated: Is there reason to have a special crime
of piracy besides the special provisions against killing, stealing, etc.
which are the cardinal points of most penal codes?
This brings us down into that part of legal science which deals
with the establishment of crime notions. Is there any element which
sets the totality of piracy apart from the total of its parts?
Two points here require attention. One is the usefulness of the
very word "piracy" with its possible socio-psychological appeal. The
other is the international element in the crime of piracy as it appears
in most texts, national and international. Let us treat them one at a
time.
It has already been shown that a stigma attaches to the word "pi-
rate"; and some examples have been given of how various people
have tried to take advantage of this stigma. We need only recall
here the efforts at the Washington Conference, in 1922, and at the
Nyon Conference, in 1937. It is apparent that the stigma which
follows from being branded as a "pirate" is useful for propaganda
purposes. But is that not enough to secure its use also when munici-
pal law fights crime?
Name-calling performs an important function in structuring so-
ciety to abide by the law. This function is known in most of the
Western world by the title of the "stigma" theory.240 Recently, Dr.
Per Edwin Wall6n devoted his inaugural lecture as professor of crim-
240. See generally ch. 3, SHOHAM, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVIATION (1966).
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inal law to this phenomenon wherein he showed how it surfaced in
the 1940's in Sweden.241 In its report of 1940, the Law Reform
Committee attempted to give a separate name to each crime listed.
The Committee explained in the report that this had been done in
order to make the crimes easy to understand and the criminal law
more directly addressed to the people. "The general public"-said
the Committee- "looks rather more to the name of the crime than to
the actual punishment meted out." To the extent that the develop-
ment tends to substitute for the fixed penalties or sanctions, the con-
tents of which may be varied to a larger or lesser degree, and in par-
ticular in the cases where no punishment is even mentioned in the
court order but some other treatment of the offender is prescribed,
the need for naming the crime will be greater.242 In subsequent
Swedish history there are several examples of an important interplay
between legislators, public reaction and the judiciary over questions
of name-calling. 43 In the context of the Swedish philosophy, ap-
parently, there is a good case for having "piracy" as a separate crime
of its own even if it merely duplicates a number of crimes which to-
gether constitute piracy, due to the forceful appeal of this term to
241. Walldn, Har brottsrubriceringen nagon betydelse?, NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR
KRIMINALVIDENSKAB 286 (1967).
242. STATENS OFFENTLIGA UTREDNINGAR 1940:20, 67.
243. Among those may be mentioned the controversy whether the intentional
killing of a person should be called manslaughter or murder. The drafters had in-
tended to reserve the name "murder" for particularly grave cases of such killing,
but in the comments solicited from various public bodies before the bill was laid
before parliament, this terminology had provoked adverse reactions: in their view,
manslaughter should be reserved for cases where there were attenuating circum-
stances. See supra note 241, at 289. Another such question was whether the un-
lawful using of a motor vehicle belonging to another should be named "arbitrary
conduct" or "theft." The Committee felt that the actor in these cases was no typical
thief and that his conduct certainly was arbitrary but not dishonest. Here the
courts disagreed and in a celebrated case of 1954 (HD 8-9 June 1954, NJA 1954,
240) the Swedish Supreme Court subsumed the act under theft. The Committee
then changed its mind and explained that to call it "arbitrary conduct" was contrary
to what a widespread opinion among the general public felt to be natural and pro-
posed to make the section on theft expressly include this case. See STATENS
OFFENTLIGA UTREDNINGAR 1953:14 267. When the Law Council was asked to give
its opinion, however, it thought that the two subsumptions discussed had not been
"adequate" to the crime and suggseted a special name for it: "appropriation of a
traffic conveyance." It may be noted in passing that Thorsten Sellin's translation
is inadequate on this point. He calls it "vehicle theft" but that does not convey
the sense of the dispute which had taken place and which was eventually solved
in the way explained.
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most people. Similar conclusions have been drawn elsewhere.244
The second point which would seem to set piracy apart from the
sum of its parts, is the international element which it encompasses.
It is a fair guess that the idea which made all nations accept that any
one of them could assume the right to visit and punish a pirate ship,
when the doctrine of the freedom of the seas was consecrated, was
the desire to protect the freedom of navigation to which the pirate
constituted a threat. Today's expression of this idea is to be found
in Article 14 of the Geneva Convention of 1958, requiring all states
to co-operate to suppress piracy. The idea that all states have a
vested interest in freedom of navigation turns the creation of the crime
of piracy into the protection of an interest other than the ones which
are protected by such various mainstay criminal provisions as those
relating to killing, robbing, stealing, coercion, etc. To the extent that
the crime can be identified by the interest it protects, there exists a
case for a separate crime of priacy.
One may wonder, though, if the notion of piracy as defined in the
Geneva Convention really coincides with the international element
it is believed to protect. Unlike the interest in freedom of naviga-
tion on the high seas the interest in civil aviation extends far beyond
the activities which take place on the international sea, occasionally
overflown by civilian airliners. If piracy is associated with aviation
it is consequently hard to explain why it should be limited to the
airspace above the international sea. The people involved certainly
experience such a limitation as highly artificial. After all, the speed
of modern aircraft is such as to render it almost ridiculous to attach
decisive weight to the fact that an incident took place on this or that
side of an invisible state border in the air. The flight, as such, is the
natural unit: whether the hijackers entered the cockpit while the
aircraft was over Sorrento or the Mediterranean; whether the shoot-
ing started while the aircraft was still in Spanish air space or outside
of it, seems very immaterial to every non-lawyer.
Air safety, not the freedom of navigation, is the interest which
244. Paul de ]a Pradelle refers to "l'impression que produit sur l'opinion la suele
6vocation d'un terme charg6 de myst~re et d'aventures": Les ddtournements
d'adronefs et le droit international, 1969 REv. GAN. Ani. 249, 254.. The use of the
term "aircraft piracy" in the hijacking amendment of 1961 to the American Federal
Aviation Act, 1958, testifies to the same type of thinking.
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should be protected in civil aviation. How much that interest is
threatened by aerial hijackings has been a central point in public dis-
cussion lately.245 The risks which go with a hijacking are very real
indeed. A recent example is the hijacking, on March 17, 1970, of an
Eastern DC-9 in the shuttle service between Newark and Boston.
After a cockpit struggle that left the copilot dead and a passenger
seriously wounded, the pilot shot in both arms, landed the craft. An
even more evil end was put to Cubana Airways flight Miami-Ha-
vana on November 3, 1958, at the time when the Batista rule of Cuba
was drawing to a close. Fidelistas hijacked the plane and forced the
pilot to land on a strip of the beach at Panto Cigarro which resulted
in the airliner crashing into the Bay of Nipe. There were seventeen
deaths. 246
The very manifest risks which go with hijackings (whether con-
sidered as piracy or something else) are a matter of international con-
cern. At the present stage of international travel, passengers of any
nationality fly with aircraft of any nationality. The multitude of
nationalities among the passengers using a modern commercial air-
liner, whether in international or in domestic aviation, makes every
safety hazard a matter of international concern. This concern found
early expression in article 12 of the Chicago Convention in 1944.247
This Article calls upon all contracting states to "insure the prosecution
of all persons violating the regulations," for example, the rules and
regulations relating to the flight and maneuver of the aircraft. Inci-
dentally, this article calls for prosecution of hijackers as well. It is
difficult to imagine a hijacker taking command of the aircraft with-
out violating, in the course of his actions, the pilot-in-command's
obligation to stick to his prefiled flight plan. 248
245. See, e.g., Note by de Juglart & du Pontavice to Trib.gr.inst.Corbeil 12
March 1969, J.C.P. 1969. 16023.
246. TIME MAGAZINE, Nov. 10, 1958, at 28; de Juglart, Les Infractions Commises
t bord des Aeronefs dans la Doctrine Internationale, 1960 REV. FR. DR. AlRIEN,
123, 138.
247. Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed in Chicago Dec. 7,
1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
248. Cf. Annex 2 (Rules of the Air) to the Chicago Convention, points 2.3.1;
3.3.1.1.1; and 3.5.2.1. For a discussion whether Article 12 should be read literally
and call for prosecution irrespective of where, by whom, and in what aircraft the
violation took place, or if some limitations are to be implied, see, e.g., Mankiewicz,
Aspects et Problmes du droit Penal de l'Aviation Internationale, 1958 A.F.D.I. 112,
116.
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Two elements have thus been found which set the totality of piracy
apart from the total of its parts-a perfect name and an interna-
tional element. It has also been shown that the regulation of aircraft
piracy in the Geneva Convention on the High Seas was much pre-
mature. The conclusion is that from the criminal law point of view
no reasons seem to exist which should prevent the combining of
these two elements into a new notion of air piracy which would ef-
fectively combat the extraordinary hijacking fad which the world has
experienced lately.
CRIMES COMMITTED IN FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS OR AFFECTING
FOREIGN INTERESTS AND NATIONAL POLICY
The state of hostility which marks the present age may not be pe-
culiar to this age alone. One may doubt whether any previous age
really was free from it. Still, it appears in retrospect that late
nineteenth century, world-dominating Europe was markedly different
even in that particular respect.
Those were the days of optimistic and semipacifist liberalism.
There was a firm belief in the steady progress of mankind towards
some kind of Utopia. To the delegates at the contemporary peace
conferences it seemed "that all European governments were funda-
mentally the same and differed only in details. War, even if it could
not be altogether avoided, was in essence a regrettable interruption
of the normal order."249  Countries were not regarded as enemy
countries when no war was in progress. A citizen was normally
free to leave his country and start a fresh life in another. Indeed, the
whole emigration to the United States was built upon this assumption.
If the conditions of the masses were deplorable, the existence of a
superstructure of a European nobility and a European bourgoisie,
spread thin over the nations, secured the uniformity in outlook which
was the basis of this peaceful homogeneity. 250
249. Smith, Book Review 7 I.C.L.Q. 792 (1958).
250. ScHMIr, supra note 164, at 208, observes that "liberal economic thinking
and global commerce was self-evident in European thinking and current in the gen-
eral flow of ideas .... In the idea of a free world economy lay not only the sur-
mounting of the state-political borders. It included as well, as an essential pre-
condition, a standard for the internal constitution of each member of this interna-
tional law order; it presupposed that each member introduced at home a minimum
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Such a state of things, of course, should be congenial to the ideas
of solidarity between states and, in particular, to solidarity in carry-
ing on the universal fight against crime. A foreign crime was an evil
just as much as a domestic one: "une collaboration entre Etats pour
la rralisation de la justice," was the matter called for.25' Universal
fight against crime must mean that crime is punished wherever
committed and that the parcellisation of jurisdiction is not allowed to
disturb the working of the penal law. As a technical matter, it meant
some variation of the principle aut dedere aut punire.251a And this
makes the principle of political asylum much of a test case in the evo-
lution. The evolution, however, has been most complicated because
simplicity is marred by numerous crosscurrents from other sources.
Solidarity between states was marred already at the outset by mi-
nor political differences. The difference between monarchism and
republicanism is an example. Republican Switzerland, for instance,
was unable to appreciate that the Emperor of France needed particu-
lar criminal law protection of his life and, consequently, refused to
accept the Belgian attentat clause. 2 The solidarity between the
states was also disturbed by the odd effects of the principle of non-
intervention. Nonintervention, of course, means that one state will
not organize rebel movements in neighbouring countries. But it also
means that one state will not apply, domestically, the legislation of a
foreign country. Extradition proceedings invariably involve the ex-
pression, even if only indirectly, of an opinion on the internal affairs
of the foreign state; an outright application of foreign legislation
would of necessity do so even more. The more political the legisla-
tion is, the greater the potential risk of such an opinion. It can be
of constitutional order. This minimum consisted in the freedom, i.e. the separa-
tion of a state-public sphere from the domains of the private individual, in particular
in the non-state character of property, commerce and economy."
251. PAPADATOS, LE DELIT POLITIQUE, 66 (Gen~ve, 1954).
251a. See BASSIOUNI, International Extradition and World Public Order: A Con-
ceptual Evaluation, in Aktuelle Probleme Der Internationalen Strafrecht, (Oehler and
Potz eds. 1970); Bassiouni, Rapporto di sintezi, in 'PRE-CONGRESSO DI DIRrTTo
PENALE INTERNAZIONALE DI SIRACUSA (Siracusano ed. 1969); and Wise, Some
Problems of Extradition, 3-4 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 518 (1968),
reprinted in 15 WAYNE L. REv. 709 (1968); Bassiouni, International Extradition in
the American Practice and World Public Order, 36 TENN. L. REv. 1 (1969).
252. Id. at 68.
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argued that avoiding the expression by suppressing extradition alto-
gether is a tribute to the sovereignty of the foreign state. 258
In the nineteenth century, the right to seek and be granted asylum
abroad for political crimes was formulated as a general rule: "ce
fut par la R6volution de juillet 1830 en France que l'asile politique
trouva pour la premiere fois sa cons6cration d6finitive en Europe."2"4
In a way, however, the exceptions to this rule reveal the state of
solidarity between nations. The Belgian attentat clause was consid-
ered by Hudson to be one of the expressions of "the common in-
terest of all peoples of the modem world in the administration of
criminal justice. 255  It arose from the attempt to kill Emperor Na-
poleon III which was made by Celestin Jacquin in September, 1854.
Jacquin escaped to Belgium;25 this led to a treaty between Belgium
and France of March 22, 1856, establishing this so-called "clause
belge d'attentat." Belgium, born out of the 1830 revolutions and
being, not unnaturally, the very first country to give the principle of
political asylum statutory form (1833), undertook by that treaty to
except from the notion of the political crime the attempt upon the
life of a head of state or a member of his family.25 7 The solidarity
between states in this respect, perhaps, reached its summit with the
signing, in 1937, of the convention for the prevention and punish-
ment of acts of political terrorism. 2 s The signatory states were pre-
pared to reject the idea of foreign crime as a national asset vis-ei-vis a
wide spectrum of acts. By that time, however, most of the assump-
tion of a common culture had become untrue.
New forces had been brought to life when democracy spread to the
masses and perverted into totalitarianism, a totalitarianism which
placed militant faith in its economic system, whatever happened to be
its contents. Not all of these systems survived the Second World War.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 64; cf. also 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 697, (8th ed. Lauter-
pacht, 1955).
255. Hudson, The Proposed International Criminal Court, 32 Am. J. IN1TL L.
553 (1938).
256. See generally 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 254, at 709.
257. Law concerning extradition, 1 Oct. 1833. On the "attentat clause," see, e.g.,
H. LAMMASCH, DAS RECHT DER AUSLIEFERUNG WEGEN POLITSCHER VERBRECHEN
74-81 (Vienna, 1884).
258. L.N. Doc./C.546/M.383 (1937).
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The one which did reflects profound transformation of the issues at
stake. "La loi du r6gime sovi6tique"-said an authoritative Soviet
textbook on criminal procedure of 1936-"est une directive poli-
tique, et le r6le du juge [est] . . . de 'appliquer d'une manire
vigoureuse comme 'expression de la politique du parti et du gouv-
ernement. ' 259  In perfect harmony with this view, the Soviet Penal
Code contains 105 articles on political crime and only 45 for crimes
affecting individuals only. 260 Among the crimes peculiar to the So-
viet political order are to be found economic crimes, 261 such as the
production of defective goods. Nearly every criminal activity is thus,
according to one opinion, political in character. This is coupled with
a renaissance of the principle of intervention. It is misleading to at-
tach too much significance to such denunciations of active inter-
ventions as were made in the 1930's-the acceptance of the United
States (with qualifications) of the principle of nonintervention at the
Montevideo Conference in 1933, or the signing of the League of
Nations sponsored Convention for the Definition of Aggression in
London during the same year.262  Nor should the show put on in the
United Nations organization mislead anybody. "Today everyone
still persists in asserting that nations must not intervene in the in-
ternal affairs of other nations, and governments continue to accept
this principle as law, . . . but in regard to the fundamental and dra-
matic issues of political change, there is no indication that these prin-
ciples have much relation to the conduct of nations. 268  Not only
the super-sovereign powers are apt to intervene in other states' af-
fairs shielded by the power of veto in the Security Council. The semi-
sovereign, medium and small powers are also inclined to play the
game if only they can avoid the censure of the superpowers. On vari-
ous grounds, immune against judicial review, it is possible even for
a professedly neutral country like Sweden (which furthermore is
259. PAPADATOS, supra note 251, at 107.
260. PAPADATOS, supra note 251, at 106.
261. By "economic crimes" appears to be meant "toutes les activit~s pouvant
compromettre directement ou indirectement l'ordre 6conomique et la r~alisation
des plans quinquennaux." PAPADATOS, supra note 251, at 117.
262. 147 L.N.T.S. 79, 211. The latter said in an annex to Article 3 that no act
of aggression could be justified on the grounds of the internal conditions of a state.
263. Henkin, Force, Intervention and Neutrality in Contemporary International
Law, 1963, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 156.
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allied with Portugal in the European Free Trade Area) to openly
support the formation of rebel movements for warfare in the Portu-
guese territories in Africa.2"' The world has thus grown increas-
ingly "political" in outlook and states are increasingly mutually hos-
tile. Indeed, in reference to the progressive parcellisation of the
world, one may say that its hostilities now multiply by division.
In such an atmosphere, it is, misleading to view criminality in
general and hijackings in particular only in the context of grave
offences which it is the common interest of all nations to suppress.
Too often foreign crime is viewed as a national asset to be encouraged
rather than suppressed. It is, in particular, considered of benefit to
one state to lure defectors from another state and it is logical to offer
such defectors asylum. It cannot then be avoided that even the tak-
ing of ships or aircraft in the course of such defections is over-
shadowed by the political context. Indeed, it was a hijacking case
which brought the change out into the open.
On October 17, 1951, a Yugoslav airliner was hijacked in flight
betwen Ljubljana and Belgrade by one of its pilots co-operating
with one of the passengers. Having forced the radio operator to con-
tinue regular traffic and having fired a gun at the mechanic to keep
him out of the cockpit, they flew the aircraft to Zurich-Kloten in
Switzerland. Yugoslavia demanded their extradition and could hope
for a favourable reply under a strict interpretation of the Serbian-
Swiss extradition treaty of November 28, 1887.2 15
Swiss extradition practice is not without international importance.
Even the leading British international law textbook admits that "the
firm attitude" of Switzerland contributed to the result that the princi-
ple of non-extradition of political criminals "conquered the world."26
The nation's importance has not been diminished by the fact that it
has remained aloof to the invitation to join the United Nations. The
264. According to a letter of Feb. 6, 1970, received from the Information
Unit of the Swedish International Development Authority, the Swedish Government
has allotted about $90,000 to aid the civilian part of the FRELIMO organization
during each of the accounting years 1968-69 and 1969-70. According to same
letter another rebel movement, PAIGC, in Guinea-Bissay will receive during the
latter accounting year support in the form of goods worth about $200,000.
265. In re Kavic, Bjelanovic and Arsenijevic 78(1) BGE 39; I.L.R. supra
note 254, at 371 (Switzerland, 1952).
266. OPPENHEM 706 f.
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Extradition Act which Switzerland passed in 1892 attempted a new
departure in determining whether a common crime was political or
not. Article 10 of the act refuses to grant political asylum in case the
chief feature of the offense wears more the aspect of an ordinary than
of a political crime,267 but abstains from further definition or de-
scription and leaves the matter with the Federal Tribunal ("Bundes-
gericht," the highest Swiss court). In the hammering out of the
Swiss attitude, and probably with a keen eye toward the anarchist
ways of terrorizing society without wanting to govern it, the Swiss
court had arrived at the rather restricted view that the crime, if po-
litical, must have been committed in the framework of a struggle for
political power and been directed towards the immediate realization
of political ends. 268  Apparently, the hijackers could not meet such
a test. The Court then deviated from the prior case law and empha-
sized the fact that there were states in which all opposition was so
ruthlessly suppressed that there could be no struggle for political
power in the sense of the prior case law and that in such states escape
for political reasons must be equalized with participation in a politi-
cal struggle.
This Swiss case set the pattern for subsequent extradition deci-
sions. The escape of seven members of the crew of a Polish trawler,
fishing in the North Sea, to Whitby, England, in September, 1954,
by means of seizing the vessel, resulted in asylum being granted to
the sailors-although it is not easy to identify the exact grounds for
the court's refusal to extradite. From this case, 69 J.A.C. Gutte-
ridge says, "there has emerged an adaptation of the conception of
an offense of a political nature to the circumstances of a world in
which there exist States where all opposition is so ruthlessly sup-
pressed that there can be no question of two parties in the State in
open competition with each other."2 '  The German Federal Con-
267. Oppenheim, supra note 254, at 709.
268. German original: "[Dass die Handlung in Beziehung zu einer unmittelbar
auf die Verwirklichung gewisser politischer Ziele gerichteten aligemenen Aktion
stehe." Cf. In re Ficorilli, 59(1) BGE 136, 146 (1933), [1933] ANN. DIG. 369;
In re Ockert, 77(1) BGE 57, 62 (1951), 7 I.L.R. 345 (Switzerland, 1951).
269. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte Kolczynski, [1955] 1 All E.R.
31 I.L.R. 240 (1954).
270. J.A.C.G., The notion of Political Offences and the Law of Extradition, 31
BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 430, 434 (1954).
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stitution of 1949 provides (Article 16, paragraph 2) that "the politi-
cally persecuted shall enjoy the right of asylum." On February 4,
1959, the German Constitutional Court was called upon to interpret
this rule in relation to a Yugoslav seeking to avoid extradition to his
home country. (Not without reason since he had, during his so-
journ in West Germany, joined a Royalist Serbian organization, and,
furthermore, co-operated with Wehrmacht during the war.) The
Court found that the protection "is not confined to so-called political
offenders . . . [but] applies also to persons who are being perse-
cuted for non-political offences 'where such persons, if extradited,
would be liable in their home country to suffer measures of persecu-
tion involving danger to life and limb or restrictions of personal lib-
erty for political reasons.' "271
In 1961, however, the Swiss Court retreated slightly in the Ktir
Case272 concerning the extradition of an Algerian rebel who had
murdered a supposed adversary ("traitor"). The gravity of the
crime was heavily weighted, and the Court, failing to find some posi-
tive political interest, held the crime was extraditable. "It had not
been shown that the interests of the FNL were so gravely impaired by
the alleged treason that to 'suppress' him was the only means to
safeguard these interests."
What, then, does the political context, reinforced by the state of
hostility now surveyed, mean to the legal hijacking problem? It may
be wise at first to estimate the relative importance of the political
element. Looking at the nature of hijackings, it is natural to dis-
tinguish between classical robbery, guerilla warfare acts, and escape
cases. The great majority of cases belong to the last category. Even
with due allowance for a great number of mental cases among them,
the hijackers' choice of destination infects all these escape cases with
a political element. The hijackers always select a political adversary
of the state to which the victimized airline belongs. The political
element is therefore one of the most important in the whole hijack-
ing problem.272a
271. 9 BVerfG 174, 180; 28 I.L.R. 347, 349-50 (Germany, 1959).
272. Ktir v. Minist~re Public F6drral, 1961(1) BGE 134 (1961), 34 I.L.R. 143
(Switzerland, 1961).
272a. Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offence Ex-
ception in Tradition-A Proposed Juridical Standard for an Unruly Problem, 19
DE PAUL L. REV. 217 (1969).
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Let us first approach the problem of unlawfulness. It is often as-
sumed-e.g., in the Geneva Convention on the High Seas-that there
exists a body of law common to all nations: indeed the existence of
a world law doctrine of universal application, and that the test of
"unlawfulness" is a mere "technicality. '2 78  Unfortunately, this as-
sumption by no means always holds true. To take such an abstract
view of the requirement of unlawfulness only tends to obscure some
very real conflicts in a world where there is no Full Faith and Credit
Clause to control the attitude of nations towards one another. In
some legal areas the applicable laws are in such direct conflict that
there can be no question of common fight against crime: There is
no area of overlapping penal provisions and no area of double in-
crimination.
This statement calls for examples. An excellent example is pro-
vided by the Tschombe hijacking in 1967. For all that we know,2 74
Tschombe was a murderer and a thief in the eyes of the Algerian
Supreme Court. It is an almost universal rule that persons other
than officials of criminal justice have the right to make an arrest un-
der certain circumstances. In some places, the gravity of the crime
determines a private person's powers of arrest.2 5  In other places,
the existence of a general arrest warrant opens up the opportunity for
private enterprise.2 76  It may be assumed that the Algerian law fol-
lowed similar principles. But if so, the Algerian authorities had every
reason to look favourably upon the hijacker who had upon his own
initiative arrested a murderer and a thief and brought him together
with some of his presumed accomplices-the British pilots-to jus-
273. Cf. the Greek intervention at the Geneva Conference, 4 Official Records
84, and the criticism by McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 158, at 811. Compare also
Simonnet, supra note 8, at 159.
274. The extradition proceeding against Tschombe before the Algerian Supreme
Court was secret, the decision was never published, and only more or less informed
press reports as to the views taken are available. See generally KEESING'S CON-
TEMPORARY ARCHIVES 1967 at col. 22.187; TIME MAGAZINE July 28, 1967, at 47.
275. Under § 183 of the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF NEW YORK, a pri-
vate person is allowed to arrest another when the person arrested has committed a
felony. The same rule applies, it would seem, in England. See DEVLIN, THE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND, 14 (London, 1960).
276. The SWEDISH CODE OF PROCEDURE, c. 24, § 7, provides that if a person is
"wanted for an offense" every private person is entitled to apprehend him.
Tschombe was sentenced to death in contumaciam by a Congolese court and pre-
sumably was "wanted" by the Congolese state.
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tice. The hijacking would thus be part of a lawful arrest of a crim-
inal.
It has been countered that "a State's powers of law enforcement
are part of its territorial sovereignty and, like its territorial sover-
eignty, they come to an end at the State's frontiers." The argument
goes on to say that abductions in aeroplanes "are, in principle, no
different from abductions on board ships and are subject to the same
legal rules as if they had occurred on foreign territory. 2 77  Since
the Tokyo Convention, 1963, has destroyed even the very modest at-
tempt made in the Transit Agreement of 1944, to establish some sort
of jurisdictional immunity for aircraft, 78 this argument is more
of an avant garde lawmaking venture than a true rendering of the
law as it stands. The argument also suffers from the failure of
the English law, as interpreted in the R. v. Martin Case, to provide
a complete legal regime for aircraft over the high seas. That may
have made it difficult even for the British to find the Tschombe hi-
jacking criminal.2 79
Consequently, in such areas of direct conflict between two legal
systems, it is impossible to express any opinion of unlawfulness except
in relation to one chosen legal system. This view places a certain
premium upon the state which, for political reasons, is willing to
promulgate, as an accessory to its criminal law, legislation for the cap-
ture of airliners (or people or property in them), outside of the
state's territory. Unless one is prepared to accept the international
sea and the air space above it as an expanse of lawlessness, it seems
hard to deny that this is a theoretical possibility.
Let us now turn to the area of double (multiple) incrimination, that
is to say, where the legal systems involved are overlapping and all
brand the hijacking as criminal conduct. The crime thus created
should, of course, be punished wherever committed and the parcelli-
sation of jurisdiction should not be allowed to disturb the working of
the penal law. Indeed, this is the area of the universal fight against
crime. As a technical matter, however, this fight remains related
to the parcellisation of jurisdiction in a system of concurrent juris-
277. 1967 BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURIsTS No. 32, 24.
278. Supra p. - text.
279. Supra p. - text.
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dictions. The classical and indeed the only practical way to carry it
out, is by application of some variant of the principle aut dedere aut
punire. When the criminal is apprehended, the apprehending gov-
ernment is liable either to extradite him to the country the laws of
which he has violated initially, or to punish him within its own juris-
diction.
At this stage it may be useful to consider briefly how political con-
trol is exercised over law enforcement. In many countries, if not
most, there is something equivalent to the power of the British At-
torney General to enter a nolle prosequi and it is an accepted princi-
ple that the rule is not that the suspected criminal offence should au-
tomatically be the subject of prosecution, but that there should be am-
ple room for considerations affecting public policy.2"' While Swe-
den is one of the relatively few countries which adhere to the opposite
principle, this adherence is more lip service than hard fact. Prosecu-
tion for a crime committed outside of Sweden may-with certain ex-
ceptions-be instituted only pursuant to an order from the King or
from someone authorized by the King to give such order. 28 ' The
very purpose of this provision is to allow considerations of general
policy to prevail.
Returning to the principle aut dedere aut punire it is apparent
that within the sphere of application of that principle there is no
room for any political control over law enforcement. This is what
creates the problem: The state has tied its own hands.
The only system to suppress hijackings which so far has been ad-
vanced up to a signed convention, is the one which is found in the
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 1937
(even though it was never ratified). True, it did not cover all forms
of aerial hijackings, only the most vicious among them,2"2 but it
280. See DEVLIN, supra note 275, at 17-20.
281. PENAL CODE c. 2, §§ 2 & 5.
282. This convention was intended to cover terrorist acts which compromised
the safety of the air traffic of several contracting states, provided that the enterprise
operating the traffic was owned by the state or at least franchised by it. The
greatest limitation of the area of application would seem to follow from the re-
quirement of an intent behind the terrorist act to "create a state of terror in the
minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public" (Art. 1,
para. 2). Outside the area of the guerilla warfare of the Palestinian commandos,
it would seem comparatively rare to find acts of hijacking which are covered by
this requirement. On the scope of the Convention in respect to franchised air ser-
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came to grips, energetically, with the political element in the crime
picture. For this reason it will be more profitable to deal with this
convention than with the draft conventions on aerial hijackings pro-
duced during 1969 and 1970 within the International Civil Aviation
Organization framework as the latter avoids the problem of the pol-
itical element. Under the Terrorism Convention, the terrorist activi-
ties, as defined in the Convention, were to be made extraditable crimes
between the contracting states, but the state asked to extradite was
entitled to add whatever condition or restriction permitted under its
statute, law, or simply in its practice (Article 8). Should extradition
fail by reason of such condition or restriction, the state concerned
undertook to punish the perpetrators of the criminal acts as if they
had been committed within the state territory (Articles 9 & 10).,
Donnedieu de Vabres has characterized the Convention on Ter-
rorism as "r6aliste et transactionnel."2 ss  He based this judgment
on the way in which the political issue was confronted and mastered.
It was anticipated that mutually hostile states participating in this
joint fight against crime, at times, must be very embarrassed. Such
embarassment could easily follow from the hard choice between, in
vices, see Art. 2, para. 2, and the comments thereto by Donnedieu de Vabres, de
Vabres, La Rdpression International du Terrorisme, 1938 REV. DR. INT. Lko. COMP.
37, 46. The IACO draft convention on hijacking proceeded on the assumption that no
absolute obligation to prosecute should be imposed on the contracting states (see
Legal Committee minutes from 17th session, ICAO doc. 8877-LC/161 at 69, cf 51
and 52). At the Hague Diplomatic Conference in December 1970, attempts by, in
particular, the American Delegation to have an absolute obligation to prosecute sub-
stituted for this assumption, finally ended in the compromise 27-nations formula
which recurs in Art. 7 of the Convention for the Supression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft (December 16, 1970): "to submit the case to its competent authorities for
the purpose of prosecution." This formula is believed to move the possible decision
not to prosecute to the level of the grand jury in the United States and to the level
of the Attorney General in England. The formula seems to entail a less strict obli-
gation to prosecute than the formula in Art. 9 of the Terrorism Convention: "shall
be prosecuted and punished in the same manner as if the offence had been commit-
ted on that territory." For some information on the International Air Transport
Association, see e.g. Sheehan, The JATA Traffic Conferences, 7 Sw. L.J. 135-84;
Guinchard, International Air Transport Association, 2 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 606-72 (1956); Rinck, Interessengemeinschaften und Kar-
telle im Luftverkehr, FESTSCHRIFT FbR OTTO RIESE (Karlsruhe, 1964). The
Civil Aeronautics Board attitude to the IATA Conference Resolutions is evidenced
in 1949 U.S. Av.R. 362 and 1950 U.S. Av.R. 310. For a more general critical view
of the organization, see PILLAI, THE AIR NET: THE CASE AGAINST THE WORLD
AvIATION CARTEL (New York, 1969).
283. de Vabres, supra note 282, at 61.
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the case of extradition, "soumettre l'inculp6 'a des juridictions 6trang-
res dont il redoute la partialit6," and, in the case of a domestic trial,
"s'exposer . . . l'alda d'une sentence grosse, peut 8tre, de compli-
cations: acquittement scandaleux, condamnation injustement severe
que dictera h des juges populaires une opinion ignorante et surex-
citde. 2 8 4 The solution provided here-the feature which substantiates
the characterization just made-was the faculty to refer the whole pro-
ceeding to an international penal court, set up under a twin conven-
tion.2 85
Relating this to present day conditions, it may be seen that the
problem has two sides--extradition and domestic trial. As to ex-
tradition, the situation has been surveyed some pages ago, and un-
less the hijacking has included some especially grave crime with vi-
cious motives, most countries which are likely to get involved in this
type of criminality, are inclined to grant asylum. As to punishment,
following trials in the state's own courts, a recent sequence of Euro-
pean cases displays a rising reaction against aerial hijackings. These
cases do not challenge the principle of asylum; they simply set the
penalties. Although they do not relate to a special crime of air hi-
jacking, or air piracy, but rather to a combination of other crimes,
the sentences in them now uniformly reach the level of two years'
imprisonment or more. The Olympic hijackers, Panichi Maurizio
and Giovine Umberto, who forced an Olympic plane to return to
Orly on November 8, 1968, as part of their fight against the Greek
government, were tried by a local French court and found guilty of
intentional violence and illegal possession of firearms and were sen-
tenced to five and eight months' imprisonment, respectively. Only
one year later, hijackers Peter Klemt and Hans Ulrich von Hof, who
forced an aircraft to come down at Tegel airport in the French sector
of Berlin on October 19, 1969, were tried by the French military
court for the French occupation sector, found guilty of having com-
promised the security of the working of an air line, of having en-
dangered the lives of the people on board, and of unlawful coercion,
and were each sentenced, to two years' imprisonment. Subsequently,
284. de Vabres, supra note 282, at 60.
285. Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, 1937, 1938,
REV. DR. INT. LAG. COMP. 68. Cf. Hudson, The Proposed International Criminal
Court, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 549 (1938).
19711
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Romuald Zolotucho and Wieslaw Szymankiewicz, hijacked an air-
craft on November 20, 1969, and forced a landing in Vienna. They
were tried by a local Austrian court, found guilty of similar crimes
under Austrian law, and sentenced to two years, and two years and
three months' imprisonment, respectively.
These cases, however, do not display much of the political ele-
ment. Only in the first French case (the Olympic hijacking) was
there any political agitation in connection with the trial. In an article
in Le Monde of March 24, 1969, the court was criticised by Jean
Paul Sartre and others for collaborating with the Greek "Junta."
As this article appeared after the judgment was rendered, it seems
unlikely that such agitation influenced the rather light sentences.2"8
The central problem with which the drafters of the twin conventions
on terrorism were concerned, is better revealed by the Tsironis Case
in Sweden. This case, thus far, has not yet been brought to trial but
provides nevertheless excellent illustrations of the problems feared.
On August 16, 1969, en route between Athens and Jannina, do-
mestic Olympic DC-3 flight 500/1, under command of Captain
George Georgis, was hijacked by passengers: Dr. Tsironis, his wife,
and their two boys. Tsironis pointed a gun at the pilots and said:
"I am Doctor Tsironis. In the name of freedom and humanity, I
have taken this aircraft and from now on you shall obey to my orders
and to those of my colleagues with regard to the course we are go-
ing to follow." Thereupon Tsironis forced the pilots to land in Al-
bania. Being subsequently allowed to leave Albania, Dr. Tsironis
sought entry into Italy and France but was refused. Finally he ar-
rived in Sweden where he received permission to take up residence.
Pursuant to the Swedish Penal Code Chapter 2, § 2, an alien
who has committed a criminal act outside of Sweden which was
punishable under the law in force at the place of the crime, should be
tried according to Swedish law and in a Swedish court, if after hav-
ing committed the crime he has acquired domicile in Sweden; and
even if he is only found in Sweden, provided that in such case the
crime is punishable according to Swedish law by imprisonment for
more than six months. By the very act of seeking sanctuary in Swe-
den, Dr. Tsironis had brought the possibility of prosecution for the
286. See Sartre, Le Monde, March 24, 1969, at -, col. -.
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hijacking upon himself. Although Sweden had nothing to do with
the hijacking as such-it was not the state of registry, not the state
of landing and not the state within which the crime had taken place-
it claimed jurisdiction over the crime committed by way of the hi-
jacking. Inasmuch as jurisdiction is established, the Swedish ex-
perience would seem to be instructive vis-a-vis other cases in which
jurisdiction to prosecute a far away hijacking may be assumed (al-
though pursuant to other rules of jurisdiction and political compli-
cations cloud the horizons).
In order to understand the significance of the Swedish case, it is
necessary to mention briefly the political facts. The political situa-
tion between the victim country in this hijacking, Greece, and Sweden
had at the time of Dr. Tsironis' entry for some years been charac-
terized by an open if not armed hostility. The Swedish ambassador
to Greece had been withdrawn at the same time as the Swedish gov-
ernment had sought other ways to participate actively in Greek politi-
cal life. A Greek politician had been invited to take residence in Swe-
den at the expense of the Swedish government in order to plan and
lead from Sweden the struggle of his political organization in Greece.
It was reported that this activity on Swedish soil even covered resort
to armed force inside Greece. When Dr. Tsironis arrived in Sweden,
he referred to his previous (in fact rather modest) position as a poli-
tician in Greece and asked for treatment similar to that enjoyed by his
predecessor. This request was very favourably received by the Swe-
dish authorities which went to considerable lengths to provide him
with an economic basis in Sweden and to shield him from any ac-
tions by Greek government agents. It appears that Tsironis during
the initial period received about $2,000 per month in support. When
the question was raised whether the hijacking, in view of the Swedish
views of the Swedish criminal jurisdiction, could be left unpunished,
the Chief State Prosecutor, on November 12, 1959, ordered a pre-
liminary police inquiry.
This police inquiry immediately split into two channels. As
to the state of landing, Albania, with which friendly relations were
entertained, the inquiry proceeded by means of diplomatic chan-
nels. They did not yield more, however, than a cable reproduc-
ing the Albanian official news agency's bulletin of the day Tsironis
landed in Albania. Relating to Greece, being the state of registry
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and the locus delicti, with which relations were hostile, it was decided
to avoid the diplomatic channel which would involve political em-
barrassment, as well as the slightly more technical International Civil
Aviation Organization channel. Instead, it was decided to rely on
the Interpol routine which functioned pursuant to the European Con-
vention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, signed in Strass-
bourg on April 20, 1959.287 The local police authority initiated such
a request for assistance on November 27, 1969. The request, after
five months, had produced no results whatsoever. The only evidence
against the hijacker which the Swedish police succeeded in collecting
was a translation of the flight report which had been turned in to the
Air Traffic Department of Olympic Airways by Captain Georgis,
and this piece of evidence was volunteered to the police from private
quarters. It is a fair guess that the very slight Greek response to the
Swedish police requests was connected with Greek realization of
what political embarrassment the situation meant to the Swedish
government. The Greeks were in no way inclined to diminish this
embarrassment.
The result of the inquiry confronts the Swedish law enforcement
agencies with difficult decisions. The Chief State Prosecutor may
decide to drop the case in view of the unsatisfactory evidence, or in
view of the political agitation which may be expected to surround the
trial. If a prosecution is initiated, there is the risk of a scandalous
acquittal. The general public finding it "unfair to proceed against
men who came to Sweden with official help and were treated by the
authorities not as criminals but rather as honoured guests" 288 may
react with indignation to the trial, and even more trouble may lie
ahead if the court bends over backwards and hands down an excessive
sentence.
The Tsironis Case, however, has even greater significance. In re-
sponse to general public opinion in Sweden, the Swedish Foreign
Office has been pursuing a moralizing foreign policy. This has en-
gendered a state of general hostility between Sweden and nations with-
out Socialist leanings. One result of this state of affairs is that the
friends of Sweden's enemies, as conceived by public opinion, are
287. 472 U.N.T.S. 185.
288. Harris, The Swedes and the Sky-Jackers, Daily Telegraph, March 10, 1970,
at 11, col. -.
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sure to find a sanctuary in Sweden. The political conditions of the
world being what they are, many, if not most, hijackings are cases
of escape from non-Socialist countries to Cuba. For economical and
political reasons, however, Cuba is reluctant to harbour all the es-
caping hijackers. It appears that people in Cuba are now realizing
what sanctuary can be offered by Sweden. At least, this is suggested
by the Fuentes Case.
On February 5, 1969, military policeman, Leonardo Dominguez
Fuentes, secured his escape from Colombia to Cuba by hijacking a do-
mestic DC-4 flight of Sociedad Aeronautica Medellin. After three
months in camp in Cuba, he was denied immigration entry. With
Cuban identity papers he was then sent to seek entry in Switzerland
via Prague. Being rejected by the Swiss, he spent the rest of the year
in Prague at the expense of the Cuban consulate and a Latin Ameri-
can Student Organization. When he found out that the Czech au-
thorities probably would send him back to Colombia once the Cuban
consulate decided to support him no more, he flew to Sweden and
asked for asylum on January 18, 1970.
The Fuentes case is very similar to the Tsironis case, the main
difference being that Fuentes does not claim to be a politician and
that the Swedish Foreign Policy has not singled out Colombia as a
chief enemy comparable to Greece. While Tsironis' is an odd case,
however, Fuentes' is not: There are scores of hijackings in Latin
America which have produced closely similar cases. In view of the
idolization of Latin American revolutionaries in Sweden (the Gue-
vara cult) the embarrassment of making Fuentes stand trial in Swe-
den will be the same, if not worse as that which would surround
prosecution of Dr. Tsironis.
But the embarrassment to be felt in connection with the entry of
hijackers is not exclusively a Swedish phenomenon. Other countries
may expect to experience it as well. Italy is on its way to that end
in the Minichiello case. Raphael Minichiello, it will be recalled, was
the U.S. Marine who succeeded, on October 31, 1969, in forcing
Trans World Airlines flight 85 to take him for a 6,900 mile ride to
Rome. Minichiello's deed was immediately exploited locally. Melito
Irpino, Minichiello's Italian home town, made his American counsel
an honorary citizen and film magnate Carlo Pond announced that
he wanted to make a film out of his deed.
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The embarrassment to be expected in such hijacking cases is very
much of the same kind as that which was anticipated by the drafters
of the twin conventions on terrorism of 1937. The Convention on
the Creation of an International Criminal Court was opened to sig-
nature on November 16, 1937. It was signed by twelve European
powers, among them France and the Soviet Union, and by Cuba.2" 9
This court was to be set up for the trial of persons accused of an of-
fence dealt within the Convention on Terrorism. Instead of punish-
ing these offences in its own courts, or extraditing accused persons, a
party to the convention might refer the accused for trial to the court,
but it would be under no obligation to do so. The court was to be
permanent with its seat at the Hague. The court was to consist of five
judges and five deputy judges of different nationality. The judges
would be jurists of competence in criminal law, chosen by the World
Court from among persons nominated by the parties and the regular
term of the judges would be ten years. Only five members of the court
would sit in any case. The Registry of the World Court would be
asked to serve the new court also. The salaries of the judges, on a
fixed scale, would be payable by the states of which they were na-
tionals.
The conflict of laws problems which the court would encounter
were, in so far as punishment was concerned, solved by resort to a
dual system of law: the lex loci delicti and the law of the state which
had committed the accused for trial. In casu, the penalty was to be
controlled by the more leninent of the two systems (Article 21).
Otherwise, the court itself was sole master of the conflict of laws
questions. If this meant the application of a legal system not rep-
resented among the judges on the bench, a consultative assessor spe-
cializing in that system could be joined to the court. Arrest and de-
tention of the accused during trial was decided by the court but exe-
cution was left to the state in which the court was sitting. Letters
rogatory could be sent by the court itself and the court could on its
own motion call witnesses and experts. The costs thus incurred were
to be met by a common fund. Penalties imposed were to be exe-
cuted by the state which the court, at its discretion, had selected for
this purpose, provided that it assented thereto. The same state could
289. Bouzat, Propositions pour la Constitution d'une Cour Pdnale Europdenne,
1967 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PA.NAL, 179.
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pardon the criminal, after consulting with the court. Money re-
ceived by way of fines could be disposed of by the court in its discre-
tion.
The apparent merit of this system of law enforcement lies in the
fact that it establishes a modus vivendi for a world which is more
deeply split than is generally officially acknowledged. It never en-
tered into force, due to the Second World War. After the war, in-
terest has not focused so much on this very practical international
criminal court which was to deal with everyday crimes under na-
tional law, but rather turned towards rather impractical courts for
exceptional crimes of the type with which the multi-national Nurem-
berg Military Tribunal was confronted. It should be recalled, how-
ever, that as late as at the Tenth Congress of International Criminal
Law, in 1969, it was resolved to recommend that disputes relating to
the extradition aspects of international criminal law should "be re-
ferred compulsorily, or at least optionally, to an international criminal
court."' In the context of the upsurge of hijackings with important
political elements involved, I view the creation of an international
criminal court along the lines delineated in the 1937 conventions as
the most promising way to cope with the difficult law enforcement
problem here met. The only hesitation I have, relates to the geo-
graphical jurisdiction of such a court. It may be very impractical to
have only one such court. Even such a worldwide organization as
IATA finds it useful to split the aviation world into three regions; I
believe that one court for each region is a better model to follow.
Once created, of course, an international court of this type could be
charged with other types of business as well. I believe that the de-
velopment of this international court system is the means of effec-
tively dealing with the problems of piracy and hijacking.
290. The idea was presented at the Freiburg Colloquium on Extradition held in
1968 at the Max-Planck Institute for International and Comparative Criminal Law
by Professor Bassiouni. See Bassiouni, International Extradition in the American
Practice and World Public, 36 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1968); Bassiouni, International Ex-
tradition: An American Experience and a Proposed Formula, 3-4 REVUE INTERNA-
TIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 494 (1968), reprinted in 15 WAYNE L. REV. 733 (1969);
Bassiouni, La Estradizione Internazionale: Riassunto della Prassi Americana Contem-
poraneo, ed. uno schema di porposte per il sinnovanmente dell'istituto, 10 RMsTA
DEL DIRITTO MATRIMONIALE E DELLO STATO DELLE PERSONE 418 (1968).
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APPENDIX A
CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT
PREAMBLE
THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION
CONSIDERING that unlawful acts of seizure or exercise of control of aircraft
in flight jeopardize the safety of persons and property, seriously affect the opera-
tion of air services, and undermine the confidence of the peoples of the world in
the safety of civil aviation;
CONSIDERING that the occurrence of such acts is a matter of grave concern;
CONSIDERING that, for the purpose of deterring such acts, there is an urgent
need to provide appropriate measures for punishment of offenders;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE I
Any person who on board an aircraft in flight:
(a) unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation,
seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act, or
(b) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform any
such act
commits an offence (hereinafter referred to as "the offence").
ARTICLE H
Each Contracting State undertakes to make the offence punishable by severe pen-
alties.
ARTiCLE III
1. For the purposes of this Convention, an aircraft is considered to be in flight at
any time from the moment when all its external doors are closed following em-
barkation until the moment when any such door is opened for disembarkation. In
the case of a forced landing, the flight shall be deemed to continue until the com-
petent authorities take over the responsibility for the aircraft and for persons and
property on board.
2. This Convention shall not apply to aircraft used in military, customs or police
services.
3. This Convention shall apply only if the place of take-off or the place of actual
landing of the aircraft on board which the offence is committed is situated outside
the territory of the State of registration of that aircraft; it shall be immaterial
whether the aircraft is engaged in an international or domestic flight.
4. In the cases mentioned in Article V, this Convention shall not apply if the
place of take-off and the place of actual landing of the aircraft on board which the
offence is committed are situated within the territory of the same State where that
State is one of those referred to in that Article.
5. Notwithstanding paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, Articles VI, VII, VIII, and
X shall apply whatever the place of take-off or the place of actual landing of the
420
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aircraft, if the offender or the alleged offender is found in the territory of a State
other than the State of registration of that aircraft.
ARTICLE IV
1. Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to estab-
lish its jurisdiction over the offence and any other act of violence against passen-
gers or crew committed by the alleged offender in connection with the offence, in the
following cases:
(a) when the offence is committed on board an aircraft registered in that State;
(b) when the aircraft on board which the offence is committed lands in its ter-
ritory with the alleged offender still on board;
(c) when the offence is committed on board an aircraft leased without crew to
a lessee who has his principal place of business or, if the lessee has no such place
of business, his permanent residence, in that State.
2. Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the offence in the case where the alleged offender is
present in its territory and it does not extradite him pursuant to Article VIII to any of
the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accord-
ance with national law.
ARTICLE V
The Contracting States which establish joint air transport operating organizations
or international operating agencies, which operate aircraft which are subject to joint
or international registration shall, by appropriate means, designate for each air-
craft the State among them which shall exercise the jurisdiction and have the at-
tributes of the State of registration for the purpose of this Convention and shall give
notice thereof to the International Civil Aviation Organization which shall com-
municate the notice to all States Parties to this Convention.
ARTICLE VI
1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any Contracting State
in the territory of which the offender or the alleged offender is present, shall take
him into custody or take other measures to ensure his presence. The custody and
other measures shall be as provided in the law of that State but may only be con-
tinued for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal or extradition pro-
ceedings to be instituted.
2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary enquiry into the facts.
3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall be as-
sisted in communicating immediately with the nearest appropriate representative of
the State of which he is a naticnal.
4. When a State, pursuant to this Article, has taken a person into custody, it shall
immediately notify the State of registration of the aircraft, the State mentioned in
Article IV, paragraph 1(c), the State of nationality of the detained person and, if
it considers it advisable, any other interested States of the fact that such person is in
custody and of the circumstances which warrant his detention. The State which
makes the preliminary enquiry contemplated in paragraph 2 of this Article shall
promptly report its findings to the said States and shall indicate whether it in-
tends to exercise jurisdiction.
422 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX:337
ARTICLE VII
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall,
if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or
not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their de-
cision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature
under the law of that State.
ARTICLE VIII
1. The offence shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in any
extradition treaty existing between Contracting States. Contracting States undertake
to include the offence as an extraditable offence in every extradition treaty to be
concluded between them.
2. If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional on the existence of
a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Contracting State with
which it has no extradition treaty, it may at its option consider this Convention as
the legal basis for extradition in respect of the offence. Extradition shall be sub-
ject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State.
3. Contracting States which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of
a treaty shall recognize the offence as an extraditable offence between themselves
subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State.
4. The offence shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between Contracting
States, as if it had been committed not only in the place in which it occurred but
also in the territories of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accord-
ance with Article IV, paragraph 1.
ARTICLE IX
1. When any of the acts mentioned in Article I(a) has occurred or is about to
occur, Contracting States shall take all appropriate measures to restore control of
the aircraft to its lawful commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft.
2. In the cases contemplated by the preceding paragraph, any Contracting State in
which the aircraft or its passengers or crew are present shall facilitate the continua-
tion of the journey of the passengers and crew as soon as practicable, and shall
without delay return the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to
possession.
ARTICLE X
1. Contracting States shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in
connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offence and other
acts mentioned in Article IV. The law of the State requested shall apply in all cases.
2. The provisions of paragraph I of this Article shall not affect obligations under
any other treaty, bilateral or multilateral, which governs or will govern, in whole or
in part, mutual assistance in criminal matters.
ARTICLE XI
Each Contracting State shall in accordance with its national law report to the Coun-
cil of the International Civil Aviation Organization as promptly as possible any
relevant information in its possession concerning:
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(a) the circumstances of the offence;
(b) the action taken pursuant to Article IX;
(c) the measures taken in relation to the offender or the alleged offender, and,
in particular, the results of any extradition proceedings or other legal pro-
ceedings.
ARTICLE XII
1. Any dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning the interpreta-
tion or application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation,
shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six
months from the date of the request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree
on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dis-
pute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute
of the Court.
2. Each State may at the time of signature or ratification of this Convention or
accession thereto, declare that it does not consider itself bound by the preceding
paragraph. The other Contracting States shall not be bound by the preceding
paragraph with respect to any Contracting State having made such a reservation.
3. Any Contracting State having made a reservation in accordance with the pre-
ceding paragraph may at any time withdraw this reservation by notification to the
Depositary Governments.
ARTICLE XIII
1. This Convention shall be open for signature at The Hague on 16 December
1970, by States participating in the International Conference on Air Law held at
The Hague from I to 16 December 1970 (hereinafter referred to as The Hague
Conference). After 31 December 1970, the Convention shall be open to all
States for signature in Moscow, London and Washington. Any State which does
not sign this Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3
of this Article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States. Instru-
ments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Gov-
ernments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, which are hereby
designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Convention shall enter into force thirty days following the date of the de-
posit of instruments of ratification by ten States signatory to this Convention which
participated in The Hague Conference.
4. For other States, this Convention shall enter into force on the date of entry
into force of this Convention in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, or
thirty days following the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification or
accession, whichever is later.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding
States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of rat-
ification or accession, the date of entry into force of this Covention, and other
notices.
6. As soon as this Convention comes into force, it shall be registered by the De-
positary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations
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and pursuant to Article 83 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chi-
cago, 1944).
ARTICLE XIV
I. Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by written notification to
the Depositary Governments.
2. Denunciation shall take effect six months following the date on which notifioa-
tion is received by the Depositary Governments.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being duly authorised
thereto by their Governments, have signed this Convention.
DONE at The Hague, this sixteenth day of December, one thousand nine hun-
dred and seventy, in three originals, each being drawn up in four authentic texts in
the English, French, Russian and Spanish languages.
APPENDIX B
May 12, 1971
M. Cherif Bassiouni
Professor of Law
DePaul University
College of Law
25 East Jackson
Chicago, Illinois
Dear Professor Bassiouni:
I enclose a copy of the joint Canadian-U.S. draft convention on concerted
action against states in certain cases of unlawful seizure and unlawful in-
terference with aircraft. I also enclose a copy of the resolution adopted on
October 1 by the ICAO Council instructing the Legal Committee to con-
sider the question of joint action. Our original draft, submitted at the 18th
Legal Committee, and opening statement introducing that draft, other
documentation and report of the 18th Legal Committee on the subject of
joint action can be obtained by writing directly to the International Civil
Aviation Organization in Montreal. In some respects the proceedings at
the 18th Legal Committee are out of date in view of the joint Canadian-
U.S. proposal; however, many of the fundamental questions remain the
same. I regret we do not have copies of the full set of documents of the
18th Legal Committee to send you.
The Legal Subcommittee report, dated 27 April, can also be obtained by
writing to ICAO. It contains a general discussion of the Canadian-U.S.
draft as far as the Subcommittee was able to complete its work. Neither we
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nor the Canadians submitted any position papers as working documents.
Our position is fully set out in the Subcommittee report.
Sincerely yours,
Franklin K. Willis
Attorney
Office of the Legal Adviser
Enclosures:
As stated
APPENDIX C
First resolution adopted by the Council on I October 1970
(LXXJ-6)
THE COUNCIL,
Finding that a heightened threat to the safety and security of international
civil air transport exists as a result of acts of unlawful seizure of aircraft
involving the detention of passengers, crew and aircraft contrary to the
principles of Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention, for international black-
mail purposes, and the destruction of such aircraft;
Recognizing that Contracting States to the Convention on International
Civil Aviation have obligated themselves to ensure the safe and orderly
growth of international civil aviation throughout the world;
Calls upon Contracting States, in order to ensure the safety and security of
international civil air transport, upon request of a Contracting State to
consult together immediately with a view to deciding what joint action
should be undertaken, in accordance with international law, without ex-
cluding measures such as the suspension of international civil air transport
services to and from any State which after the unlawful seizure of an air-
craft, detains passengers, crew or aircraft contrary to the principles of
Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention, for international blackmail purposes,
or any State which, contrary to the principles of Articles 7 and 8 of the
Draft Convention on Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, fails to extradite or
prosecute persons committing acts of unlawful seizure for international
blackmail purposes;
Directs the Legal Committee to consider during its Eighteenth Session, if
necessary by extension of the session, an international convention or other
international instruments:
i) to give effect to the purposes set out in the preceding paragraph;
ii) to provide for joint action by States to take such measures as may be
appropriate in other cases of unlawful seizure; and
iii) to provide for amendment of bilateral air transport agreements of
contracting parties to remove all doubt concerning the authority to
join in taking such action against any State.
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APPENDIX D
Canadian/U.S. Draft
The Governments of Canada and the United States of America each
presented proposals, based on Canadian and United States resolutions
adopted by the ICAO Council on October 1, 1970, to the 18th Session of
the Legal Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organization,
which met at London in September-October 1970. After preliminary
consideration of the two proposals, the Legal Committee decided to estab-
lish a Special Legal Subcommittee to study them in detail.
Representatives of Canada and the United States have met for the pur-
pose of combining the two proposals submitted to the ICAO Legal Com-
mittee with a view to presenting a single joint proposal to the Special
Legal Subcommittee. The combined proposal is in the form of a draft
multilateral convention.
The text of the draft Convention reflects the following essential features
which have been drawn from the two original Canadian and United States
proposals.
The Convention
(1) deals with the question of concerted action in the most serious
types of incidents of aircraft hijacking and unlawful interference with
civil aviation involving breaches of fundamental principles of inter-
national law as expressed in the Tokyo Convention on Offenses and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, the Hague Con-
vention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, and the
draft unlawful interference convention prepared by the ICAO Legal
Committee;
(2) provides for a two-step procedure-initially, a finding of de-
fault followed by, when appropriate, a separate decision on concerted
action;
(3) establishes simplified machinery for the decision-making proc-
ess while preserving emergency procedures for urgent circumstances.
In addition, the Convention:
(a) stipulates that as between parties nothing in existing multi-
lateral and bilateral air transport service agreements shall be consid-
ered incompatible with rights and obligations under the Convention;
(b) provides explicitly that parties shall use their best efforts to
amend any existing bilateral air transport service agreements with states
not parties that may be incompatible with rights and obligations under
the Convention;
(c) provides explicitly that parties shall not conclude any future
multilatral or bilateral air transport agreements incompatible with
rights and obligations under the Convention;
(d) provides that nothing in the Convention shall exclude the right
of a party to suspend air services or to take any other action to preserve
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and promote the safety and security of international civil aviation exer-
cised in accordance with international law.
The text of this draft Convention is as follows:
Article 1
Determination Relating to Detention
1. Whenever a Contracting State which is an interested State has rea-
son to believe that an unlawful seizure of an aircraft has occurred and that
such aircraft, its passengers or crew are being detained within the territory
of another State, it may invoke the provisions of this Article in order to
obtain a determination that such State is in default of its obligations to
facilitate the continuation of the journey of the passengers and crew,
and to return the aircraft to the persons lawfully entitled to possession.
The State alleging default shall be designated the claimant State.
2. The claimant State shall, prior to requesting the convening of a
Commission to determine default, request the State alleged to be in de-
fault to facilitate the continuation of the journey of the passengers and
crew, and to return the aircraft to the persons lawfully entitled to posses-
sion. It shall also notify such State that, in the event of failure to comply
with this request within 24 hours, it may request to con-
vene Commission pursuant to this Convention for the purpose of ob-
taining a determination of default. It shall immediately notify
of this request, who shall transmit the notification to all other Con-
tracting States.
3. The claimant State may, not earlier than 24 hours following the re-
quest referred to in paragraph 2, request ---- to establish and
convene a Commission pursuant to this Convention for the purpose of ob-
taining a determination of default. The Commission shall meet (at
- ) within 72 hours of receipt by of the
claimant State's request.
4. The Commission shall make a determination within (72) hours
after it first meets. It shall report its determination and any other findings
or conclusions it deems appropriate to ---- , who shall transmit
the report to all Contracting States.
Article 2
Determination Relating to Custody, Extradition or Prosecution
1. Whenever a Contracting State which is an interested State has rea-
son to believe that a person has committed
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a) an act of unlawful seizure of an aircraft which has resulted in the
detention of such aircraft, its passengers or crew, or
b) an act of unlawful interference with international civil aviation
which has resulted in the destruction of an aircraft, or death or
physical injury to a person on board,
and that such person is within the territory of another State and that such
State is in default of its obligations to take him into custody or take other
measures to ensure his presence and thereafter to extradite him or submit
the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, it may
invoke the provisions of this Article in order to obtain a determination of
its allegations that such State is in default of such obligations. The State
alleging default shall be designated the claimant State.
2. The claimant State shall, prior to requesting the convening of a
Commission to determine default, request the State alleged to be in default
to take such person into custody or to take other measures to ensure his
presence and thereafter to extradite him or submit the case to its compe-
tent authorities for the purpose of prosection. It shall also notify such
State that in the event of failure to comply with this request within
(30) days it may request ----------- to convene a Commission pur-
suant to this Convention for the purpose of obtaining a determination of
default. It shall immediately notify ------------ of this request, who
shall transmit the notification to all other Contracting States.
3. The claimant State may, not earlier than (30) days following the
request referred to in paragraph 2, request ------------------------ to establish
and convene a Commission pursuant to this Convention for the purpose
of obtaining a determination of default. The Commission shall meet (at
-. within (7) days of receipt by ------------ of the
claimant State's request.
4. The Commission shall make a determination within (30) days after
it first meets. It shall report its determination and any other findings or
conclusion it deems appropriate to ---------------------------------------, who shall
transmit the report to all Contracting States.
Article 3
The Commission
1. Each Contracting State shall, at the time of depositing its instru-
ment of ratification, designate two persons with suitable qualifications and
experience who shall be available to serve on a Commission which may
be established and convened pursuant to Articles 1 or 2. Contracting
States may at any time designate such persons as replacements or fill
vacancies. The names of persons designated shall be transmitted to
2. A Commission shall be composed of seven members drawn from
among the persons designated by Contracting States. Each member of the
Commission shall be from a different State and no member shall be from
either the claimant State or State alleged to be in default. The Commis-
sion shall choose its chairman and establish its rules and procedures.
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3. A determination shall be made by a majority of the members of the
Commission.
Article 4
Concerted Action
1. Any Contracting State which is an interested State may request
- -to convene a meeting of interested and air service States
(at )
a) in the event of a determination of default under Article 1, to take
place within 72 hours;
b) in the event of a determination of default under Article 2, to take
place within (30) days
to decide upon concerted action with respect to the defaulting State. All
interested and air service States shall be entitled to participate in the
meeting.
2. Concerted action pursuant to this Article may include
a) suspension of all international air navigation to and from the de-
faulting State;
b) other measures to preserve and promote the safety and security of
international civil aviation.
3. Any decision on concerted action shall be taken by a majority of
States present and voting, except that any decision involving the suspen-
sion of international air services shall also require a majority of air service
States present and voting. Decisions shall be binding on all Contracting
States entitled to participate in the meeting and recommendatory with re-
spect to non-contracting States entitled to participate in the meeting.
4. The failure of one or more interested or air service States to partici-
pate in a decision on concerted action shall not affect the validity of the
decision.
Article 5
Modification, Suspension or Termination of Concerted Action
1. Any Contracting State which participated at a meeting at which a
decision on concerted action was taken, or the defaulting State, may re-
quest ----------- to convene a meeting for the purpose of modification,
suspension or termination of the concerted action on the grounds that such
action is no longer appropriate or necessary.
2. -------------- shall convene the meeting as soon as practicable.
Participation, voting, and decisions at the meeting shall be as provided in
Article 4.
Article 6
General Provisions
1. Copies of notices, determinations, findings, conclusions and deci-
sions made pursuant to this Convention shall be transmitted to all States
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Parties to the Convention on International Civil Aviation by
2. A State alleged to be in default may submit appropriate documen-
tation and make oral statements before a Commission established pursuant
to this Convention. No State determined to be in default shall be entitled
to participate in a meeting convened under Articles 4 or 5.
Article 7
Other International Agreements
1. As between Contracting States the provisions of any multilateral or
bilateral air transport service agreement to which they are parties shall
not be considered incompatible with and shall not affect any determination
or decision made pursuant to this Convention.
2. Contracting States undertake to use their best efforts to amend any
bilateral air transport service agreement with a non-Contracting State
which may be incompatible with the provisions of this Convention.
3. Contracting States undertake not to become parties to any multi-
lateral or bilateral air transport service agreement which is incompatible
with the provisions of this Convention.
4. The provisions of this Convention shall not exclude the right of a
Contracting State to suspend air services or to take any other action to
preserve and promote the safety and security of international civil avia-
tion exercised in accordance with international law.
Article 8
Scope and Definitions
1. For the purposes of this Convention the expression:
a) "interested State" means
(1) in Articles 1 and 4(1) (a), the State of registration or
operation of the aircraft being detained and any State
whose nationals are being detained;
(2) in Articles 2 and 4(1)(b), the State of registration or
operation of the aircraft and
(i) in the case of unlawful seizure of the aircraft, any
State whose nationals were detained
(ii) in the case of unlawful interference with the air-
craft, the State within whose territory the unlawful
interference took place and any State whose na-
tional has suffered death or physical injury as a re-
sult of the unlawful interference;
b) "air service State" means any State which has an intentional air
service with a State determined to be in default under Articles 1
or 2 and any State with which a State determined to be default
under Articles 1 or 2 has an international air service;
whether or not such a State is a party to this Convention.
2. The State of operation of an aircraft refers to the State in which the
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lessee of an aircraft leased without crew has his principal place of busi-
ness or, if the lessee has no such place of business, his permanent resi-
dence.
3. This Convention shall not apply to aircraft used in military, customs,
or police services.
APPENDIX E
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 286 (1970)*
Adopted September 9, 1970
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
Gravely concerned at the threat to innocent civilian lives from the hijack-
ing of aircraft and any other interference in international travel,
Appeals to all parties concerned for the immediate release of all passen-
gers and crews without exception, held as a result of hijackings and
other interference in international travel,
Calls on states to take all possible legal steps to prevent further hijackings
or any other interference with international civil air travel.
APPENDIX F
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION 2645 (XXV)**
Adopted November 25, 1970
AERIAL HIJACKING OR INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL AIR TRAVEL
The General Assembly,
Recognizing that international civil aviation is a vital link in the promo-
tion and preservation of friendly relations among states and that its safe
and orderly functioning is in the interest of all peoples,
Gravely concerned over acts of aerial hijacking or other wrongful inter-
ference with civil air travel,
Recognizing that such acts jeopardize the lives and safety of the passen-
gers and crew and constitute a violation of their human rights,
* 63 DEPT. OF STATE BULLETIN 341, at 342 (1970); 9 INT. LEGAL MATERIALS
1291 (1970).
** Doc. A/RES/2645 (XXV); U. N. Press Release GA/4355 (Dec. 17, 1970),
Pt. VIII, at 20; 64 DEPT. OF STATE BULLETIN 32 (1971); 9 INT. LEGAL MATERIALS
1288 (1970).
1971] 431
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Aware that international civil aviation can only function properly in
conditions guaranteeing the safety of its operations and the due exercise of
the freedom of air travel,
Endorsing the solemn declaration' of the extraordinary session of the
Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization held at Mont-
real from 16 to 30 June 1970,
Bearing in mind General Assembly Resolution 2552 (XXIV) of 12
December 1969, and Security Council Resolution 286 (1970) of 9 Sep-
tember 19702 adopted by consensus at the 1552nd meeting of the Council,
1. Condemns, without exception whatsoever, all acts of aerial hijack-
ing or other interference with civil air travel, whether originally national
or international, through the threat or use of force, and all acts of violence
which may be directed against passengers, crew and aircraft engaged in,
and air navigation facilities and aeronautical communications used by,
civil air transport;
2. Calls upon states to take all appropriate measures to deter, pre-
vent or suppress such acts within their jurisdiction, at every stage of the
execution of those acts, and to provide for the prosecution and punishment
of persons who perpetrate such acts, in a manner commensurate with the
gravity of those crimes, or, without prejudice to the rights and obligations
of states under existing international instruments relating to the matter, for
the extradition of such persons for the purpose of their prosecution and
punishment;
3. Declares that the exploitation of unlawful seizure of aircraft for the
purpose of taking hostages is to be condemned;
4. Declares further that the unlawful detention of passengers and crew
in transit or otherwise engaged in civil air travel is to be condemned as
another form of wrongful interference with free and uninterrupted air
travel;
5. Urges states to the territory of which a hijacked aircraft is diverted
to provide for the care and safety of its passengers and crew and to enable
them to continue their journey as soon as practicable and to return the
aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession;
6. Invites states to ratify or accede to the Convention on Offences and
Certain Other Acts committed on Board Aircraft signed at Tokyo on 14
September 1963,3 in conformity with the Convention;
7. Requests concerted action on the part of states, in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, towards suppressing all acts which
jeopardize the safe and orderly development of international civil air trans-
port;
8. Calls upon states to take joint and separate action, in accordance
with the Charter, in co-operation with the United Nations and the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization to ensure that passengers, crew and
aircraft engaged in civil aviation are not used as a means of extorting ad-
vantage of any kind;
1. International Civil Aviation Organization, Resolutions adopted by the As-
sembly, Seventeenth Session (Extraordinary) (Montreal, 1970), Res. A17-1; re-
printed infra, at 452.
2. Reprinted supra.
3. 704 U. N. TREATY SERIES, No. 10106 (1969); 58 A.J.I.L. 566 (1964).
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9. Urges full support for the current efforts of the International Civil
Aviation Organization towards the development and co-ordination, in ac-
cordance with its competence, of effective measures in respect of inter-
ference with civil air travel;
10. Calls upon states to make every possible effort to achieve a suc-
cessful result at the diplomatic conference to convene at The Hague in De-
cember 1970 for the purpose of the adoption of a convention on the un-
lawful seizure of aircraft, so that an effective convention may be brought
into force at an early date.4
The General Assembly, without a vote, took note of the following state-
ment contained in the report of the Sixth Committee:
"It was agreed in the Committee that the adoption of the draft resolution
cannot prejudice any international legal rights or duties of states under
instruments relating to the status of refugees and stateless persons."
APPENDIX G
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
ASSEMBLY DECLARATION*
Adopted June 30, 1970
WHEREAS international civil air transport helps to create and preserve
friendship and understanding among the peoples of the world and pro-
motes commerce between nations;
WHEREAS acts of violence directed against international civil air transport
and airports and other facilities used by such air transport jeopardize
the safety thereof, seriously affect the operation of international air
services and undermine the confidence of the peoples of the world in the
safety of international civil air transport; and
WHEREAS Contracting States, noting the increasing number of acts of vio-
lence against international air transport, are gravely concerned with
the safety and security of such air transport;
THE ASSEMBLY:
CONDEMNS all acts of violence which may be directed against aircraft,
aircraft crews and passengers engaged in international civil air trans-
port;
CONDEMNS all acts of violence which may be directed against civil avia-
tion personnel, civil airports and other facilities used by international
civil air transport;
4. See above, p. 440.
* Res. A17-1, ICAO Assembly, 17th Sess. (Extraordinary), June 16-30, 1970;
63 DEPT. OF STATiE BULLEIN 302, at 303 (1970); 9 INT. LEoAL. MATERIALS 1275
(1970).
434 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX:337
URGENTLY
CALLS UPON states not to have recourse, under any circumstances, to acts
of violence directed against international civil air transport and airports
and other facilities serving such transport;
URGENTLY
CALLS UPON STATES, pending the coming into force of appropriate inter-
national conventions, to take effective measures to deter and prevent
such acts and to ensure, in accordance with their national laws, the
prosecution of those who commit such acts;
ADOPTS THE FOLLOWING DECLARATION:
The Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization,
Meeting in Extraordinary Session to deal with the alarming increase in
acts of unlawful seizure and of violence against international civil air
transport aircraft, civil airport installations and related facilities,
Mindful of the principles enunciated in the Convention on Interna-
tional Civil Aviation,
Recognizing the urgent need to use all of the Organization's resources to
prevent and deter such acts,
SOLEMNLY
(1) Deplores acts which undermine the confidence placed in air trans-
port by the peoples of the world.
(2) Expresses regret for the loss of life and injury and damage to im-
portant economic resources caused by such acts.
(3) Condemns all acts of violence which may be directed against air-
craft, crews and passengers engaged in, and against civil aviation
personnel, civil airports and other facilities used by, international
civil air transport.
(4) Recognizes the urgent need for a consensus among states in order
to secure widespread international co-operation in the interests of
the safety of international civil air transport.
(5) Requests concerted action on the part of states towards suppressing
all acts which jeopardize the safe and orderly development of
international civil air transport.
(6) Requests application, as soon as possible, of the decisions and
recommendations of this Assembly so as to prevent and deter such
acts.
COUNCIL RESOLUTION
Adopted October 1, 1970*
THE COUNCIL
Finding that a heightened threat to the safety and security of interna-
* DEPT. OF STATE BULLETIN 449, at 453 (1970); 9 INT. LEGAL MATERIALS 1286
(1970).
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tional civil air transport exists as a result of acts of unlawful seizure of air-
craft involving the detention of passengers, crew and aircraft contrary to
the principles of Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention, for international
blackmail purposes, and the destruction of such aircraft;
Recognizing that Contracting States to the Convention on International
Civil Aviation have obligated themselves to ensure the safe and orderly
growth of international civil aviation throughout the world;
Calls upon Contracting States, in order to ensure the safety and security
of international civil air transport, upon request of a Contracting State to
consult together immediately with a view to deciding what joint action
should be undertaken, in accordance with international law, without ex-
cluding measures such as the suspension of international civil air transport
services to and from any state which after the unlawful seizure of an air-
craft, detains passengers, crew or aircraft contrary to the principles of
Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention, for international blackmail pur-
poses, or any state which, contrary to the principles of Articles 7 and 8 of
the Draft Convention on Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, fails to extradite or
prosecute persons committing acts of unlawful seizure for international
blackmail purposes;
Directs the Legal Committee to consider during its Eighteenth Session,
if necessary by extension of the session, an international convention or
other international instruments:
i) to give effect to the purposes set out in the preceding paragraph;
ii) to provide for joint action by states to take such measures as
may be appropriate in other cases of unlawful seizure; and
iii) to provide for amendment of bilateral air transport agreements of
contracting parties to remove all doubt concerning the authority
to join in taking such action against any state.
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